Opinion
No. 37868
Decided April 3, 1967.
Actions — Personal injury and property damage resulting from same tort — Single cause of action arises — Personal injury to minor — Parent's claim for medical expenses separate cause — Assignment to insurance company — Action by insurance company.
1. Where one person suffers both personal injury and property damage as a result of the same wrongful act, only a single cause of action arises in favor of such person.
2. A parent's claim for medical expenses which he is obligated to pay for his minor child as a result of the wrongful act of another constitutes a separate cause of action, independent of such minor's claims for damages for personal injury.
3. A claim for medical expenses as a result of a wrongful act in an automobile accident, may be assigned to an insurance company which has paid such medical expenses under the medical payment provisions of a policy of insurance on a motor vehicle.
4. An insurance company which in compliance with its contract of insurance on a motor vehicle has taken an assignment to a claim for medical expenses incurred on behalf of a minor from the parent of said minor obligated to pay such expenses, may prosecute an independent action for such expenses against a defendant wrongfully causing injury to such minor independent of the minor's action to recover damage for personal injuries.
Messrs. Smith, Renner, Hanhart Miller, for plaintiff.
Messrs. Day, Ketterer, Raley, Wright Rybolt, for defendant.
On June 21, 1966, the plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant for property damages and medical expenses which it claims it paid growing out of an automobile accident which occurred on January 23, 1964. It claims it had insured a Chevrolet automobile owned by William A. Smith for property damage and medical expenses of passengers which it became obligated to pay under said contract for property damages to its insured's automobile and for medical expenses for passengers who were injured while riding in said automobile.
The defendant, John T. Godfrey, claimed to have been operating a 1963 Pontiac Coupe Sedan on the day in question, is alleged to have been negligent in the operation of said automobile and that this alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the collision when the automobile which the defendant was driving collided with the automobile of William A. Smith.
In its first cause of action the plaintiff seeks to recover $750.52 which it paid to William A. Smith for property damage to said William A. Smith's automobile.
In its second cause of action it seeks to recover the sum of $52.00 for medical expenses which it paid to said William A. Smith, father of and on behalf of Jennifer Smith, a minor who is alleged to have been riding as a passenger in Smith's automobile at the time of the accident and was injured, under the medical payments coverage provision in its policy to William A. Smith.
In its third cause of action it seeks to recover the sum of $1557.50 for hospital and medical expenses which it paid to Mr. and Mrs. Albert Sciarini, parents of and on behalf of Priscilla M. Sciarini, a minor who is also claimed to have been injured while riding as a passenger in Smith's automobile at the time of the collision, under the medical payments coverage provision in its policy to William A. Smith.
The defendant has filed a demurrer to the second and third causes of action on the ground that the plaintiff is attempting to split a cause of action for personal injuries and that is the matter now before the court.
In its petition the plaintiff claims that under its policy of insurance and by assignment of the parties involved it became subrogated to the rights of the parties against the defendants of such hospital and medical expenses.
According to the records of this court, the said Priscilla Sciarini, a minor, filed an action in case No. 38173 for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of said collision against the defendant in this action on July 18, 1966. This case was settled and dismissed on October 10, 1966.
In Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375, it is held that as a result of the same wrongful act, only a single cause of action arises in favor of such person, but in this case it was also held that a defendant could waive the rule against splitting such a cause of action.
The present doctrine in Ohio and other jurisdictions seems to be that a subrogated insurance company is entitled to sue in its own name for the part of a claim for damages arising out of an accident which has been assigned to it under a subrogation agreement and this is true whether it is a subrogated right for property damages or for hospital and medical expense. ( Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lutz, 3 Ohio Misc. 144; Smith v. Motor Club, 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A.2d 37.)
Generally a minor may not combine an action for both physical injury and medical expenses. Two separate causes of action may exist in such a situation. One by the minor itself, and the other by the parent for medical expenses he was obligated to pay.
The same rule applies to a wife who has sustained physical injury. The husband may have a separate cause of action for hospital and medical expenses for which he is liable for his wife, separate and apart from the wife's claim for physical injury.
The court must conclude that the question of splitting causes of action is not involved in this case.
William A. Smith, if he had not made an assignment of his rights to the plaintiff, would have a separate cause of action against the defendant for property damage to his automobile and for medical expenses which he was obligated to pay for his minor daughter, independent of other claims. Mr. and Mrs. Albert Sciarini, likewise, would have a cause of action against the defendant for medical expenses which they were obligated to pay for their minor daughter independent of said minor daughter's claim for personal injury. The settlement of the daughter's claim could not affect their right to recover for such expenses.
It will therefore be held that the demurrer be overruled.
Demurrer overruled.