Opinion
2011-11-9
In the Matter of Christie OJOFEITIMI, petitioner,v.NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, respondent.
Stern & DeRossi, LLP, Carle Place, N.Y. (Mario J. DeRossi of counsel), for petitioner.Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavek, Marion R. Buchbinder, and Matthew Grieco of counsel), for respondent.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services dated December 21, 2009, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner's application to amend and seal a report maintained by the New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
At an administrative expungement hearing to determine whether a report of child abuse or maltreatment is substantiated, the allegations in the report must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence ( see Matter of Lee TT. v. Dowling, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 703, 642 N.Y.S.2d 181, 664 N.E.2d 1243; Matter of Esteva v. New York State Cent. Register of Child Abuse & Maltreatment, 82 A.D.3d 978, 979, 919 N.Y.S.2d 93; Matter of Blythe v. Carrion, 63 A.D.3d 1059, 880 N.Y.S.2d 555; Matter of Lynnann P. v. Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs., 28 A.D.3d 484, 485, 813 N.Y.S.2d 179). “It is the function of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses” ( Matter of Bullock v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Social Servs., 248 A.D.2d 380, 382, 669 N.Y.S.2d 618; see Matter of Silberfarb v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., Third Supervisory Dist., Suffolk County, 60 N.Y.2d 979, 981, 471 N.Y.S.2d 257, 459 N.E.2d 482; Matter of Reed v. Carrion, 84 A.D.3d 1094, 924 N.Y.S.2d 797; Matter of Benjamin v. Carrion, 79 A.D.3d 744, 915 N.Y.S.2d 81).
“Judicial review of a determination that a report of maltreatment has been substantiated is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record” ( Matter of Esteva v. New York State Cent. Register of Child Abuse & Maltreatment, 82 A.D.3d at 979, 919 N.Y.S.2d 93; see Matter of Benjamin v. Carrion, 79 A.D.3d 744, 915 N.Y.S.2d 81; Matter of Blythe v. Carrion, 63 A.D.3d 1059, 880 N.Y.S.2d 555). Substantial evidence “means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” ( 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183; see Matter of Lynnann P. v. Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs., 28 A.D.3d 484, 485, 813 N.Y.S.2d 179).
To establish that maltreatment occurred, the agency must show that the child's physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of the person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care ( see 18 NYCRR 432.1[b][1] ). Here, the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services determined that a fair preponderance of the evidence established that the petitioner's failure to provide proper supervision of an eight-month-old child in her daycare center placed his physical condition in imminent danger of becoming impaired. That determination is supported by substantial evidence ( see 18 NYCRR 432.1[b][1][ii]; Matter of Febles v. Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. Child Protective Servs., 68 A.D.3d 993, 891 N.Y.S.2d 441; Matter of Bullock v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Social Servs., 248 A.D.2d at 382, 669 N.Y.S.2d 618; Matter of Ribya BB. v. Wing, 243 A.D.2d 1013, 663 N.Y.S.2d 417). The evidence established that the children in her daycare center were left unattended and that, during this period, a two-year-old child escaped from her playpen and scratched the eight-month-old child, who was in a highchair, several times on his face, drawing blood and requiring medical assistance.
Accordingly, the determination must be confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding dismissed on the merits.
DILLON, J.P., DICKERSON, CHAMBERS and MILLER, JJ., concur.