Opinion
No. 08-18-00189-CV
04-30-2021
In the MATTER OF the Expunction of V.R.
Amanda Frizzelle, Kevin McCary, El Paso, Donnie Keith McGilbra, Jo Anne Bernal, for Appellant. Theresa Caballero, El Paso, for Appellee.
Amanda Frizzelle, Kevin McCary, El Paso, Donnie Keith McGilbra, Jo Anne Bernal, for Appellant.
Theresa Caballero, El Paso, for Appellee.
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
OPINION
GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice
Appellants, the El Paso County Attorney's Office, El Paso County Sheriff's Office, El Paso County Clerk's Office, District Attorney's Office, District Clerk's Office, Records Management and Archives, West Texas Community Supervision and Corrections Department, El Paso County Court Administration, and Jail Magistrate (collectively, the County), appeal an order granting expunction of all records relating to an arrest of Appellee, V.R., for indecency with a child by sexual contact under cause number 20140D04367 in the 346th District Court of El Paso County, Texas. We issued our original opinion in this case on November 30, 2020. The County filed a motion for rehearing. We withdraw our original opinion and substitute this opinion in its place. The County's motion for rehearing is denied.
In a single issue, the County argues that V.R. failed to prove she was entitled to an expunction under either of the following applicable subsections of article 55.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure : (1) that the prosecution of the offense for which she was arrested was no longer possible because the statute-of-limitations period had expired, pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2)(B) ; or (2) that the presentment of her indictment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating the absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe she committed the offense, pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's order of expunction.
V.R. did not file a brief in this Court, and the case was therefore submitted on the County's brief alone.
BACKGROUND
V.R. worked as a homecare provider taking care of children and adults. Employed with an agency, V.R. was assigned to work in a private residence caring for a child who was physically disabled. The child, a 10-year-old boy, was not able to walk or perform many daily activities without assistance due to a condition that weakened the muscles of his body. Three other children lived in the home, two of whom were also disabled and received like care from other caretakers. The mother of the children always remained present while an aunt took care of the oldest child, V.R. took care of the middle child, and another person took care of the youngest girl. While working, V.R. fed the child under her care, changed his diaper, if needed, and moved him back and forth from his wheelchair to his bed.
At the expunction hearing, V.R. testified she was falsely accused of molesting the child under her care. She described that her supervisor had simply stopped her job. After two years went by, she was detained by immigration when she returned to El Paso from a trip to Juarez, Mexico. Until then, she was unaware that an arrest warrant had been issued against her. Following her arrest, V.R. was indicted. The State of Texas, as the prosecuting authority, charged V.R. with indecency with a child by sexual contact. The charge included three paragraphs alleging the following alternatively pleaded acts: (1) touching the male complainant's genitals; (2) causing him to touch her breast; or (3) causing him to touch her genitals.
Later, the State moved to dismiss the charge filed against V.R. The State's motion to dismiss reflected it had moved for a dismissal because "[Complaining Witness's] family does not want to cooperate with prosecution." Granting the motion, the trial court dismissed the charge for the reasons stated by the motion.
Following dismissal of her case, and pursuant to article 55.01(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, V.R. filed a petition for expunction of records relating to her arrest for indecency with a child by sexual contact. The County filed a general denial, and the trial court held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, V.R. was the sole witness to testify, and the only other evidence consisted of the following three exhibits relating to the charge against V.R.: (1) the indictment; (2) the State's motion to dismiss the charge; and (3) the police reports and affidavit from the investigating officer.
At the hearing, V.R. testified she never molested the child under her care, never made him kiss her, never touched his genitals in a sexual manner, nor made him touch her breasts. She further stated that she was never left alone with any child as the other two caretakers were present with her the entire time. On cross-examination, when asked how she knew the accusations were false, V.R. replied: "Because I'm completely innocent. I didn't do anything." Asked a second time about being charged with indecency with a child, V.R. responded, "[t]hat's false on my part. I mean, I didn't do it."
The police department's investigation report detailed the responding officer's interview with the child's mother and with the child himself. The child's mother told the responding officer that, after V.R. had been employed for about three months, her son had reported to her that he had been "sexually abused by [V.R.]." When the boy's mother asked her son what he meant, he responded that V.R. had been touching him on his private parts and had also made him touch V.R.'s breast and vaginal area. The officer further noted that the child's mother reported that her child had no mental disabilities whatsoever; instead, his disabilities were strictly physical. The police report also included a typed summary of an interview with the child conducted by a forensic interviewer at the Advocacy Center. The child repeated the allegations against V.R. when interviewed. As part of their investigation, the report also reflected that the officers contacted V.R.'s attorney in an unsuccessful attempt to speak with V.R. with her attorney present.
