Opinion
W.C. No. 4-462-671
April 16, 2003
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Henk (ALJ) insofar as the ALJ required the repayment of medical impairment benefits. We reverse.
In May 2000 the claimant suffered an admitted low back injury. On January 3, 2002, an 8 percent whole person impairment rating was assigned. Pursuant to a Final Admission the respondent paid the claimant medical impairment benefits of $14,117.53 during March and April 2002.
On February 11, 2002, the claimant was convicted of a felony and sentenced to 6 years in community corrections. The claimant was immediately taken into custody and confined in the Adams County Detention Center. On February 15 the claimant was admitted to the "Time to Change" community corrections program which leased space at the Adams County Detention Center. Consequently, the claimant remained housed at the Adams County Detention Center. Pursuant to the community corrections work program the claimant was employed full-time from February 14, 2002 to March 27, 2002, when he could no longer work because of permanent impairment from the industrial injury.
Section 8-42-113(1), C.R.S. 2002, provides that:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any individual who is otherwise entitled to benefits under [the Act] shall neither receive nor be entitled to such benefits for any week following conviction during which such individual is confined in a jail, prison, or any department of corrections facility. (Emphasis added).
The statute also provides that an individual who is ineligible shall repay the insurer for any workers' compensation benefits received while not eligible. In the context of § 8-42- 113(1) the term "benefits" includes medical impairment benefits. Salazar v. Hi-Land Potato Co., 917 P.2d 326 (Colo.App. 1996).
The ALJ determined the Adams County Detention Facility is a "jail." Relying on People v. Hoecher, 822 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1991), and Beecroft v. People, 874 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1994), the ALJ further determined that residency in a community corrections program is equivalent to confinement in a jail. Therefore, the ALJ determined the claimant was ineligible for medical impairment benefits when the respondent paid benefits of $14,117.53. Under these circumstances, the ALJ ordered the claimant to repay all such benefits.
On review, the claimant contends, inter alia, that § 8-42-113 is not applicable to this claim. We agree and, therefore, reverse the contested portion of the ALJ's order.
Section 8-42-113(1) is only applicable where the claimant is confined in a jail, prison, or department of corrections facility. It is undisputed the claimant was not confined to prison and there is no evidence he was sentenced to department of corrections facility. Furthermore, we conclude the claimant was not "confined in a jail" within the meaning of § 8-42-113(1).
Resolution of the claimant's argument requires that we determine the meaning of the term "confined in a jail". The rules of statutory construction require that we construe the statute to give effect to the legislative intent. Hafelfinger v. District Court, 674 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1984) ; Bestway Concrete v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 984 P.2d 680 (Colo.App. 1999).
One of the purposes of workers' compensation is to protect employees injured in the course of their employment from becoming wards of the state by providing compensation for loss of earning capacity. Wood v. Beatrice Foods Co., 813 P.2d 821, 824 (Colo.App. 1991). In Woods v. Beatrice Foods Co., supra, the court noted that persons confined to a prison "have little, if any, opportunity for earning as compared to the general population." Because these inmates have no significant employment opportunities "the payment of compensation would not prevent them from becoming wards of the state, because the state pays for their basic physical needs in prison." Therefore, § 8-42-113(1) is designed to "remedy the perceived unfairness of requiring employers and insurance carriers to pay benefits as compensation for lost earning capacity to persons who have no earning capacity because their imprisonment has removed them from the work force." 813 P.2d 821; Salazar v. Hi-Land Potato Co., supra.
Community corrections is a sentencing alternative which is more severe than probation and less harsh than incarceration in a jail or department of corrections facility such as a prison. Beecroft v. People, supra. It is designed to retain the offender of less severe offenses in the community at a cost far less than 24 hour confinement in a jail or prison by requiring the offender to maintain full time employment and apply his wages towards rent, other living expenses and restitution. See § 17-27-103(3), C.R.S. 2002; Claimant's Hearing Exhibit 6.
We do not dispute that the Adams County Detention Center is a "jail." Furthermore, as found by the ALJ, People v. Hoecher, supra, and Beecroft v. People, supra, both indicate that confinement as a resident in a community corrections program imposes sufficient restrictions on liberty to justify credit for time served. However, neither case purports to address the issue of whether residential status in a community corrections program is equivalent to confinement in a jail for purposes other than calculating credit for good time served, and they certainly do not address the meaning of "confinement" in § 8-42-113(1). Accordingly, we are not persuaded Hoecher and Beecroft compel a conclusion that residency in a community corrections facility is synonymous with confinement in a "jail." See Hendrickson v. Spitzer Masonry, W.C. No. 4-221-814 (October 15, 2002).
To the contrary, People v. Hoecher, supra, and Beecroft v. People, supra, involve issues of criminal law and confinement which impairs an offender's personal liberties. In contrast, medical impairment benefits paid by the Workers' Compensation Act are designed to compensate for an injured worker's loss of earning potential. It necessarily follows that § 8-42-113(1) is focused on confinement which impairs the offender's earning capacity.
Here, the claimant was sentenced to a community corrections program that leased space from the Adams County Detention Center because it did not have its own facility. (Tr. pp. 18, 26). However, he ALJ explicitly found the claimant entered the correction program on February 15, 2002, even through he remained housed at the Adams County Detention Center. Further, the claimant did not experience the same restrictions imposed on inmates of the jail, and was at liberty to leave the premises to go to work.
Moreover, it cannot be disputed the claimant had employment, and thus an earning capacity, at the time he entered the community corrections program. Consequently, this is not a situation where the claimant's confinement eliminated all meaningful employment opportunities. Rather, the claimant remained employed as part of the community corrections program until the residual effects of the industrial injury caused him to lose the job. Accordingly, the claimant did not become a ward of the state as a result of his criminal conviction. Rather, the claimant was earning wages to pay for his room and board until he was physically precluded from working because of the industrial injury. Put another way, the claimant's financial dependence on the state of Colorado was the result of the industrial injury, not the conviction. Under these circumstances, it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of § 8-42-113(1) to transfer the financial burden of the claimant's wage loss from the employer to taxpayers. Indeed, such a conclusion would result in disparate treatment of claimants who are sentenced to community corrections programs that have a separate facility and are not dependent on leasing space at a county jail.
Consequently, we conclude the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant was "confined in a jail" at the time he received medical impairment benefits. Therefore, we set aside the ALJ's order which requires the claimant to repay the permanent partial disability award.
In view of our disposition we need not consider the claimant's remaining arguments in support of his challenge to the reimbursement order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated November 7, 2002, is reversed insofar as it required the claimant to repay permanent impairment benefits.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ David Cain
____________________________________ Kathy E. Dean
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2002. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202.
Copies of this decision were mailed April 16, 2003 to the following parties:
Hilario Vasquez, c/o The Phoenix Center, 8031 Highway I-76, Henderson, CO 80640
Mary Padilla, Adjuster, 201 W. Colfax Ave., Dept. 1105, Denver, CO 80202
J. J. Fraser, III, Esq., 501 S. Cherry St., #500, Denver, CO 80246 (For Claimant)
Olivia L. Hudson Smith, Esq., 201 W. Colfax Ave., Dept. 1108, Denver, CO 80202 (For Respondent)
BY: A. Hurtado