Opinion
W.C. No. 4-627-742.
February 13, 2006.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Jones (ALJ) dated September 30, 2005 that dismissed the claim. The claimant contends that the ALJ's order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
The ALJ's pertinent findings of fact may be summarized as follows. The claimant was employed as a registered nurse on September 11, 2004, when she injured her right knee while showing a new patient the room to which the patient had been assigned. The claimant was standing behind the wheelchair in which the patient sat, with her back to the patient. When she turned to again face the wheelchair the claimant felt severe pain in her knee. The ALJ credited the testimony of Dana Jennings, who is the employer's occupational health nurse responsible for completing paperwork for workers' compensation claims. Jennings testified that the claimant left a message reporting the injury, in which she stated that she injured her knee while walking. The claimant later submitted a report to Jennings in which the claimant stated that she was standing behind the patient, facing away from the wheelchair. When she took a step to turn and face the patient she felt a pain in her knee. The ALJ also found that there was no special hazard present that contributed to the injury.
Based upon her findings, the ALJ concluded that the claimant failed to establish that her injury arose out her employment. Accordingly, she denied the claim. The claimant appealed and contends that two of the ALJ's factual findings pertinent to the mechanism of the injury are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. We disagree and therefore affirm the order.
To recover workers' compensation benefits, the claimant must prove she suffered a compensable injury. A compensable injury is one which arises out of and in the course of employment. § 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2005. The "arising out of" test is one of causation. It requires that the injury have its origin in an employee's work-related functions, and be sufficiently related thereto so as to be considered part of the employee's service to the employer. In this regard, there is no presumption that an injury which occurs in the course of a worker's employment arises out of the employment. Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968); see also, Industrial Commission v. London Lancashire Indemnity Co., 135 Colo. 372, 311 P.2d 705 (1957) (mere fact that the decedent fell to his death on the employer's premises did not give rise to presumption that the fall arose out of and in course of employment). Rather, it is the claimant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a direct causal relationship between the employment and the injuries. § 8-43-201, C.R.S. 2005; Ramsdell v, Horn, 781 P.2d 150 (Colo.App. 1989).
The determination of whether there is a sufficient "nexus" or causal relationship between the claimant's employment and the injury is one of fact which the ALJ must determine based on the totality of the circumstances. In Re Question Submitted by the United States Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1988); Moorhead Machinery Boiler Co. v. Del Valle, 934 P.2d 861 (Colo.App. 1996). We must uphold the ALJ's determinations if supported by substantial evidence in the record. § 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2005. Under this standard, we must defer to the ALJ's credibility determinations, her resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and her assessment of the sufficiency and probative weight of the evidence. Arenas v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 8 P.3d. 558 (Colo.App. 2000); Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990).
The claimant first contends that the ALJ's finding of fact No. 2 is unsupported by the record. That finding states that:
The claimant stood behind the wheelchair as she showed the patient around the room to which the patient was assigned. Positioned behind the wheelchair, the claimant turned her back to the patient, indicating to the patient an area of the room behind her. As the claimant turned around to resume her tour of the room in from of her, the claimant felt severe pain in her right knee. There was no special hazard of the employment that contributed to the claimant's right knee injury.
The claimant argues that the finding suggests that she was injured while merely turning and taking a step, whereas the record reflects that the injury occurred when the claimant was required to step around the patient's wheelchair, which was therefore a special hazard of the employment. Initially, we note that it was unnecessary for the claimant to establish that a special hazard of employment contributed to the injury in this case. The requirement to show a "special hazard" applies only where the precipitating cause of an injury is a preexisting, non-industrial condition, which the claimant brings to the workplace. National Health Laboratories v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 844 P.2d 1259 (Colo.App. 1992); Ramsdell v. Horn, 781 P.2d 150 (Colo.App. 1989). Although the claimant testified that she had experienced previous problems with her left knee, including a surgical total knee replacement, the ALJ did not find that any preexisting right knee problems precipitated or contributed to the claimant's injury here. Hence, because the ALJ did not find that the claimant's preexisting condition was the cause of the injury, it was unnecessary for the claimant to show that a special hazard contributed to the accident or the injury sustained. See Hembry v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 878 P.2d 114 (Colo.App. 1994).
It was necessary, however, in order to satisfy the "arising out of" requirement, for the claimant to show that her injury was caused by the conditions of her employment. As argued by the claimant, in Finding of Fact No. 2 the ALJ found that the mechanism of the injury was the claimant's merely turning and taking a step in order to return from behind the wheelchair and again face the patient. The ALJ did not find that any awkward or unusual movements were required, either by the wheelchair or by any other condition of the claimant's employment. Indeed, the claimant concedes that the ALJ's conclusion is correct if the claimant "was simply stepping in a room and turning. . . ." Brief in Support of Petition to Review at 2. As we read the ALJ's findings, she essentially found that the claimant's injury occurred upon the mere turning and taking by the claimant of a step toward the front of the wheelchair.
Contrary to the claimant's argument, this finding is supported by the record and by reasonable inferences from it. The claimant testified that she had stepped around to the rear of the wheelchair in order to point out certain features of the room. Tr. at 10. In response to her counsel's question regarding what then happened, she replied, "I turned and took a step behind her to come around in front of her and face her again and as I took a step on my knee, sharp pain and couldn't put weight on my knee." Tr. at 10 (emphasis added). The claimant later reiterated that the injury occurred when "it was the first step that I took. . . ." Tr. at 12. In our view the ALJ's Finding of Fact No. 2 is a reasonable inference from the record.
The findings of fact are sufficient to permit appellate review, and they are supported by substantial evidence in the record and by reasonable inferences from the record. Further, the ALJ's findings support the pertinent conclusions of law and the order denying the claim. Under these circumstances, we decline to disturb the ALJ's order that the claimant failed to carry her burden to prove a compensable injury.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated September 30, 2005, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ Curt Kriksciun
____________________________________ Thomas Schrant
Sandy Willis, Englewood, CO, Craig Hospital, Englewood, CO, Steve Gabriel, Liberty Insurance Company, Englewood, CO, Peter H. McGuire, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Claimant).
Scott M. Busser, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).