Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jack J. Gold, Commissioner. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PJ41405
Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Vanessa V. appeals from an order of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) following a finding she committed two counts of first degree residential burglary, count 1 pertaining to victim Karine Sargsyan, and count 3 pertaining to victim Yajaira Yoque, (Pen. Code, § 459). She was placed home on probation in the home of her mother and contends the finding she committed the burglaries must be reversed because the carport did not fall within the definition of an inhabited dwelling house. For reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Yajaira Yoque lived at 6716 Whitsett Avenue, number 2, in North Hollywood. On August 6, 2007, she was told by police that her car had been broken into. The driver’s side window was smashed and two Walkman players and an iPod were no longer in her car. The night before, she had parked and locked her Toyota Camry automobile in a parking stall behind her building. She identified petitioner’s exhibit number 2 as a photograph of the back of her building depicting spot number 1, where her car had been parked.
Karine Sargsyan lived at 6660 Whitsett Avenue, apartment 209, in North Hollywood. On August 6, she observed that the window of her black 2007 Nissan Altima had been smashed, its door was damaged and its navigation system was missing. Her vehicle had been parked in a carport at the rear of her apartment building. She identified petitioner’s exhibit number 1 as a photograph of her garage, the empty stall in the middle of the photograph being her parking space.
On August 6, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Ben Ellis was on patrol in the area of Whitsett Avenue and Archwood Street in North Hollywood and received a radio call of a possible burglary in the area. When he arrived in the area, he observed appellant and two males attempting to enter a blue minivan. The van was parked directly behind the Camry and just to the north of the Altima. One of the males turned toward Officer Ellis and his partner and said, “Oh, shit. It’s the police.” The three took off running northbound through the alley and then eastbound through another alley. The two males scaled a wall and ran northbound through an apartment complex. Appellant stopped running, “put her hands over her head, and put herself up against the wall submitting.” Following waiver of her Miranda rights, appellant stated she was in the van with the two suspects and saw them looking into vehicles. One of her companions got out of the van, approached the driver’s side of the black Nissan, broke the window, entered the vehicle and removed the navigation system, and returned to the van. That same companion broke into a green Toyota Camry. Appellant also entered the Camry to grab a bottle of Gatorade because she was thirsty. From the blue minivan, the officers recovered a cloth bag and black wallet with Yoque’s name and address in it along with several electronic products. Officer Ellis testified the Camry had been parked in a parking stall.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
In moving to dismiss counts 1 and 3 after presentation of the petitioner’s evidence, defense counsel argued nothing was taken from the home. The issue was whether “the garage” qualified. There was no door on “the garage,” there was no evidence as to how “the garages” were connected to the residences. “It looks like a carport which generally ends up into a public area which opens up into apartment buildings, not into anyone’s private residence.” Defense counsel continued there was “no evidence shown what the relationship of the garages are to where these individuals lived. You know they live in apartments at a certain address, but there is no indication their particular apartment shared a wall with the carport in any event.”
In response, the prosecution argued that case authority all referred to “an attached garage being part of a dwelling house, a house that has been broadly defined as any structure which has walls on all sides and covered by a roof. Further, whether the structure is part of an inhabited dwelling, essentially it’s whether the structure is functioning and interconnected with the immediate continuance of the other portions of the house. There is no doubt based upon petitioner’s 1 and 2 the structure is part of the overall housing structure meaning the carport area is part of the overall house structure.”
The prosecution continued that it presented evidence regarding these structures in the form of pictures. Further, with respect to the Sargsyan building, there was no access by other people living in those apartment buildings to that specific carport. Regarding the Yoque carport, counsel argued it met the criteria. “[T]here are four walls to this dwelling. The carport sits directly underneath the residential building, the apartment building. There is a roof on top. And so the carport specifically fits the dwelling, meaning the apartments in this case.”
The court concluded, based on the state of the law, that an attached garage to an apartment building sufficed as residential under Penal Code section 459.
