Opinion
No. 2-606 / 02-0784.
Filed September 25, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Gerald W. Magee, Associate Juvenile Judge.
The mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children. AFFIRMED.
Judith O'Donohoe of Ellwood, O'Donohoe, Stochl, Braun Churbuck, Charles City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, M. Elise Pippin, Assistant Attorney General, and Marilyn Dettmer, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith Schuknecht, P.L.C., Charles City, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Kevin E. Schoeberl of the Story, Schoeberl Kowalke Law Firm, Cresco, for father.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
The mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children. She contends the juvenile court erred by (1) judicially noticing evidence from prior proceedings; (2) determining there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights; (3) not applying the exception to termination found in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) (2001); and (4) ruling her constitutional rights had not been violated. We affirm.
Michelle and Dennis are the parents of Paul, born in 1993, and Denise, born in 1995. Michelle has a history of purposefully injuring herself to seek medical attention and was diagnosed with Munchausen Syndrome and an attachment disorder. In 1998 Denise developed a strange and severe rash that would clear up when Denise was hospitalized, but reappear when the child returned home, which led healthcare workers to suspect Michelle had developed Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. The children were removed from the parents' care in June 1998. They were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b) and (c)(2) (1997).
The CINA adjudication was affirmed on appeal. In re D.C.-B., No. 99-1509 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001).
On May 10, 2002, Michelle's parental rights were terminated under sections 232.116(1)(d) (Supp. 2001) (child CINA for neglect, circumstances continue to exist despite receipt of services), (e) (child CINA, child removed for six months, parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with child), (f) (child four or older, child CINA, removed from home for twelve of last eighteen months, and child cannot be returned home), and (i) (child meets definition of CINA, child was in imminent danger, services would not correct conditions).
The juvenile court cited the previous code numbers which were in effect prior to the amendment of section 232.116(1) on April 24, 2001. We will use the current form of the section.
I. Scope of Review
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. Id. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
II. Judicial Notice
At the termination hearing, Michelle objected to the admission of testimony from the removal and dispositional hearings, plus certain CINA exhibits, on hearsay grounds. We first note section 232.96(6) allows the use of hearsay evidence in juvenile proceedings, provided the evidence is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, in a termination proceeding, a court may judicially notice exhibits that were part of the prior CINA proceedings regarding the same children. In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Iowa 1994). A court may take judicial notice of any part of the CINA record. In re H.R.K., 433 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). We find the juvenile court properly took judicial notice of the evidence in question.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Michelle contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to warrant termination of her parental rights. On our de novo review of the evidence, we determine there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to justify termination of Michelle's parental rights. She had not addressed her mental health problems. In addition, Michelle's parenting skills did not improve because she was resistant to services, and she remained unable to meet the children's needs. She was focused on her volatile relationship with Dennis instead of her relationship with the children. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to warrant termination of Michelle's rights under sections 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (i).
IV. Best Interests
Michelle claims termination of her parental rights is not in the children's best interests. She points out the juvenile court need not terminate a parent's rights if "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship." Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The juvenile court did not address this issue, and we determine it was not preserved for our review. See In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). To the extent Michelle raises an issue concerning the best interests of the children aside from section 232.116(3), we find termination is in the children's best interests.
V. Constitutional Issues
The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978). A parent's right to have custody of his or her child should be terminated only with the utilization of the required constitutional safeguards. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923); In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). A parent has a right to due process and a fair trial when the State seeks to terminate parental rights. Alsager v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D. Iowa 1975); In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).
A petitioner challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. In re M.H., 367 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). A statute should be declared unconstitutional only upon a showing that it clearly infringes on constitutional rights and only if every reasonable basis for support is negated. Id. at 281. When there is a doubt, that doubt should be resolved in a manner to avoid finding the statute unconstitutional. Id. A. Michelle first claims she was denied due process by the juvenile court's action of judicially noticing certain evidence from the CINA proceedings. She claims she was denied her right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. This issue has been previously addressed and rejected. See In re D.A.W., 552 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). We held, "It is permissible for a trial court in a termination proceeding to judicially notice the prior child in need of assistance case, including the evidence, providing certain safeguards are followed." Id. (citing In re Adkins, 298 N.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Iowa 1980)). B. Michelle asserts sections 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (i) are unconstitutionally vague. When alleging a statute is void for vagueness, a petitioner must overcome a vigorous presumption of constitutionality. M.H., 367 N.W.2d at 281. Our supreme court has stated:
It is also clear there is no Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in termination proceedings because such proceedings are civil in nature, not criminal. In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 846 (Iowa 1990).
On appeal, Michelle raises a vagueness argument regarding section 232.116(1)(e), but this argument was not raised before the juvenile court, and we will not consider it. See Klobnock v. Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Iowa 1981).
Furthermore, while due process of law mandates a statute be not so vague, indefinite or uncertain as to defy an understanding of consequences attendant upon failure to comply therewith, this tenet does not require more specificity than is reasonable under the circumstances.In re Ponx, 276 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Iowa 1979) (citation omitted). We consider whether "men of common intelligence must have necessarily guessed at its meaning and differed as to its application." Id. A statute may be saved from unconstitutional vagueness if the needed specificity has been supplied by other means. Id. at 431.
Previous vagueness challenges to section 232.116, and its predecessor, have been rejected. See id., 276 N.W.2d at 432; In re Lewis, 257 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Iowa 1977); In re Long, 255 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 1977); In re Hochmuth, 251 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Iowa 1977); M.H., 367 N.W.2d at 282. "In cases where the Iowa courts have addressed similar arguments, the courts have found that a long and detailed history of juvenile court proceedings can afford the parents with ample information of what is expected of them." M.H., 367 N.W.2d at 280. In the present case, also, we determine section 232.116 is not unconstitutionally vague.
C. Michelle contends her substantive due process rights were violated because section 232.116(1) is not narrowly drawn to express only the State's compelling interest in the protection of children. She asserts that as applied in this case, section 232.116(1) does not adequately balance the State's interest with her interest as a parent.
The substantive dimension of due process dictates that where a fundamental right is involved, regulations limiting the right may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at stake. In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 844 (Iowa 1990) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 728, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178 (1973)). The State has a compelling interest in protecting children from harm. Id. at 845. For this reason:
Where valid statutory grounds for termination, such as child abandonment and parental inability or unwillingness to adequately care for the child, are established by clear and convincing evidence, substantive due process is not offended by termination of the parent's parental rights.Id. We have already determined there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination of Michelle's parental rights on the basis of her inability or unwillingness to adequately care for her children. We conclude Michelle's right to substantive due process was not violated by the termination of her parental rights.
D. Finally, Michelle claims the application of section 232.116(1) violated her constitutional right to equal protection. She asserts the statute unfairly classifies a child who has had one isolated incident of abuse with children who have suffered a course of conduct of abuse. We first question Michelle's characterization of her children as children who have suffered only one isolated incident of abuse, which led to the termination of her parental rights. Michelle's parental rights were terminated for several reasons, not solely based on one incident.
We will proceed, however, to address Michelle's equal protection argument. If a classification is reasonable and operates equally upon all within the class, it is a valid classification. Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Iowa 1975). The supreme court stated:
[T]he classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. It does not deny equal protection simply because in practice it results in some inequality; practical problems of government permit rough accommodations; and the classification will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to justify it.Id. at 545 (citations omitted); see also In re R.E., 462 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). The classifications in section 232.116(1) are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in the welfare of the children in the State and these classifications are not patently arbitrary. We determine Michelle was not denied equal protection by the application of section 232.116(1).
After considering all arguments raised in this case, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court which terminated Michelle's parental rights.