After closing arguments, the trial court rendered an order granting V.R.'s petition for expunction "as provided by Article 55.01(a)(2), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure...." The County filed a motion for new trial, requested findings of fact and conclusions of law from the trial judge, and upon the expiration of that deadline, notified the trial court of its past due findings of fact and conclusions of law. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were entered by the trial court, no further hearings were held, and no other orders were entered. Subsequently, the County timely filed its notice of appeal from the expunction order.
Because the County declined to challenge the trial judge's failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, we need not address any matter related thereto. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
DISCUSSION
In a single issue, the County appeals the trial court's order granting V.R.'s petition for expunction and argues V.R. failed to prove the only ground of the two grounds on which expunction could have been granted. In granting the expunction, the trial court's order stated, "as provided by Article 55.01(a)(2), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure." The County frames the two possible grounds at issue as follows:
[V.R.] was indicted and the case was subsequently dismissed; therefore, there are two ways she may have qualified for an expunction. First, she could have shown that the statute of limitations ran.... Second, [V.R.] could have proven that the grand jury's indictment was dismissed due to mistake of fact (or some similar reason), indicating a lack of probable cause.
Of the two grounds stated, we need only address the second ground because it alone is sufficient to uphold the trial court's order. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.1.
Standard of Review
The right to an expunction is neither a constitutional nor common-law right, but rather a statutory privilege. In re Expunction of J.R. , 578 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.). An expunction cannot be granted unless the statutory requirements are satisfied. Id. ; see also State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018) ("A person is not entitled to expunction until all of the statutory conditions are met."). An expunction proceeding is civil in nature, and accordingly, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that all statutory requirements have been met. In re Expunction of J.R. , 578 S.W.3d at 274.
A trial court's ruling on a petition for expunction is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte E.H. , 602 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. 2020) ; State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or it its actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. See In re S.S.A. , 319 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). When an appellant asserts that a petitioner failed to prove entitlement to expunction, as was argued here, we apply the traditional legal sufficiency standard of review. In re Expunction of J.A. , 186 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.).
We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only if the record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. In Matter of Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d 591, 594–95 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005) ). In conducting our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. In Matter of Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 594–95 ; see also City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d at 810. Further, we indulge every reasonable inference that would support the ruling. In Matter of Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 595.
Applicable Law
Under article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a petitioner who was arrested for the commission of a felony is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if they prove (1) the petitioner has been released; (2) the charge, if any, is no longer pending; (3) the charge did not result in a final conviction or court-ordered community supervision; and (4) the indictment charging the petitioner with commission of the felony was dismissed because "the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense...." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). The County challenges only the fourth statutory requirement in this appeal.
A finding that the presentment of an indictment was made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating the absence of probable cause requires proof that the grand jury based its decision on erroneous facts. See In re Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 596. In that vein, dismissal of an indictment based on insufficient evidence to obtain a conviction cannot be the basis of an expunction. Id. Moreover, our sister courts have consistently held that the unavailability, incompetency, or unwillingness of a key witness to testify at the time of trial is not evidence that the presentment of the charging instrument was made due to false information, mistake, or other reason indicating a lack of probable cause. However, in expunction proceedings, the trial court may look beyond the reasons given by the prosecutor when examining the reason for a dismissal. Id. ; see also Gomez v. Beaumont Police Dep't , No. 09-06-461-CV, 2007 WL 1364621, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 10, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("To hold otherwise would in effect allow the prosecutor alone to adjudicate expunction and force upon the petitioner an impossible burden."). "The expunction court may look at any admissible evidence to determine the State's true reason for dismissal." Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. Hopson , 880 S.W.2d 1, 3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
See In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , No. 08-18-00087-CV, 2019 WL 5206000, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 16, 2019, no pet.) (citing T.L.B., Jr. v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety , No. 03-10-00196-CV, 2011 WL 182889, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (surveying cases holding that the unavailability, incompetency, or unwillingness of a key witness is not evidence that the presentment of a charging instrument was made due to false information, mistake, or other reason indicating lack of probable cause); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Collmorgen , No. 14-06-00478-CV, 2007 WL 853812, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 22, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same)).
