Opinion
W.C. No. 4-785-525.
November 18, 2011.
FINAL ORDER
The respondent, MKBS, LLC d/b/a Metro Taxi (Metro Taxi), seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Cain (ALJ) dated May 25, 2011, that denied its petition to reopen. We affirm.
The issues presented for review arise from a complex procedural history involving two separate claims filed by the same claimant. Because an understanding of this history is necessary to resolve the issues on appeal, we review it here. On February 8, 2009, the claimant sustained serious injuries while operating a taxi cab under a lease agreement with Metro Taxi. The driver of a stolen vehicle broadsided the claimant while he was driving a taxi pursuant to a Taxicab Operation Agreement (Agreement) with Metro Taxi.
As pertinent here, pursuant to the Agreement, the claimant and Metro Taxi acknowledge and agree that the claimant is not an employee of Metro Taxi, but, rather, is an independent contractor. The Agreement also provides that the claimant acknowledges that he is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Metro Taxi's Records Submission Exhibit B at 8.
The claimant subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Metro Taxi. On March 17, 2009, the claimant filed an application for hearing against Metro Taxi as the employer and Pinnacol Assurance (Pinnacol) as the insurer. Pinnacol's Hearing Exhibits, Exhibit B.
A prehearing conference was held. On April 30, 2009, the prehearing ALJ issued an order, granting the parties' joint motion to dismiss Pinnacol as a party. In the order, the prehearing ALJ specifically noted that "Metro Taxi acknowledged at the Prehearing Conference that Pinnacol Assurance did not insure Metro Taxi's taxi cab drivers on the date of Claimant's alleged work injury." Thus, the prehearing ALJ ruled that even if the claimant was determined to be an employee of Metro Taxi that Pinnacol had no liability under the claim, and Pinnacol, therefore, was dismissed as a party, without prejudice.
Thereafter, on October 27, 2009, a hearing was conducted before ALJ Friend on the issues of compensability, whether the claimant was Metro Taxi's employee or an independent contractor under the lease agreement, average weekly wage, temporary total disability benefits, and a penalty based on Metro Taxi's failure to carry workers' compensation insurance. The claimant and Metro Taxi participated in this hearing, but Pinnacol did not appear.
On November 12, 2009, ALJ Friend issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In his order, ALJ Friend found that at the time of the claimant's accident, Metro Taxi had a policy with AIG that covered the claimant, but that it did not provide similar coverage to a workers' compensation policy, § 8-40-301(6), C.R.S. ALJ Friend implicitly ruled that at the time of his accident, the claimant was an "employee" of Metro Taxi rather than an independent contractor. ALJ Friend awarded the claimant ongoing temporary total disability benefits based on an average weekly wage of $550, subject to a 50% increase because Metro Taxi was uninsured. ALJ Friend also awarded the claimant reasonable and necessary medical benefits. Metro Taxi's Records Submissions Exhibit K at 55-61.
Metro Taxi then appealed ALJ Friend's November 12, 2009, order. In a Final Order dated May 3, 2010, the Panel affirmed ALJ Friend's order. Relying on USF Distribution Services, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 111 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2004) and Gebrekidan v. MKBS, LLC, W.C. No. 4-678-723 (May 10, 2007), the Panel held that ALJ Friend correctly ruled that the claimant was Metro Taxi's employee rather than an independent contractor because the AIG policy did not provide similar coverage to a workers' compensation policy as required under § 40-11.5-102(5)(a), C.R.S., § 8-40-301(5) (6), C.R.S., and § 8-40-202(2)(c), C.R.S. The Panel also affirmed ALJ Friend's assessment of the 50% penalty for Metro Taxi's failure to carry workers' compensation insurance. No further appeal was taken from the Panel's order.
Thereafter, on April 1, 2010, the claimant filed an application for hearing demanding coverage under Metro Taxi's workers' compensation policy issued by Pinnacol. The sole issue that the claimant endorsed for hearing was "Coverage under Insurer's Policy." The claimant did not seek any specific benefits against either Metro Taxi or Pinnacol. Pinnacol then filed a summary judgment motion against both Metro Taxi and the claimant. In its summary judgment motion against Metro Taxi, Pinnacol argued, in part, that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred any claims against Pinnacol. In its summary judgment motion against the claimant, Pinnacol argued, in part, that the claimant waived any claims he may have against Pinnacol and that the claimant's claim is barred by the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.
