Opinion
No. 2-170 / 99-1787.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, JOHN G. MULLEN, District Associate Judge.
Minor child J.B. appeals from a juvenile court order finding he committed the delinquent act of vehicular homicide. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jack E. Dusthimer, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Cusack, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and HUITINK and HECHT, JJ.
Minor child J.B. appeals from a juvenile court order finding he committed the delinquent act of vehicular homicide. On appeal, J.B. contends the juvenile court erred in concluding there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of recklessness. We agree and reverse.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
On October 10, 1998, Joseph Sutton was in possession of a stolen black Lincoln Continental. Despite his mother's instructions to return the car to its owner, Sutton picked up two friends: fifteen-year-old J.B and thirteen-year-old Markey Glenn. The three teenagers alternated as drivers of the car. While J.B. was driving on a two-lane residential street, the Lincoln approached Jim Willert's vehicle, a van pulling a stock car on a trailer, traveling in the opposite direction. The front of the van edged slightly across the middle of the street. The Lincoln swerved slightly and appeared to travel briefly upon the curb to avoid a collision with the van.
The following facts are taken from the adult jury felony trial of co-defendant Sutton charged with aiding and abetting vehicular homicide by reckless driving. Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, all counsel stipulated the Court could take judicial notice of Sutton's trial record. In an Order on Record dated September 9, 1999, the Court stated in making its findings of recklessness, "the Court took into consideration the evidence submitted in the felony trial of the codefendant, Joseph Sutton." Sutton's conviction was overturned by our supreme court on appeal. See State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2001) (finding insufficient evidence of recklessness to sustain Sutton's conviction).
Sutton congratulated J.B. on his maneuvering and they exchanged "high-fives." Just after this exchange, the Lincoln struck and fatally injured a three-year-old child who had run into the street. J.B. removed the child from the undercarriage of the Lincoln while Sutton and Glenn fled on foot.
On October 12, 1998, a delinquency petition was filed charging J.B. with second-degree theft and leaving the scene of an injury accident in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.2(2) and 321.261 (1997). On January 13, 1999, a subsequent delinquency petition was filed charging J.B. with homicide by vehicle in violation of section 707.6A(2)(a). An adjudicatory hearing was held on September 1, 1999. At the hearing, J.B. pled guilty to second-degree theft and homicide by vehicle. A dispositional hearing was held on October 5, 1999. J.B. was placed in residential treatment. He appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
"Juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, but are special proceedings that serve as an ameliorative alternative to the criminal prosecution of children." In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1996). Our scope of review in appeals from delinquency cases is de novo. In re G.J.A., 547 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 1996). Questions of both law and fact are subject to review. Iowa Code § 232.133(1) (1997); In re D.L.C., 464 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Iowa 1991).
III. Merits.
J.B. contends the juvenile court erred in concluding J.B. committed homicide by vehicle. In particular, he argues the court erred in finding substantial evidence to support a finding of recklessness.
The State asserts J.B.'s guilty plea "waives all defenses and objections, even as to constitutional guarantees." State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Iowa 1997) (holding a defendant who pleads guilty in district court waives any claims arising out of the previous juvenile court proceedings). We disagree the waiver rule applies in the juvenile court context. Furthermore, we find it significant that J.B. did not admit recklessness during the plea colloquy. We conclude J.B.'s direct appeal was sufficient to preserve error on this issue. In re N.W.E., 564 N.W.2d 451, 455-56 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (holding a direct appeal sufficiently preserves a challenge to delinquency dispositional orders).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d) requires the district court to inform adult defendants "that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal." Iowa Code section 232.43, regarding plea proceedings in juvenile court, does not contain a similar provision.
During the plea colloquy, the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: Do you admit that on October 10, 1998, you were operating a motor vehicle on Wilkes Avenue in Davenport that you had stolen?
THE CHILD: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And the vehicle was involved in an accident wherein a child was struck and as a result of the accident died? Do you agree that is true?
THE CHILD: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the evidence that Mr. Dustihimer [child's attorney] has described that was admitted in the trial against the co-defendant and how that might be also admitted against you?
THE CHILD: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Are you aware of any defense that you feel that you might have to prosecution of this charge that has not been discussed here in court today by your attorney and me?
THE CHILD: I don't understand what you're talking about.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you aware of some reason you think you might not be guilty of this charge such that you should not be pleading guilty?
THE CHILD: Still don't understand.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DUSTHIMER: May I?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. DUSTHIMER: Other than your question about reckless[ness], is there anything else that says that this didn't happen and it's not your fault?
THE CHILD: No.
MR. DUSTHIMER: Okay.
THE COURT: Thank you. Based on J.B.'s statements, the statements of his attorney, I find that . . . there is a factual basis supporting the plea. I accept the plea.
Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a) provides the reckless driving alternative to the crime of homicide by vehicle. The statute states in pertinent part:
2. A person commits a class "C" felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by any of the following means:
a. Driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, in violation of section 321.277.
Iowa Code § 707.6A(2)(a). Section 321.277 defines the crime of recklessness as "driv[ing] any vehicle in such manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." Iowa Code § 321.277. To support a conviction under section 707.6A(2)(a), the State "must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct `fraught with a high degree of danger,' conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it." State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993)); see e.g., State v. Abbas, 561 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Iowa 1997) (finding recklessness where defendant, driving nearly ninety miles per hour in a no passing zone, forced a motorist into the path of vehicle); State v. Travis, 497 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (finding recklessness when defendant rode motorcycle on curbs, sidewalks, lawns, and lifted front wheel while driving, despite knowledge of small children playing in the area).
The State contends several factors support a finding of recklessness. The State argues J.B., an underaged, unlicensed, and inexperienced driver, created an unreasonable risk of harm by driving onto the curb to avoid the van. The State further contends J.B. was reckless for driving a car with faulty brakes at the speed of approximately twenty-seven miles per hour. Although not corroborated by any eyewitnesses at Sutton's trial, the State additionally asserts J.B. ran a stop sign prior to meeting the van.
Based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude J.B.'s driving was not highly unreasonable or such an extreme departure from ordinary care to constitute recklessness. According to expert testimony in Sutton's trial, J.B.'s reaction time to a crisis situation was better-than average. Photographic evidence admitted at Sutton's trial revealed Willert's van and stock car trailer obscured J.B.'s view of the child as he entered the street. Furthermore, the record contains no definitive proof J.B. was aware the Lincoln's brakes were in such a poor condition that harm would flow from driving the car. See State v. Conyers, 506 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Iowa 1993) (finding defendant's disregard for brake's defective condition for which he had been warned that very day, combined with an excessive speed in a school zone, constituted recklessness).
Moreover, at Sutton's trial, the State's expert conceded J.B.'s speed of twenty-seven miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone did not constitute willful and wanton disregard for people or property. See State v. Klatt, 544 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995) (holding State failed to meet burden absent proof of excessive speed or other conscious disregard for public safety). Finally, even if J.B. had run a stop sign prior to the accident, we do not find it dispositive on the issue of recklessness. See State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1993) (holding violation of a rule of the road does not elevate simple misdemeanor to class C felony).
We conclude there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding of recklessness. We therefore reverse the juvenile court's dispositional ruling finding J.B. committed the delinquent act of vehicular homicide in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.