Opinion
No. 2-534 / 02-0051
Filed September 11, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Humboldt County, James A. McGlynn, Associate Juvenile Judge.
Mother appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor child. AFFIRMED.
James McCarthy, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Derk Karl Schwieger, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Larry Ivers, Eagle Grove, for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Mother appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor child. She contends the court erred in finding the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be returned to her custody at the present time, that she continued to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation, and that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation. We affirm.
Jennifer is the biological mother of three children, Aaron, Caleb, and Amber. Her parental rights to Aaron were previously terminated and Amber was living with her paternal grandmother at the time of this termination proceeding. Caleb, born May 30, 1992, is the only child at issue in this matter. Rob is the biological father of both Caleb and Amber. Rob consented to the termination of his parental rights to Caleb pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(a) (1999) and his rights are not at issue in this appeal. Rob and Jennifer were married when Caleb was born but divorced in September of 1994. At that time Rob and Jennifer were given joint legal custody of Caleb and Amber with physical care of the children placed with Rob. Jennifer was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support. Rob and Jennifer each subsequently remarried.
Although Jennifer had visitation rights she missed many of her scheduled visits with Caleb and, in fact, there was a period of over one year in which she did not see the children at all. It was during this time that Caleb first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS). In 1997 the University of Iowa Hospital recommended intensive family-centered services for Caleb after a psychiatric evaluation had been completed which resulted in Caleb's eleven-day hospitalization on the adolescent psychiatric unit. Caleb's behavior subsequently improved for a time. In January 1998 Jennifer resumed regular visitation with Caleb. In February 1998 DHS services were ended because service providers felt the family was doing well. However, in August 1998 family-centered services were once again initiated when Caleb's behavior deteriorated. He began stealing and acting out sexually, and he was defiant and aggressive. This behavior began within one week of his two-week visitation with Jennifer. These services continued until February 1999.
Caleb was again hospitalized on the adolescent psychiatric unit in September of 1999 and the DHS was contacted once again to provide services. Upon Caleb's release on October 19, 1999 it was determined he should be placed in foster care and Rob voluntarily did so. Caleb has not lived with either parent since his placement in foster care in October of 1999. At the time Caleb was placed in foster care Jennifer was in Kansas and DHS was unable to locate or contact her. Jennifer did return to Iowa in late October 1999 and began living in a motel. Caleb was subsequently adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) by the juvenile court under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), and (g) on October 29, 1999 and a visitation schedule was established between Caleb and Jennifer. Both Jennifer and Rob stipulated to the adjudication.
Over the next year Caleb was placed in two different foster homes. He was removed from each because the foster parents found themselves unable to meet Caleb's special needs and requested his removal. Caleb's third foster placement began in August of 2000 and he remained in that home at the time of the termination hearing. Jennifer's visits had become supervised due to her lack of supervision, failing to interact, at times discussing adult topics with Caleb, and engaging in inappropriate behavior during visitation. During supervised visitation the service provider worked with Jennifer on her parenting skills and Jennifer did make some improvement. Based on her improvement, in September of 2000 visitations once again became unsupervised to allow Jennifer another chance to parent Caleb on her own.
For example, in December 1999 Jennifer became drunk and passed out during a visitation.
A permanency hearing was held in October of 2000 and Jennifer indicated an interest in having Caleb live with her and her husband Steve. It was decided at that time to give Jennifer an additional six months to show she could appropriately parent Caleb and provide for his special needs. However, on October 31, 2000 visitation was suspended because the utilities to Jennifer's house were shut off due to her failure to pay the bill. Despite her apparent lack of money and being unable to have Caleb with her because her utilities had been shut off, only a few days later Jennifer and Steve went on an extended trip to California to pick up a new tow truck. Except for a Thanksgiving visit Jennifer then missed visitation with Caleb for the next month and a half. In December of 2000 Jennifer and Steve moved and unsupervised visitations resumed. A provider continued to work with Caleb and Jennifer. However, Caleb's behavior at school began to deteriorate again to the point he was almost uncontrollable. This behavior was always at its worst after a visit with Jennifer.
In April of 2001 a founded child abuse report was filed against Jennifer for denial of critical care/lack of supervision of Casey, Steve's son, and Casey was removed from their home. Due to this incident Jennifer's visitations with Caleb were returned to supervised once again. During the supervised visits Jennifer failed to properly supervise Caleb and interacted with him only briefly during each visit, after prompting from the supervising service provider to do so. Rob stated to the DHS in February 2001 that he was willing to voluntarily terminate his parental rights to Caleb. The State then filed a petition for termination of Jennifer's parental rights to Caleb on April 11, 2001. At that time Caleb was doing well in his current foster care placement and his foster mother had indicated a desire to adopt him if parental rights were terminated.