On June 28, 2010, ALJ Friend granted Pinnacol's summary judgment motion against Metro Taxi, but denied Pinnacol's summary judgment motion against the claimant. In his order, ALJ Friend ruled that issue preclusion did not apply to the claimant's assertion that Pinnacol insured Metro Taxi and, therefore is liable for the claimant's injuries. ALJ Friend ordered that the matter would proceed to hearing involving the claimant and Pinnacol, but that Metro Taxi was not a party in interest at the hearing and would not participate in the hearing.
Subsequently, the claimant proceeded against Pinnacol at hearing regarding insurance coverage. On September 3, 2010, ALJ Friend entered an order finding that the claimant was covered by the insurance policy issued by Pinnacol to Metro Taxi. ALJ Friend ruled that "[t]he coverage afforded by workers' compensation insurance policies is coextensive only with the employer's liability in the operations covered by the policy or some naturally connected business." ALJ Friend reasoned that the claimant was injured while driving a taxi, and that taxi driving is an operation or a "naturally connected" business that is not separate from a taxi service. As such, ALJ Friend ordered that the claimant was covered under the insurance policy issued by Pinnacol to Metro Taxi. Metro Taxi's Records Submission Exhibit J at 45-50.
Metro Taxi appealed ALJ Friend's September 3, 2010, order. On November 17, 2010, the Panel dismissed the appeal, without prejudice, ruling that ALJ Friend's order did not grant or deny any benefit or penalty and, therefore, was not final and appealable under § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S.
Metro Taxi then filed a petition to reopen based on error and mistake. In its petition, Metro Taxi argued that because it was insured under a workers' compensation insurance policy issued by Pinnacol that was effective on the date of the claimant's injury, ALJ Friend's order dated November 12, 2009, was in error and the case must be reopened. Metro Taxi further alleged that it is not liable for workers' compensation benefits payable to the claimant, and that ALJ Friend's November 12, 2009, order must be vacated and an order be entered requiring Pinnacol to pay the claimant's workers' compensation benefits.
Thereafter, on May 25, 2011, ALJ Cain entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, denying Metro Taxi's petition to reopen. ALJ Cain found that "all of the relevant legal principles and facts that support [Metro Taxi's] petition to reopen were known or should have been known to [Metro Taxi] by the exercise of due diligence prior to the hearing on October 27, 2009, and prior to issuance of the November 12, 2009 order." ALJ Cain found that despite this, Metro Taxi did not raise the legal and factual arguments until after ALJ Friend's November 12 order became final. ALJ Cain concluded that by October 27, 2009, Metro Taxi "knew, or should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, all the facts and law that it now cites as the basis for reopening. ALJ Cain also concluded that from September 2004, the date Metro Taxi applied to Pinnacol for workers' compensation insurance, through the renewal of the policy in September 2008, Metro Taxi made clear that it desired coverage for office workers, sales persons, and garage workers but not for taxi cab drivers. ALJ Cain found that consistent with Metro Taxi's wishes, Pinnacol's insurance policy never listed taxi cab drivers as covered employees, and Metro Taxi never paid a premium for the coverage of such drivers. Order at 1-16.
Metro Taxi now appeals ALJ Cain's order denying its petition to reopen.
I.
Initially, we address Pinnacol's contention that ALJ Cain's order is interlocutory and not reviewable. Pinnacol reasons that ALJ Cain's order did not grant or deny any benefit, nor did it grant or deny any penalty. We disagree.
Section § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. provides that a dissatisfied party may file a petition to review any order which requires a party to pay benefits or a penalty or denies the claimant any benefit or penalty. Consequently, an order must satisfy the finality criteria set forth in that statute or we lack jurisdiction. See Ortiz v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo. App. 2003) (final order grants or denies benefits or penalties).
