Opinion
A95A0822.
APPEAL DISMISSED JANUARY 13, 1995. RECONSIDERATION DENIED FEBRUARY 3, 1995. CERT. APPLIED FOR.
Child custody. Putnam Juvenile Court. Before Judge Parrott, pro hac vice.
Martin L. Fierman, for appellant.
Shepherd Brown, Timothy N. Shepherd, for appellee.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
We dismissed this appeal from a child custody order for failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). On reconsideration, appellant argues the order is directly appealable because it involves the termination of parental rights which does not fall within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See In the Interest of R. L. Y., M. R. Y. R. A. Y., 180 Ga. App. 559 ( 349 S.E.2d 800) (1986). However, the order in question did not terminate appellant's parental rights; it simply awarded custody of the youngest child to the father and granted visitation rights to appellant.
While this case began as a deprivation proceeding in the juvenile court, we have consistently held that custody orders arising out of such proceedings are subject to the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See In the Interest of M. D. S., 211 Ga. App. 706 ( 440 S.E.2d 95) (1994); In the Interest of M. A. V., 206 Ga. App. 299 ( 425 S.E.2d 377) (1992); In the Interest of N. A. B., 196 Ga. App. 819 ( 397 S.E.2d 301) (1990). We therefore reject appellant's assertion that we must look to the nature of the underlying proceeding rather than the substance of the order complained of in determining whether the discretionary appeal procedures apply. Thus, orders dealing with child custody are subject to the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2); In the Interest of A. M. D., 212 Ga. App. 291 ( 444 S.E.2d 166) (1994); and orders terminating parental rights are directly appealable. In the Interest of R. L. Y.,
180 Ga. App. at 559.
Motion for reconsideration denied.