Hearing was held on the termination petition on October 5, 2001. Shortly before the hearing Jennifer's utilities had been shut off again due to non-payment and she had been evicted from her house for failure to pay the rent. The house was also in an unsanitary condition, including animal feces all over the floors, and her car had been repossessed due to her failure to make payments. Jennifer was without a home of her own at the time of the hearing and was staying with friends. The DHS caseworker's report to the court regarding the termination, dated September 21, 2001, noted that these most recent events only continued Jennifer's pattern of instability and inability to met her own needs, let alone those of her children. Jennifer had moved sixteen times in the past six years. The DHS recommended termination of Jennifer's parental rights in order to allow Caleb to achieve stability and permanency in his life.
The juvenile court terminated Jennifer's parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) (1999) (child four years or older, adjudicated CINA, removed from home for twelve of last eighteen months, cannot be returned home) and (f) (child adjudicated CINA, parent's rights to another child terminated, parent does not respond to services, additional rehabilitation would not correct the situation). Jennifer appeals from the termination order contending the court erred in finding the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Caleb could not be returned to her care at the present time, that she lacked the ability or willingness to respond to services, and that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interest of the child. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds for termination under one of the provisions relied upon by the juvenile court to affirm the termination. Id.
Jennifer claims the juvenile court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that Caleb could not be returned to her custody, a necessary element under section 232.116(1)(e)(4). Under subparagraph four the court must find: "There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102." Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(4) (1999).
Jennifer apparently concedes the requirements under subsections 232.116(1)(f)(1), (2) and (3) were proven as she argues only that the requirement of subsection 232.116(1)(f)(4) was not sufficiently shown.
We look to the child's long-range, as well as immediate, interests. We consider what the future holds for the child if returned to his or her parents. Insight for this determination can be gained from evidence of the parent's past performance, for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent is capable of providing. Our statutory termination provisions are preventative as well as remedial. They are designed to prevent probable harm to the child.
In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998) (quoting In re C.M.W., 503 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993)). A good prediction of the future conduct of a parent is to look at their past conduct. In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The parent's past performance may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
With regard to Jennifer's ability to care for Caleb and have him returned to her care and custody the juvenile court found the following:
The bottom line is that the mother can barely take care of herself. She seems to be dependent upon having a man to support her. She has constantly had problems managing money, paying bills, and keeping a residence. She has shown that she cannot maintain a home. Since her divorce from the father, she has only successfully resided in one place for about six months, and her longest period of employment has been about one year. There is simply no evidence that this mother would have been able to assume custody of this child at any time since the child's adjudication. She has not shown any ability to make this child a priority in her life. Past performance is the best gauge of future performance. It is unlikely that she will ever be in a position to adequately take care of this child. When the Court uses this mother's past performance to gauge the future of this child, the Court can only envision a poor quality of life should this mother's parental rights remain intact.
Based on our de novo review of the record we agree with the juvenile court's findings and adopt them as our own. We find Caleb cannot safely be returned to Jennifer's care at the present time or in the foreseeable future and doing so would cause further harm to Caleb. At the time of the termination hearing Jennifer was basically homeless. She had been evicted from her home for failure to pay the rent and was depending on the kindness of others for housing. Prior to her eviction, her utilities had been turned off again due to her failure to pay the bills and her car had been repossessed for the same reason.
Furthermore, Jennifer's inability to adequately parent a child has been demonstrated through both the previous termination of one of her children and the recent incident of founded child abuse for denying critical care to Casey, requiring Casey to be removed from the home. Finally, despite the fact that after permanency was established Jennifer was given an additional six months to show she could adequately parent Caleb, and during those six months service providers again attempted to teach her proper parenting skills, she was still unable to appropriately interact with Caleb or adequately supervise him.
Jennifer has demonstrated a complete lack of stability and an inability to adequately parent Caleb. Caleb needs a safe, nurturing, stable, and permanent place to live, a need exacerbated by his emotional problems and resulting special needs. Jennifer has been unable or unwilling to put Caleb's needs and interests ahead of her own. We cannot force Caleb to wait interminably for Jennifer to become responsible and stable enough to parent him."Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable." In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). Children need permanency and based on the evidence in the record we believe that Caleb can achieve stability and permanence only if Jennifer's parental rights are terminated. "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987).
Caleb has been in the same foster home since August of 2000. This placement has been successful and Caleb has shown improvement while in this home, although he has experienced setbacks after visits with Jennifer. Caleb reported to his caseworker that he loves his current foster mom, that she keeps him safe, meets his needs, and he wants to be with her. His foster mother has indicated a willingness to adopt Caleb if parental rights are terminated. We find it is in Caleb's best interests to terminate Jennifer's parental rights in order to allow him to achieve the stability, security, and permanency he so deserves and which has been palpably lacking up to this point in his young life.
Based on our de novo review of the record we find clear and convincing evidence that Caleb cannot be returned to Jennifer as provided in section 232.102, that is he cannot be returned without suffering adjudicatory harm. We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Jennifer's parental rights to Caleb under section 232.116(1)(e).
AFFIRMED.