Here, contrary to Pinnacol's argument, we conclude that ALJ Cain's order is final and reviewable. In his order, ALJ Cain denied Metro Taxi's petition to reopen to shift liability to Pinnacol to pay the claimant's workers' compensation benefits. Thus, the substantive effect of ALJ Cain's order is to require Metro Taxi to continue paying the claimant the specific medical and temporary workers' compensation benefits that previously were awarded. As detailed above, these benefits include medical benefits and temporary total disability based on an average weekly wage of $550, subject to a 50% increase because Metro Taxi was uninsured. Section 8-43-301(2), C.R.S.; see Ontiveros v. Gallegos Corp., W.C. No. 4-575-790 (July 21, 2006)(ALJ's order requires respondents to pay further specific medical benefits and is final for purposes of review). Additionally, if we were to hold that ALJ Cain's order is not final and reviewable, then Metro Taxi would have no other recourse for review of such order. Consequently, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review ALJ Cain's order.
II.
On review, Metro Taxi argues that ALJ Cain abused his discretion in denying its petition to reopen. We disagree.
Section 8-43-303, C.R.S. provides that an award may be reviewed and reopened "on the ground of fraud, an overpayment, an error, a mistake, or a change in condition. . . . "The reopening authority is permissive and is in the sound discretion of the administrative law judge. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo. App. 2002). The party seeking to reopen an award bears the burden of proof to establish the appropriate grounds to reopen. Section 8-43-303(4), C.R.S.
Reopening based on mistake is left to the sound discretion of the ALJ, and we may not interfere with the ALJ's decision unless an abuse of discretion shown. Renz v. Larimer County School District Poudre R-1, 924 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). An abuse of discretion does not exist unless the order is beyond the bounds of reason, as where it is contrary to law or not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Pizza Hut v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 18 P.3d 867 (Colo. App. 2001).
When a party seeks to reopen based on mistake, the ALJ must determine "whether a mistake was made, and if so, whether it is the type of mistake which justifies reopening" the claim. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 646 P.2d 399, 400 (Colo. App. 1981). When evaluating whether a mistake justifies reopening, the ALJ may consider whether the mistake could have been rectified or avoided by the timely exercise of a party's rights prior to closure of the claim. A petition to reopen need not be granted where it is used as a method of circumventing the ordinary adjudicative and appellate processes available prior to closure. Industrial Commission v. Cutshall, 164 Colo. 240, 433 P.2d 765 (1967); Klosterman v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 873 (Colo. App. 1984); Department of Agriculture v. Wayne, 30 Colo. App. 311, 493 P.2d 683 (1971).
A.
Metro Taxi specifically argues that the mandates of Colorado Workers' Compensation Act (Act) "support the theory that no limitations should be placed on the insurance policy beyond those allowed by statute, and there is no statutory authority for excluding certain classes of employees within an employer's business from coverage." Metro Taxi's Brief at 6. Metro Taxi therefore contends that the policy that Pinnacol issued to Metro Taxi requires payment of benefits to any employee of Metro Taxi once liability is established under the Act. Consequently, Metro Taxi asserts that ALJ Cain abused his discretion by denying its petition to reopen to shift liability to Pinnacol to pay the claimant's workers' compensation benefits. We disagree.
Under the Act, it is the responsibility of the employer to secure compensation for all employees. Section 8-44-101, C.R.S. The employer is allowed under the Act to accomplish this in different ways, including securing an insurance policy. The contract for insurance is subject to the Act, and the policy must meet certain requirements to insure that proper coverage for liability is established under the Act. Section 8-44-102, C.R.S.
Moreover, in Colorado it is the insurance policy, rather than the liability of the insured employer that measures the liability of the insurer. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Turkey Creek Stone, Clay Gypsum, 75 Colo. 611, 227 P. 569 (Colo. 1924); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Dean, 689 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App. 1984).
If an employer fails to procure workers' compensation insurance as required under the Act, then § 8-43-408, C.R.S. provides a remedy for the claimant. Section 8-43-408(1), C.R.S. specifically provides that the employee may claim the compensation and benefits provided in said articles, and the amounts of compensation or benefits provided in said articles shall be increased fifty percent. See Merchants Oil, Inc. v. Anderson, 897 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1995) (additional compensation in the amount of 50% awarded when employer neglects or refused to purchase workers' compensation insurance).
Here, we conclude that the Act does, in fact, require employers to secure compensation for all of its employees. Despite Metro Taxi's argument to the contrary, however, the remedy for the failure to secure such compensation is not placed upon an insurer who has contracted with the employer only to cover some, but not all, employees. Rather, the remedy for the failure to secure such compensation is for the claimant to recover such compensation and benefits from the employer plus an additional 50%. Section 8-43-408, C.R.S. We perceive no basis upon which to impose an independent liability on Pinnacol to provide workers' compensation benefits for employees who specifically were excluded under its policy with Metro Taxi. This is particularly true in light of the fact that Metro Taxi failed to pay premiums for such coverage. In particular, at the hearing before ALJ Cain, the underwriter for Pinnacol testified that if the Pinnacol policy had covered taxi cab drivers, Metro Taxi would have paid a premium which was a much higher rate due its exposure. The underwriter testified that the premium would have been $6.84 per $100 of payroll. Tr. (5/11/11) at 214-215. Thus, contrary to Metro Taxi's argument, there is no provision in the Act which requires an insurer to provide workers' compensation coverage for all employees of an employer when the employer has failed to contract with the insurer for such coverage. Accordingly, we conclude that ALJ Cain did not abuse his discretion in denying Metro Taxi's petition to reopen to shift liability to Pinnacol on this ground.
B.
Next, Metro Taxi contends that ALJ Cain abused his discretion in leaving it without a remedy for obtaining the coverage that it allegedly is entitled to receive under the Pinnacol policy. Metro Taxi reasons that ALJ Cain's ultimate decision to deny reopening flows from his alleged erroneous factual finding that taxi cab drivers are not covered employees under the Pinnacol policy. According to Metro Taxi, ALJ Cain does not explain how the finding of covered employees can be justified in light of the Pinnacol policy that contracts with its policyholders to pay their liabilities, nor does he cite any law that would support such findings and conclusions. According to Metro Taxi, it is irrelevant whether the taxi cab drivers were intended to be covered employees under the policy. Again, we disagree with Metro Taxi's arguments.
In State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Dean, 689 P.2d 1146 (Colo.App. 1984), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that it is the workers' compensation policy, rather than the liability of the insured, that measures the liability of the insurer. In Dean, a law firm paid premiums for a workers' compensation insurance policy based on risk in category of employment, including clerical office employees and officers exclusively engaged in office work. The claimant was seriously injured when she fell from the roof of a building owned by Marion St. Group, which was a client of the law firm where the claimant worked. The law firm had directed the claimant to help the contractor in completing repair and renovation work on the building, and she was performing that function when the accident occurred. Neither the contractor nor Marion St. Group had workers' compensation insurance. The claimant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits as an employee of the law firm. The law firm admitted liability. The Colorado Court of Appeals held, however, that the insurance policy did not afford coverage to the law firm. The Court explained that it is the policy, and not the liability of the insured, which measured the insurer's liability. See also Kondracki v. MKBS, W.C. No. 4-782-175 (March 23, 2011) (currently on appeal 11CA0765) (Metro Taxi and Pinnacol did not intend to cover taxi drivers under the workers' compensation policy issued by Pinnacol).
Here, we once again conclude that ALJ Cain did not abuse his discretion in denying Metro Taxi's petition to reopen and concluding that the Pinnacol policy did not cover the claimant. There is substantial evidence supporting ALJ Cain's finding that taxi cab drivers, such as the claimant, specifically were excluded from coverage under the Pinnacol policy, and we are bound by this finding. Section 8-43-301(8). According to the unambiguous terms of the Pinnacol policy, Metro Taxi's taxi cab drivers were not covered. Rather, the Pinnacol policy only covered office employees, outside salespersons, and garage employees. Pinnacol's Hearing Exhibits FF. In addition, evidence before ALJ Cain established that Metro Taxi did not intend for drivers to be covered by the Pinnacol policy. For instance, at the hearing before ALJ Cain, the underwriter for Pinnacol testified that it was her understanding that Metro Taxi was asking her to exclude taxi cab drivers from coverage when giving a quote to Metro Taxi for the premium on the policy. Tr. 5/11/11) at 228-230, 232-233, 235-236. The evidence further demonstrates that Metro Taxi did not pay premiums to Pinnacol to cover its drivers. Instead, Metro Taxi paid premiums to cover its office employees, outside salespersons, and garage employees. The policy reflected the coverage codes for these classes of employees, but not for drivers. Pinnacol's Hearing Exhibits FF at 319; Tr. (5/11/11) at 233-235. The underwriter further testified that if the Pinnacol policy had covered taxi cab drivers, Metro Taxi would have paid a premium which was at a much higher rate due its exposure. The underwriter testified that the premium would have been $6.84 per $100 of payroll. Tr. (5/11/11) at 214-215. Additionally, Metro Taxi was aware of prior litigation involving another taxi driver who was determined to be an employee of Metro Taxi rather than an independent contractor. Metro Taxi's general manager testified that he knew of Gebrekidan v. MKBS, LLC, W. C. No. 4-678-723 (May 10, 2007), and he is familiar with its holding. The general manager testified that the decision in Gebrekidan says that Gebrekidan was an employee of Metro Taxi, and he believes that the reason why Gebrekidan was found by the court to be an employee was that the AIG policy was not equivalent to a workers' compensation policy. Tr. (10/27/09) at 100-102. Were we to hold as urged by Metro Taxi, this would result in coverage for employees for whom Metro Taxi has failed to pay any premiums, and would compel Pinnacol to fulfill a duty for which it did not contract.
Moreover, to the extent Metro Taxi argues that ALJ Cain does not cite to any law to support his findings and conclusions, we disagree. In his order, ALJ Cain does, in fact, cite to applicable and supportive law for his conclusions. ALJ Cain cites the applicable statute governing reopening, § 8-43-303, C.R.S., as well as applicable case law. Order at 9-10. Further, in finding that all relevant legal principles and facts which support Metro Taxi's petition to reopen were known or should have been known by the exercise of due diligence prior to the hearing before ALJ Friend on October 27, 2009, ALJ Cain previously cited to Klosterman v. Industrial Commission, supra, Industrial Commission v. Cutshall, supra, and Department of Agriculture v. Wayne, supra. Order at 10-13. Regardless, the ALJ is not held to a crystalline standard in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo. App. 2000); Welch v. Denver West Remediation Construction LLC, W. C. No. 4-449-365 (April 27, 2004). Additionally, to the extent Metro Taxi complains that ALJ Friend has entered inconsistent orders in finding Metro Taxi uninsured in one case and, therefore, responsible for paying the claimant's workers' compensation benefits, and then in another case finding that Pinnacol is liable for the claimant's benefits, this is not grounds for reversing ALJ Cain's order denying Metro Taxi's petition to reopen. There is no indication in the record that Metro Taxi sought to consolidate the two cases in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent outcomes. Additionally, as detailed above, the evidence supports ALJ Cain's finding that all of the relevant legal principles and facts regarding coverage under the Pinnacol policy were known or should have been known prior to the hearing on October 27, 2009. Despite this, Metro Taxi steadfastly maintained that the claimant was an independent contractor at the time of his injury and, therefore, that the Pinnacol policy did not provide any coverage for his injuries. As such, at the time of the hearing on October 27, 2009, and prior to the issuance of ALJ Friend's order on November 12, 2009, Metro Taxi did not raise the legal and factual arguments regarding coverage by the Pinnacol policy. Consequently, Metro Taxi cannot now complain of confusion or contradictions that it created or made. Cf. Dalco Industries, Inc. v. Garcia, 867 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1993) (respondents cannot complain of confusion in record caused in part by their own contradictions).
C.
Metro Taxi argues that the equities in this action required ALJ Cain to reopen the claim so that Pinnacol can be ordered to pay the claimant's workers' compensation benefits. According to Metro Taxi, ALJ Friend held on September 3, 2010, that the claimant is covered by the Pinnacol policy, and that, therefore, ALJ Friend's November 12, 2009, order was in error. Thus, Metro Taxi contends that ALJ Cain abused his discretion in denying reopening of the claimant's claim. Metro Taxi further adds that the prehearing ALJ erred in dismissing Pinnacol from the claim. We disagree with Metro Taxi and conclude that substantial evidence exists supporting ALJ Cain's ruling that the equities dictate the conclusion that Metro Taxi, and not Pinnacol, is required to pay the claimant's workers' compensation benefits.
The standard on review of an alleged abuse of discretion is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the ALJ's ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. Rosenberg v. Board of Education of School District #1, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1985). In applying this standard, it is proper to consider whether the ALJ's order is supported by the record and the applicable law. Coates, Reid Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993).
Here, once again we conclude that there is substantial evidence supporting ALJ Cain's decision to deny Metro Taxi's petition to reopen in light of his balancing of the equities. In his order, ALJ Cain noted the factors he may consider when determining whether a mistake warrants reopening, including the potential for injustice if the mistake is perpetuated, and whether the party seeking to reopen could have avoided the mistake by the exercise of due diligence. Order at 10. In weighing these factors, ALJ Cain ruled that up until the hearing before ALJ Friend on October 27, 2009, Metro Taxi steadfastly maintained that it did not need and did not want workers' compensation insurance for taxi cab drivers. For instance, Metro Taxi contacted Pinnacol in 2004 to secure a quotation for workers' compensation insurance to cover only three classes of employees, including garage workers, outside salespeople, and exclusively office workers. At the hearing before ALJ Cain, the underwriter for Pinnacol testified that it was her understanding that Metro Taxi was asking her to exclude taxi cab drivers from coverage when giving a quote to Metro Taxi for the premium on the policy. Tr. 5/11/11) at 228-230, 232-233, 235-236. Pinnacol's policy with Metro Taxi provides coverage only for office employees, outside salespersons, and garage employees. The policy reflected the coverage codes for these classes of employees, but not for drivers. Pinnacol's Hearing Exhibits FF at 319; Tr. (5/11/11) at 233-235. Further, the record demonstrates that at no time prior to the October 27, 2009, hearing before ALJ Friend, did Metro Taxi ever attempt to argue or prove that Pinnacol's policy covered the claimant for workers' compensation benefits. Rather, it was not until after April 2010 that Metro Taxi switched its position and argued that the Pinnacol policy did, in fact, provide coverage for the claimant's injuries. Metro Taxi's Records Submission for Workers' Compensation Hearing Exhibit K at 51-54.
D.
Metro Taxi argues that the "naturally connected" analysis is inapplicable. Metro Taxi further argues that even if applicable, this analysis does not apply to preclude coverage under Pinnacol's policy. Metro Taxi contends that cases such as Grand Mesa Trucking, Inc. v Industrial Commission, 705 P.2d 1038 (Colo. App. 1985) and Evergreen Investment and Realty Co. v. Baca, 666 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1983) demonstrate that the Pinnacol policy is distinctly different in that it does not identify the nature of the business. Pinnacol agrees that the "naturally connected" analysis does not apply in this action. We agree with both Metro Taxi and Pinnacol that the "naturally connected" theory of insurance coverage is inapplicable in this action. As noted by the Panel in Kondracki v. MKBS, supra, the "naturally connected" analysis is inapplicable because the Pinnacol policy did not cover the injuries sustained by a taxi driver, who was involved in an activity clearly not covered by the terms of the policy. Consistent with Kondracki, the "naturally connected" analysis is inapplicable and, therefore, does not provide Metro Taxi with grounds for relief from ALJ Cain's denial of its petition to reopen.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated May 25, 2011, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ John D. Baird
______________________________ Kris Sanko
MAHDI SIKKAL, 420 W 12TH AVENUE, DENVER, CO, (Claimant), MKBS, LLC TIPQC SERVICES, LLC, Attn: KYLE BROWN/JAN L. HAMMERMAN, ESQ., C/O: D/B/A METRO TAXI, DENVER, CO, (Employer), PINNACOL ASSURANCE, Attn: HARVEY D. FLEWELLING, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Insurer), CHRISTOPHER C FELTON, P.C., Attn: CHRISTOPHER C FELTON, ESQ., LITTLETON, CO, (For Claimant).
CLISHAM, SATRIANA BISCAN, LLC, Attn: PATRICIA J. CLISHAM, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).
RUEGSEGGER, SIMONS, SMITH STERN, LLC, Attn: THOMAS M STERN, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (Other Party).