Opinion
W.C. No. 4-297-265
May 5, 1999.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Gandy (ALJ) which determined the claimant's average weekly wage. The claimant contends the ALJ's refusal to increase the average weekly wage based on the alleged value of a trailer provided by the employer is unsupported by the evidence. We affirm.
The ALJ found the claimant was hired to operate an amusement park ride on the West Coast. The employer agreed to pay the claimant $200 per week, and provide a trailer for the claimant to live in. The respondents admitted that the value of the trailer was $10 per week; and therefore, they admitted liability for an average weekly wage of $210. The claimant sought a hearing to establish that the trailer had a greater value.
At the hearing, the claimant's wife testified that she visited several RV dealers in Greeley, Colorado and Fort Collins, Colorado. Based on her discussions with these dealers the claimant's wife testified that the "rental value" of a 19-foot used trailer is between $420 and $600 per week. (Tr. p. 13)
However, the ALJ found that the wife's testimony was not credible concerning the value of the trailer. Consequently, the ALJ determined that the claimant failed to present "credible evidence" that the average weekly wage should be increased beyond the previously admitted $210 per week.
On review, the claimant contends the ALJ's order is not supported by substantial evidence. The claimant argues that his wife's testimony concerning the value of the trailer was unrebutted. Further, the claimant notes that the ALJ credited the wife's testimony concerning the existence of temporary total disability. Consequently, the claimant argues that the ALJ's refusal to credit the wife's testimony is unexplained and cannot be sustained on appeal. We disagree.
Section 8-40-201(19)(b), C.R.S. 1998, provides that the term wages shall include the "reasonable value of board, rent, housing, and lodging received from the employer, the reasonable value of which shall be fixed and determined from the facts by the division in each particular case." Consequently, the "reasonable value" of lodging provided by the employer is a question of fact which must be determined from the "multitude of circumstances which may affect the possible cost of the benefit to the employer or to the employee." Western Cultural Resource Management, Inc. v. Krull, 782 P.2d 870 (Colo.App. 1989).
Because the issue of the reasonable value of housing is one of fact, we must uphold the ALJ's order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 1998. This standard of review requires us to defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, his credibility determinations, and the plausible inferences he drew from the evidence. Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995). There is no requirement that the ALJ credit the testimony of a witness even if it is unrefuted or uncontroverted. Cary v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 867 P.2d 117 (Colo.App. 1993). Moreover, the ALJ may credit part but not all of the testimony of a particular witness. Monfort, Inc. v. Rangel, 867 P.2d 122 (Colo.App. 1993). Further, there is no requirement that the ALJ render a specific explanation of how he arrived at his credibility determinations. Wells v. Del Norte School District C-7, 753 P.2d 770 (Colo.App. 1987).
Here, there is no basis for interfering with the ALJ's decision to discredit the wife's testimony concerning the value of the trailer. The mere fact that the testimony was not directly controverted did not require the ALJ to believe it. This is particularly true since the ALJ could infer that the wife had a financial motive to exaggerate or fabricate her testimony. Moreover, the record contains evidence that the trailer was a 1966 model and could not be fairly compared to the modern trailers described by the RV dealers.
Further, the fact that the ALJ credited the wife's testimony concerning the existence of temporary total disability does not require a different result. The wife's testimony concerning temporary total disability was corroborated by medical evidence, while her testimony concerning the value of the trailer was uncorroborated. In any event, the ALJ had discretion to credit only part of the testimony.
Thus, the evidence fully supports the ALJ's decision not to add additional amounts to the claimant's average weekly wage based on the alleged value of the trailer. The mere fact that the evidence might have supported another conclusion affords no basis for relief on appeal. May D F v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 752 P.2d 589 (Colo.App. 1988).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated July 20, 1998, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
___________________________________ David Cain
___________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C.R.S. 1998.
Copies of this decision were mailed May 5, 1999 the following parties:
Scott A. Wolfe, Colorado Department of Corrections, Reg. No. 55227, Unit FCF, P.O. Box 999, Canon City, CO 81215-0999
Motion Services Management, Inc., 324 Platte St., Sterling, CO 80751-3151
Laurie A. Schoder, Esq., Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority — Interagency Mail (For Respondents)
Alexander G. Topakas, Esq., 4450 Arapahoe Ave., #100, Boulder, CO 80303 (For Claimant)
Michael Goodman, Esq., 1700 Broadway, #1700, Denver, CO 80290-1701
By: LE