Previously, in In re Expunction of A.M. , this Court affirmed a trial court's order granting an expunction on the basis that there was more than a scintilla of evidence that the State dismissed the case because presentment of the indictment was made due to false information indicating absence of probable cause to believe that the petitioner committed the offense. 511 S.W.3d at 596. In that case, petitioner A.M. was indicted for two counts of sexual assault committed against his 14-year-old daughter, B.M. Id. at 593. Police reports of the complaint reflected that B.M. reported A.M. had ejaculated on both her person and her bed sheets during the commission of the offense. Id. at 595. Eventually, the State filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court granted the dismissal. Id. at 593. Subsequently, A.M. filed a petition to expunge the records relating to the case pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii) wherein he alleged the presentment of the indictment against him had been made because of mistake, false information, or some other reason indicating an absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe that he committed the charged offense. Id. at 594–95.
At the hearing held on the expunction petition, A.M. testified he was falsely accused. Id. at 595. Additionally, he presented evidence showing that a post-indictment DNA analysis of B.M.'s underwear and other evidence determined he could be excluded as a possible contributor of sperm identified on the evidence. Id. Observing that the grand jurors did not have the benefit of the evidence, we concluded that the trial court could have properly determined that the grand jury based its decision on erroneous facts. Id. at 596. We further held that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that B.M. had falsely accused her father of sexual assault based on testimony he provided at the hearing. Id. Specifically, A.M. testified that his job required his family to move frequently, and that B.M.'s outcry surfaced only one day after he told his family of an impending move to South Africa. A.M. described that B.M. protested "because she did [not] want to move away from her grandmother." Id. at 595. Ultimately, we held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's order granting the petition for expunction. Id. at 596. We also observe that in Barker v. State , the Second Court of Appeals addressed a similar circumstance as our own but in a reverse procedural posture—that is, an appeal by the petitioner from the trial court's denial of his petition for expunction of records pertaining to an arrest for attempted sexual assault. Barker v. State , 84 S.W.3d 409, 410 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). There, the petitioner similarly alleged that he was entitled to an expunction because his indictment was dismissed because of mistake, false information, or some other reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe that he committed the offense. Id. at 412. Relying on his own testimony, along with that of his wife, Barker asserted the complainant's allegations against him were false. Id. Along with this evidence, the prosecution's motion to dismiss was introduced into evidence and recited that the prosecutors had made numerous attempts to get in contact with complainant. Id. The motion stated, "We have called her 8 times.... Without the help of the complainant the State cannot go forth with its case." Id. Additionally, the trial court knew that the complainant testified at an earlier trial that resulted in a hung jury. Id.
The Second Court of Appeals held the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court's denial of the expunction petition. See id. at 412–13. Our sister court held that, "[t]he trial court could also simply have disbelieved the testimony of Appellant and his wife, who were both interested witnesses." Id. The court squared the facts of its case in line with precedents instructing that the State's inability to locate a complainant is not evidence that presentment of an indictment was based on mistake, false information, or other reason indicating lack of probable cause. Id. Affirming the denial of the petition, Barker reasoned that the trial court "could reasonably have concluded that the complainant testified against Appellant in the first trial and simply did not want to testify a second time." Id. at 413.
Having laid the analytical framework, we turn to the sufficiency of the evidence presented in this record to determine whether it supports the trial court's grant of V.R.'s petition for expunction.
Application
Here, V.R. testified that she had been hired to provide in-home care to the child who is the complaining witness and subject of the charge. In that role, her duties included changing the diaper of the child, moving him from his bed to his wheelchair, and other care-related activities. V.R. explicitly stated that the accusations of abuse or unlawful touching which were made against her were false.
Additional to V.R.'s testimony, the trial court received a copy of the police investigation detailing the complaint initiated by the child's mother who had contacted police to report that her 10-year-old son had told her he had been touched inappropriately by V.R. The child's mother described that V.R. had been working in her home for the past three months providing general care to her son who suffered from a disease which made his muscles very weak such that he was unable to walk and do many other activities. The child's mother reported that V.R. would assist with changing her son's diaper and provide other general care. She reported that, three weeks ago, her son told her he did not trust V.R. When she asked him why he did not say anything else. But then, the day before she reported to the police, her son told her he had been "sexually abused by [V.R.]" When she asked what he meant by that, her son advised that V.R. "had been touching him on his private parts and had also made [him] touch [V.R.'s] breast and vaginal area."
The police investigation also included a supplement containing a forensic interview of the complaining witness. The child was interviewed at the Advocacy Center. The interviewer reported the child advised he was in the 5th grade; he was able to state his full name and spell his middle name out. When asked about what happened with V.R., the child reported that "she would grab his penis and do sex with it." When asked to explain, the interviewer reported, "he could not explain it." The child further stated, "she would grab his butt and have have [sic] him grab hers by forcing his hand to touch her butt."
