Opinion
No. 2-522 / 01-1404.
Filed August 14, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, SYLVIA A. LEWIS, Judge.
Mother appeals a juvenile court permanency order. AFFIRMED.
Sally H. Peck, Iowa City, for appellant mother.
Steven Klesner, Iowa City, for father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Debra Minot, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Christien L. Conover of Simmons, Perrine, Albright Ellwood, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee guardian.
Catherine Pugh, Iowa City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Amy is the biological mother and Riley is the biological father of Reed, born November 25, 1998. Amy appeals a July 30, 2001, permanency order that transferred the long term custody and guardianship of the child to his temporary guardian, Amanda, Riley's former girlfriend. Amy claims the transfer under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(d)(3) (2001) was inappropriate, as the State failed to show convincing evidence Reed could not be returned to her care. See Iowa Code § 232.104(3)(c). She also argues reunification efforts should not have been ended and that there was insufficient evidence to show she had abandoned Reed. Upon our de novo review, Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, we find the juvenile court's actions should be upheld.
The record indicates Amy had initially intended to give Reed up for adoption, but then agreed to let Riley and Amanda raise the child, as she readily admitted she was not able to care for Reed herself. Except for the first few weeks of Reed's life, when he was cared for by a family friend, Amanda has been Reed's primary caregiver. Amy did not take Reed home from the hospital and has never cared for Reed longer than a day or two. By the time Reed's custody became the subject of a contested guardianship proceeding, when the child was approximately fourteen months old, Amy had undertaken only limited and largely passive contact with Reed. She still admitted she was not in a position to assume his care, but seemed to think Reed could be placed with a relative for a few years until she was ready to assume her maternal role. It was not until he was twenty-two months old that Amy expressed any current intention of parenting Reed.
When Amanda and Riley separated he left Reed in her care. Although Riley initially made some attempts to reunify with Reed, he declined to appear at the permanency hearing and had left Iowa by the hearing's conclusion. The juvenile court found Riley had abandoned his relationship with his child, and Riley does not appeal the court's order.
Parental responsibility demands more than merely maintaining a subjective interest in the child, but requires affirmative parenting to the extent it is practicable and feasible under the circumstances. In re A.B., 554 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Although Amy now wishes to be a part of Reed's life, until this matter entered the court system through Amanda's petition for guardianship, Amy's involvement in Reed's life was largely a passive by-product of her own mother's wish to know her grandchild. Even then Amy waited until Reed was nearly two years old before making any significant effort to reunify with her child. Despite her new-found wish to parent Reed, Amy has done little, particularly in light of her past actions, to demonstrate she can be a "constant, responsible, and reliable" parent. In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). As we have often noted, "[c]hildren simply cannot wait for responsible parenting." In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
Perhaps even more importantly, it is clear Reed's primary maternal bond has been formed with Amanda, and it is Amanda that he considers to be his mother. Such emotional bonds are a significant factor to consider when assessing what is in Reed's best interest, see In re A.H., 519 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994), and it is Reed's best interest, when viewed in light of both his short-term and long-terms needs, that is our primary consideration. In re C.D., 509 N.W.2d 509, 511-12 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). In making a permanency determination, Reed's need for security, stability, and permanence in his young life must come first. Id. at 513.
Under the facts of this case, we cannot find that returning Reed to Amy's care would have been appropriate. Accordingly, the emphasis of reasonable efforts turned from reunification and family preservation to finalizing a permanency plan for the child. Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a). Given the level of bonding and attachment that Reed has to Amanda, and the minimal level of attachment and bonding he appears to have with Amy, as well has Amy's history of immaturity and instability, it was in Reed's best interests to have reunification efforts ended and to be placed in Amanda's long term care.
Amy also attacks the performance of Reed's guardian ad litem as inadequate. We have reviewed counsel's actions in regard to this case and any impact the acts or omissions may have had upon the proceedings. Putting aside the fact the guardian ad litem represents the child's, rather than the parent's interests, and the resulting doubts about whether a parent would have standing to challenge the effectiveness of the guardian ad litem's performance, see In re J.V., 464 N.W.2d 887, 891-92 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990), Amy's argument is without merit.
Finally, Amy contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her request for an expert witness to challenge the methodology used by the examining psychologist. That psychologist was appointed without resistance, Amy participated in the discussion regarding and agreed to the terms of the evaluation, and counsel all agreed the written report would be completed no later than four days before the permanency hearing, on April 2, 2001. In her request, Amy admitted the juvenile court had informed her of the need to make any request for her own expert to the court "so that an evaluation could take place in time for trial." She nevertheless failed to move for appointment of her own expert until April 20, 2001, after three days of the four-day hearing had been completed. We find no abuse of discretion in denying her request.
We affirm the juvenile court's permanency order in full, which leaves Reed's long term custody and guardianship with Amanda.
AFFIRMED.