Opinion
No. 350696 No. 350697
04-30-2020
In re WOZNIAK, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Kent Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 16-050585-NA; 16-050586-NA; 19-050348-NA Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and FORT HOOD and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother (Docket No. 350696) and respondent-father (Docket No. 350697) appeal as of right the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to their children MW, LW, and CW. The trial court terminated the rights of both respondents under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to the parent). We affirm.
I. FACTS
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for the removal of MW, LW, and RW from the home because respondent-parents were unable to properly care for them. However, the children remained in the home under the supervision of the DHHS. A few months later, the children were removed from the home because respondent-father had inappropriately disciplined MW and RW. Additionally, there were concerns about the mental and physical health of the children. Respondent-parents pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition, and the DHHS provided services, which included individual counseling, couple's therapy, and parenting classes. Respondent-parents were also permitted frequent visits with the children.
RW is the child of respondent-mother, but respondent-father is not RW's biological or putative father. Respondent-mother's cousin received guardianship over RW, and respondent-mother's parental rights to RW were not terminated. CW was not yet born at the time the initial petition was filed.
After about two years, the trial court still had not discharged the case, but MW, LW, and RW were placed back in the home because respondent-parents had made progress with the services that were provided. CW was born at that time. However, after about four months, the children were removed from the home because respondent-father physically abused RW. After the children were removed, respondent-parents stopped progressing with their service plan and exhibited the same problematic behavior that initially led to removal. Therefore, the trial court terminated their parental rights to MW, LW, and CW. Respondent-parents now appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds for termination. We disagree.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). A trial court's factual findings following a termination hearing are reviewed for clear error. In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 430; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 430-431 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether the trial court properly selected, interpreted, and applied a statute is reviewed de novo. Id. at 431.
Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court's finding with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). We may presume that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the unchallenged statutory ground was established by clear and convincing evidence, and respondent-mother is precluded from relief on this issue. In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW 2d 144 (2012); In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). We need not address the additional grounds for termination. HRC, 286 Mich App at 461.
Nevertheless, the trial court properly terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to all three children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to the parent). Respondent-parents were unable to consistently get MW to school on time, and were unable to meet the medical needs of LW and CW. Additionally, instances of domestic violence occurred during the termination proceedings. Thus, the trial court properly found that statutory grounds for termination existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Also, termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), with respect to MW and LW because after three years of services, respondent-parents continued to struggle with inappropriate parenting skills, domestic violence, and medical neglect.
Respondentfather did not argue that the trial court erred by finding that the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights were met. As such, we may presume that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the unchallenged statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. See JS & SM, 231 Mich App at 9899.
Respondent-parents argue that termination of their parental rights was not in the children's best interests. We disagree.
"[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). A trial court's factual findings following a termination hearing are reviewed for clear error. Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 430.
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 40. The trial court must evaluate each child's best interests individually. Id. at 42. However, if the best interests of the individual children do not significantly differ, then the trial court need not repeat the same factual findings for each child. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court should consider such factors as the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." White, 303 Mich App at 714. The focus of this determination is on the child, not the parent. Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411. A parent's bond with the child is one of the many factors that the trial court considers, and it may be outweighed by the child's need for safety, permanency, and stability. In re Jones, 316 Mich App 110, 120; 894 NW2d 54 (2016).
In this case, termination was in the children's best interests despite their bond with respondent-parents. Domestic violence was an ongoing issue throughout this case, and despite receiving three years of services, both respondent-mother and respondent-father continued to have violent outbursts. All three children needed significant mental and physical health assistance, but respondent-mother was unable to properly interact with the children's service providers and respondent-father failed to engage at the children's medical appointments. Respondent-father did not visit CW while she was in the hospital, and he struggled to interact with the children during parenting time.
At the termination hearing, MW was six years old, LW was three years old, and CW was seven months old. MW and LW had been involved in termination proceedings for about three years, and CW had been involved in the termination proceedings shortly after she was born. MW and LW had spent 32 of the last 37 months out of the home, and CW had spent over half of her life out of the home. Each child had special needs, such as physical and mental health issues, that required permanency and stability. The children flourished in foster care and made progress on their developmental delays and health conditions.
Considering the children's needs for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over respondent-parents' home, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that termination was in the children's best interests despite the bond they had with respondent-parents. Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411.
Respondent-father argues that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children. We disagree.
Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights, which requires a showing that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008); VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 135. "Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings." Utrera, 281 Mich at 9.
The DHHS "has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). Part of this requirement to make reasonable efforts is the creation of a service plan, which outlines the steps that the DHHS and respondent "will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification." Id. at 85-86, citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(d). "Trial courts are in the best position, in the first instance, to determine whether the steps taken by the [DHHS] in individual cases are reasonable." Id. at 88 n 6. A respondent is obliged to engage in and benefit from the service plan to avoid termination of parental rights: "While the [DHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012); see also In re TK, 306 Mich App. 698, 711; 859 NW2d 208 (2014) ("Not only must respondent cooperate and participate in the services, she must benefit from them."). When challenging the services offered by the DHHS, a respondent must establish that she would have fared better if other services had been offered. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
Respondent-father contends that the DHHS did not provide him sufficient services to assist him with the barrier of domestic violence. However, the record clearly proves demonstrates otherwise. The DHHS referred respondent-father to the program Men Choosing Alternatives to Violence at the YWCA when this case was initiated. When that program concluded, the DHHS referred him to the YWCA to attend couple's therapy with respondent-mother. Respondent-parents successfully completed couple's therapy around the time that MW and LW were placed back in the home and CW was born. After MW, LW, and CW were removed from the home, the DHHS again rereferred respondent-father to the YWCA for couple's therapy and Men Choosing Alternatives to Violence. However, he was prevented from continuing with these services due to his own actions. Specifically, he pushed respondent-mother onto a bed during an argument. Thus, respondent-father failed to benefit from the services that were offered to him. In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
Respondent-father contends that the trial court should have given him more time to address the barriers in this case, but failed to cite the record or provide any caselaw in support of his argument, and it is therefore waived. MCR 7.212(C)(7); Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (it is insufficient to simply announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to us to discover and rationalize the basis for a claim, or unravel and elaborate arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject a position).
III. CONCLUSION
Respondent-parents have not identified any basis for relief. Accordingly, the order terminating their parental rights is affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle