Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2837 Section "K"(2)
September 20, 2001
Before the Court is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (rec. doc. 39) set for hearing on September 12, 2001. The Court has considered the pleadings, memoranda and relevant law and DENIES the motion for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff seeks recovery for injuries he allegedly sustained while employed by defendant, Global Marine, and working on the GLOMAR ADRIATIC II. Plaintiff was hired by Global in 1997, promoted to the position of "roughneck" in September 1998, and continued to work in that position until September 1999. Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 3. In that job, plaintiff was required to work a great deal with "tripping pipe" — a task that involves multiple manual operations. For example, plaintiff was required to transfer or "tail" 30 to 90 foot stands of pipe to and from the drilled hole, connect tongs to pipe, connect or disconnect stands of pipe, and remove or "pull" pipe slips out of the rotary hole. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. The pipes used in all of these operations weighed as much as 220 to 225 pounds. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3.
Because "tripping pipe" is physically and mentally stressful, plaintiff asserts that defendant repeatedly emphasized the need to use three roughnecks for such operations. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant's Job Training Manuel states that three roughnecks are required to perform "tripping operations" but that 70% of the time, he was required to "trip pipe" with only one other roughneck. Id., p. 4. At trial, plaintiff plans to introduce the testimony of several other employees who will corroborate plaintiff's allegation that defendant did not enforce its own requirement to use three roughnecks to "trip pipe."
In February 1999, plaintiff alleges that he first noticed pain in his neck, was admitted into the emergency room, and diagnosed with a torn or pulled muscle. However, defendant points out that plaintiff stated on his first visit to the emergency room (and later) that his neck pain was not work related or caused by any specific traumatic event. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Thereafter, plaintiff continued to complain of neck pain and frequently visited the physician on the rig. Plaintiff Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9. On September 26, 1999, plaintiff states that he was required to trip pipe with one other roughneck all day and experienced such pain that he was unable to continue work and had to leave the rig. Plaintiff." Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 9. Plaintiff then sought the care of Dr. Gamburg and Dr. Lawrence Drerup, a neurosurgeon, and allegedly conveyed to them that his injury was work related.
Plaintiff's initial MRI and CT scan after he left the rig indicated protrusions at the C4-5 and C5-5 level. Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 9. Plaintiff underwent an anterior cervical fusion that confirmed a herniated disc at that level. Id. Plaintiff continued to complain of pain and an later MRI test revealed a tear in the labrum of the left shoulder with a compression of nerves and arteries exiting the upper left extremity. Id.
Defendant takes issue with much of plaintiff's recitation of the relevant facts. However, for purposes of the instant motion, defendant argues that because plaintiff has failed to raise any issue of material fact sufficient to establish causation, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, defendant stresses that plaintiff is unable to establish any specific incident that caused his neck injury or that it was caused by "repetitively pulling slips with inadequate assistance." Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Furthermore, defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to produce any medical testimony that establishes his injury was more likely than not the result of "tripping pipe."
Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. " Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Daniels v. City of Arlington, Texas, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more that show there is some possible doubt as to the material facts. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with " specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Eke. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Beck v. Texas State Board of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 2000).
In reviewing the motion, the Court considers the record as a whole, disregarding evidence that the jury is "not required to believe." Thomas v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 233 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to the arguments presented.
ANALYSIS
The crux of this motion rests on whether there is an issue of material fact as to causation. Plaintiff initially points out that because this cause of action arises under the Jones Act, the standard of causation imposed has been described as "feather weight." See Maraist and GalliganPersonal Injury in Admiralty citing Comeaux v. T.L. James Co. 702 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983). Similarly, in Domonter v. C.F. Bean Corporation 761 So.2d 629 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/00), the Fifth Circuit reiterated the established rule that while both the employer and employee are subject to a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances in Jones Act cases, only "slight" evidence is required to "meet the burden of proving the causation prong of the liability determination." Plaintiff's complaint alleges that his physical injuries resulted from the performance of repetitive tasks with drill slips under defendant's direction in which there was "inadequate assistance and in a manner that defendant knew or should have known would cause such injury." Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ VII. Because he believes the causation requirement has been satisfied in this case, plaintiff asserts that there are clearly issues of fact to be determined by a jury at trial. Plaintiff Motion in Opposition, p. 11.
In his motion, defendant seems to urge this Court to apply a more stringent standard in its consideration of causation in this case than the "featherweight stringency" presented by plaintiff Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff must demonstrate that his present injuries were "more likely than not" caused by defendants actions. Applying that test, defendant contends that plaintiff can not prove what caused his neck injury or, more precisely, that the repetitive task of pulling slips with less than three roughnecks caused them. In support of his motion, defendant points out that plaintiff has stated on numerous occasions that his injury was not work related and that he could not "recall injuring himself or any single activity which caused pain or made it worse." Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Defendant also reasons that even if plaintiff could link his injury to a particular activity, he only admits to pulling slips with one other person 70% of the time. Thus, defendant concludes that because there was no specific event, injury, or incidence that caused plaintiff's injury, he can not prove that "it is more likely than not that his neck injury occurred while he was pulling slips with one other person, as opposed to when he pulled slips with two other people." Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3.
Defendant also highlights excerpts of deposition testimony taken from plaintiff's physician in which he states that he "can not tell if it is more likely than not that pulling slips caused" plaintiff's injuries. Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10. However, plaintiff contends that the bits of testimony presented in defendant's motion are taken out of context and not indicative of the entirety of the testimony. Specifically, plaintiff emphasizes another portion from the same deposition in which the physician testified that assuming the exact conditions plaintiff worked under plaintiff's injuries could have been caused by his employment. Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 16.
In denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, this Court adopts the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959), in which the Court held inter alia that the jury was entitled to determine the cause of plaintiff's injuries even when the testimony of the various physicians was not unanimous and inconclusive on that issue. Specifically, the Court noted, "[t]he matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words used by the physicians in giving their testimony. The members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn to make a legal determination of the question of causation." Sentilles at 109. To survive this motion for summary judgment, plaintiff is not required to prove that his repetitive employment tasks "more likely than not caused his injuries." Rather, plaintiff need only fulfill a "featherweight" burden to sufficiently address the issue of causation. Plaintiff has met this burden.
The only conclusion to be gleaned from the parties' disagreement over the interpretation of the medical testimony related to the causation of plaintiff's injuries is that there are issues of fact that are not appropriate for this Court to resolve.
Furthermore, this Court recognizes that to ultimately prevail on his "unseaworthiness claim," the plaintiff must satisfy a more stringent standard of causation. Johnson v. Offshore Express Inc., 845 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1988). However, to defeat the motion now before the Court, plaintiff must only demonstrate that there are conflicting issues of material fact related to the seaworthiness of the vessel that a jury must resolve. Plaintiff has satisfied that requirement by alleging that the following are all issues of fact surrounding the seaworthiness of the vessel: (1) whether it was defendant's policy to use three roughnecks to "trip pipe," (2) if so, whether defendant breached that policy and allowed its employees to work with less than three roughnecks, and (3) whether plaintiff can establish through medical testimony that defendant's policies and practices caused his injuries in whole or part. All of these are issues of fact to be determined by a jury.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.