As part of our sufficiency review, we must assume that the trial court credited evidence favorable to its ruling, if a reasonable fact finder could, and disregarded all evidence to the contrary, unless a reasonable fact finder could not. See In re Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 594–95 ; City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 807. With the trial court having ruled favorable to V.R., we find that this case more closely resembles In re Expunction of A.M. , as opposed to Barker or other similar cases which solely involved circumstances in which a complaining witness was unavailable, incompetent, or unwilling to testify at trial.
The most critical point to our analysis is that, like the case of In re Expunction of A.M. , we are charged with reviewing the trial court's grant of a petition for expunction rather than its denial. See id. at 593–94. The posture of the case, in our view, makes it distinguishable from Barker where our sister court reviewed an order denying an expunction. See Barker , 84 S.W.3d at 410. And we agree that, in reviewing a denial of an expunction, we must, of course, consider the possibility that the trial court "simply ... disbelieved the testimony of Appellant...." See id. at 413.
But here, the trial court credited V.R.'s testimony that the allegations against her were false, and we must afford that determination deference under our standard of review. See In re Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 594–95 ; City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 807. And like In re Expunction of A.M. , we believe V.R.'s testimony here supplies a basis for holding the evidence was legally sufficient for the trial court to reasonably conclude that the grand jury in V.R.'s criminal case based its decision on mistaken or erroneous facts. Despite the recital in the prosecutor's motion to dismiss stating that the reason for dismissal was that the complaining witness's family did not want to cooperate with prosecution, the trial court was entitled to look beyond the reasons given by the prosecutor. See id. at 596 ; see also Gomez , 2007 WL 1364621, at *3. The court apparently chose to do so when it favorably credited V.R.'s testimony that the allegations against her were false and granted her expunction. This is especially evident when looking at the trial judge's dialog with the State during the expunction hearing: "Unfortunately, in a perfect world, in a world that I live in, a prosecutor whose maybe had an opportunity to talk to that complaining witness might have made the decision, this lady is innocent. I'm dismissing this case because these allegations shouldn't have been brought. Unfortunately, I think even sometimes in those cases, the dismissal will say cooperation not afforded or whatever."
We acknowledge that In re Expunction of A.M. presented a situation where the petitioner showed that post-indictment DNA analysis excluded him as a possible perpetrator in addition to testifying that he was falsely accused. See In re Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 595. But in this case, no similar, potentially exonerating DNA evidence existed regarding the child's allegations. Therefore, even though some scenarios may possibly include exculpatory DNA evidence, in this instance and relevant to the alleged acts, we conclude that were we to require V.R. to show similar evidence would be nonsensical—and flatly impossible—under these particular facts.
Furthermore, we think the trial court's factfinding or credibility determination as to V.R.'s testimony supplies just as reasonable of a basis for finding that the grand jury based its decision on erroneous facts. See id. at 596 (holding that a finding that the presentment of an indictment was made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating the absence of probable cause requires proof that the grand jury based its decision on erroneous facts); cf. In re Expunction of R.R. , 342 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (holding that the petitioner proved the charge against him was dismissed because the presentment was made due to mistake, false information, or some other reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe he committed the offense where, relying solely on his own testimony, the petitioner testified that: (1) he did not know why he was arrested for family-violence assault; (2) he was not present at the scene of the crime; (3) he did not know the assault victim; (4) the district attorney decided he was not the assailant after reviewing a video of the person who committed the offense and comparing it to petitioner; and (5) the district attorney dismissed the case after viewing the video). This favorable factfinding that the allegation against V.R. was false is especially critical where the case boils down to a determination about whether the sole source of V.R.'s alleged criminal activity—the complaining witness here—was mistaken or otherwise offered false information. Cf. Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Hopson , 880 S.W.2d 1, 4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (holding that the petitioner met his burden to show that the presentment of his indictment had been made because of mistake, false information, or some other reason indicating an absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal where the petitioner showed that the State's entire case rested on the complaining witness alone and where the petitioner showed that the complainant was unable to identify the petitioner as her assailant during an occasion on the day of the scheduled trial during which the prosecutor conducted an informal identification procedure in the courtroom).
While our decision in this appeal would have been made easier with the presentation of physical or scientific evidence that tended to exculpate V.R. (thereby bringing this case more closely in line with In re Expunction of A.M. ), we nonetheless recognize that such fortuitous evidence would not likely be available to an accused in every case that otherwise merits an expunction. Holding that such evidence is required to obtain an expunction on the basis that an indictment had been made because of some error would preclude possibly innocent defendants from ever obtaining an expunction. We think that such a requirement would be unsound where a trial court has ruled favorably to the petitioner, based on his or her credibility, and given due consideration to the circumstances of the case.