Following the denial of the motion to dismiss, appellant testified in her defense that she knew what her companions were going to do and had asked the driver to take her home. She had been asked to act as a lookout but said she did not want to “get into it.” One of her companions took the Gatorade out of the Camry and put it in the van. Appellant drank the Gatorade but did not take it out of the Camry. She was out of the van when the police arrived. She never told the officer she went inside the Camry, took a Gatorade, and drank it.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support two residential burglaries claiming the carport did not fall within the definition of an inhabited dwelling house. Specifically she claims there was insufficient evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude that the carport’s composition was such that a reasonable person would expect some protection from unauthorized intrusion.
Pursuant to our order of September 28, 2009, the trial court met and conferred with trial counsel for the purpose of settling the record in reference to petitioner’s exhibits 2 and 4. Thereafter, exact photocopies of the above-referenced exhibits were filed with this court. While the record indicates there were two different carports, appellant argues as if there was only one carport in which both victims’ cars were parked.
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence–such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) “This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
“‘Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.] “Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1587.)
Under Penal Code section 459, “Every person who enters any house, room, apartment,... [or] other building,... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, ‘inhabited’ means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.” “Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house,... or the inhabited portion of any other building is burglary of the first degree.” (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a).) “All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.” (Id., subd. (b).)
“‘[T]he term “inhabited dwelling house” means a “structure where people ordinarily live and which is currently being used for dwelling purposes. [Citation.] A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Courts have broadly interpreted the term ‘inhabited dwelling house’ to include a variety of structures and places [citations] in order to effect the legislative purpose of the burglary statutes—‘to protect the peaceful occupation of one’s residence’ against intrusion and violence. [Citation.]” (People v. Thorn (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 255, 261.)
“‘In determining whether a structure is part of an inhabited dwelling, the essential inquiry is whether the structure is “functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘“Functionally interconnected” means used in related or complementary ways. “Contiguous” means adjacent, adjoining, nearby or close. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 262.)
Here, according to the record, including the photographs received as petitioner’s exhibits 1 and 2, the carports which were the subject of counts 1 and 3 were immediately contiguous to the apartments. They were attached to their respective apartment complexes, sharing walls, and immediately under occupied apartments. Further, the carports were functionally interconnected to the dwellings in that they provided parking facilities for only the designated residents of the apartments, allowing residents to park in a covered location convenient to their living space in the apartments. The carports were inextricably related or complementary to the living space in the apartments above. (See People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.)
Appellant argues the carport was not part of the inhabited building under the burglary statutes because it did not carry a reasonable expectation of protection from intrusion. She references petitioner’s exhibit 1 and notes the carport was attached to a large apartment complex, was completely open to the alley behind the complex, and the spaces in the carport served many different residents of the complex.
In In re Christopher J. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 76, 80, the court concluded a carport, which was walled only on one side and roofed, constituted an inhabited dwelling and came within the meaning of Penal Code section 459 despite its open nature because it was appurtenant to the dwelling house.
In People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 255, the defendant asserted carports were not the type of place in which people had a reasonable expectation of protection from intrusion. The appellate court, however, arrived at a different conclusion. It stated under the reasonable belief test, the question was whether the defendant’s “penetration into the open carport was an entry of the building for purposes of the burglary statute. Applying the reasonable belief test, [the court concluded] that the open entrance to the carport marked the outer boundary of the apartment building for purposes of burglary.... [A] reasonable person certainly would believe that the carport ‘enclosed an area into which a member of the general public could not pass without authorization.’ [Citation.] Indeed, a member of the general public such as [defendant] had no business entering the carport at issue here. It is enclosed on three sides. It is not open at either end or in such other way that it could be reasonably viewed as a throughway or a shortcut to some point beyond. It constitutes a private, individually designated parking space in which its occupant has a possessory interest for the purpose of parking his or her vehicle as well as storing personal possessions.” (Id. at p. 265.) The court’s analysis was not “swayed by the fact that there was no physical barrier to [the] entry of the carport.” (Ibid.)
Similarly here, a reasonable person would view the carports which are the subject of count 1 and count 3 as enclosed areas into which a member of the general public could not pass without authorization. Accordingly, even under the reasonable belief test, appellant’s entry of the carports with felonious intent constitutes first degree burglary.
DISPOSITION
The order of wardship is affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., WILLHITE, J.