We therefore hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's expunction order, under the basis that the presentment of the indictment was made because of mistake, false information, or some other reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense. The record supports that the trial court chose to favorably credit the petitioner's testimony that she was falsely accused, especially considering there was no evidence conclusively establishing the opposite. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d) ; see also In re Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 594 (explaining the situations in which a legal-sufficiency challenge may be sustained).
Response to the Motion for Rehearing
By motion for rehearing, the County brings our attention to In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , No. 08-18-00087-CV, 2019 WL 5206000, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 16, 2019, no pet.) and In re Expunction of A.H. , 580 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.), two cases it had not previously cited in its argument because both were decided after the County had already filed its brief in this case. As the County points out on rehearing, we found in both cases the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a petition for expunction under article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same provision relied on here, and reversed the trial court's order. See In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , 2019 WL 5206000, at *1 ; In re Expunction of A.H. , 580 S.W.3d at 844 ; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). On rehearing, the County argues we are bound to follow both of these precedents. Because there are important differences between the record presented in In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , and In re Expunction of A.H. , as compared to our appellate record here, we disagree.
First, in In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , we stated that article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d) requires, to be entitled to the expunction of records, that "the petitioner must show that the original presentment of the indictment was made because of mistake, false information, or other reason that would, at the time of the dismissal, indicate a lack of probable cause to believe the person committed the offense." 2019 WL 5206000, at *4. We found that the trial court erred in granting petitioner's expunction because he failed to establish all statutory requirements. Id. , at *5. In seeking an expunction of his arrest record, E.G.-L. testified that his offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child had been tried to a jury. Id. E.G.-L. further described that the prosecutor "called the victim to the stand but was unable to get the victim to testify about the allegations of the offense." Id. E.G.-L. confirmed on cross-examination that the case was dismissed, "specifically, because the victim refused to testify." Id.
The trial court, having presided over E.G.-L's criminal proceeding, stated on the record that it had personal knowledge that the purported victim did not refuse to testify; but rather, regarding the allegations, "[s]he denied them." Id. Yet, in formal findings of fact, the trial court found, "that the victim did not testify about E.G.-L.'s offense after answering preliminary questions asked by the district attorney and that the district attorney moved to dismiss the charge because the victim refused to testify." Id. In short, even though E.G.-L. testified, the focus of his testimony concerned what happened solely at the criminal trial without affirmatively testifying to the falsity of information the prosecution relied on to procure an indictment. Id. Unlike our record here, we found that neither E.G.-L's testimony nor the trial court's findings satisfied the proof requirements for an expunction due to a presentment based on mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense. Id. Similar to the record of In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , the record of In re Expunction of A.H. also lacks affirmative proof of mistake and falsity sufficient to establish the statutory requirements for entitlement to an expunction under article 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(d). In In re Expunction of A.H. , the petitioner had been charged with multiple aggravated sex offenses against various children who had been placed in his home due to their need for foster care. 580 S.W.3d at 844-45. Prior to trial, the criminal charges were dismissed based on "prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 845. A.H. then petitioned for an expunction, which the trial court granted, finding there was an absence of probable cause "at the time of dismissal." Id. at 846. In sustaining the County's issue contending that A.H. was not entitled to an expunction under the same provision as V.R., we described that "the focus of the statute is on the state of the evidence that was presented to the grand jury to support the indictment." Id. at 850. Although charges were dismissed, petitioner A.H. presented no testimony establishing the indictment was based on mistake, false information, or other similar reason. Id. at 851.
As distinct from In re Expunction of E.G.-L. , and In re Expunction of A.H. , our appellate record shows that V.R. affirmatively testified to the falsity of the accusations supporting the indictment. Her testimony included her description of the context of the events and that she provided home health care for the child due to his disability. She described that she changed his diaper, fed him, and moved him back and forth from his wheelchair to his bed. We reiterate that we view V.R.'s case as being akin to In re Expunction of A.M. , 511 S.W.3d at 594, with regard to the state of the expunction record. Even though the specifics in In re Expunction of A.M. involved exculpatory DNA evidence, the same being impossible for V.R. to bring forth and not relevant to the charges here, the record nonetheless established the trial court reasonably conclude the requirements for expunction were met through the petitioner's testimony and record as a whole. See id. at 596. In addition to V.R.'s testimony, the trial court was entitled to look beyond the reasons given by the prosecutor to determine the State's true reason for dismissal of the case. Gomez , 2007 WL 1364621, at *3 ; Hopson , 880 S.W.2d at 3-4.
We overrule the County's sole issue in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's expunction order.
(Justice Alley would grant the Motion for Rehearing)