Opinion
F054309
8-5-2008
In re TYRONE L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TYRONE L., Defendant and Appellant.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Barton Bowers and Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Hill, J. and Kane, J.
Formerly known as the California Youth Authority (Gov. Code, §§ 12838, subd. (a), 12838.3; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 202, subd. (e)(5), 1000, 1710, subd. (a)). The parties have used the term Division of Juvenile Justice in their briefs, but technically the correct term is now Division of Juvenile Facilities, as the above code sections indicate.
Tyrone L. appeals from a dispositional order committing him to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF)1 for a maximum confinement time of seven years after the juvenile court found true the allegations that he committed assault with intent to commit rape, burglary, robbery and assault by means likely to produce great bodily harm. Defense counsel had argued for a less restrictive placement. The juvenile court disagreed, primarily because of the egregious nature of the offenses perpetrated by Tyrone L. and his lack of remorse. On appeal, Tyrone L. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJF, imposing the maximum confinement period of seven years, and issuing a "no contact" order. Although we strike the "no contact" order, in all other respects we affirm the disposition ordered by the juvenile court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of September 15, 2007, Tyrone L. saw and approached a young woman who was alone sunbathing next to an apartment complex swimming pool. The woman, Heather C., was reclining beside the pool while she waited for her laundry to finish drying in a nearby laundry room. Standing just outside a fence that enclosed the pool area, Tyrone L. began making crude sexual remarks to Heather C., such as "`I want to do things to you," "`I want to eat you out," and "`I want to touch you." Heather C. had never seen Tyrone L. before and was very intimidated. Tyrone L. then jumped the fence and sat down next to Heather C. and started to lean toward her. Heather C. became "really scared" at this point, so she picked up her keys and cell phone and quickly walked away from Tyrone L. She entered the laundry room with her apartment key and closed the door, which locked behind her automatically.
Moments later, Tyrone L. found a way into the laundry room, apparently through a back window, grabbed Heather C. from behind, forced her against the wall and to the ground, and began tearing at the straps of her bathing suit top. Heather C. screamed loudly and attempted to fight back while he held her from behind. After Heather C. landed some punches, Tyrone L. twisted her neck a couple of times "really hard" and kept his hands on her neck to the point that she had difficulty breathing. Heather C. continued to scream loudly and dug her fingers into appellants left side. Finally, Tyrone L. released her and fled.
On his way out the laundry room door, Tyrone L. stopped and picked up Heather C.s cell phone that had fallen to the floor. This pause allowed Heather C. to grab hold of Tyrone L.s shirt in an effort to prevent his escape, as she could not bear the thought that he might avoid capture after all he had done to her: "I wanted somebody to come out and catch him." In fact, by that time people were beginning to arrive in response to her screams. After a brief struggle, Tyrone L. slipped out of his shirt and ran. He was apprehended by the police later that day.
On September 18, 2007, a juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Tyrone L. committed the following offenses: (1) assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, §§ 220; 261, subd. (a)(2)); (2) robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)); (3) burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b)); and (4) assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).
Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court found Tyrone L.s defense that he was just trying to steal Heather C.s cell phone "incredible." All four counts in the petition were found true and Tyrone L. was adjudged to be a ward of the court. On November 21, 2007, at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court committed Tyrone L. to DJF and set the maximum confinement time at seven years. The seven-year commitment to DJF was calculated based on a six-year term for assault with intent to commit rape plus a one-year term for robbery. The other two felonies were stayed. Additionally, the juvenile court ordered Tyrone L. to stay away from Heather C. On December 4, 2007, Tyrone L. filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Tyrone L. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by (1) committing him to DJF, (2) imposing the maximum confinement time, and (3) ordering him to stay away from Heather C. We now consider each of these contentions.
I. Commitment to DJF Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
"The appellate court reviews a commitment decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile courts decision. [Citations.] Nonetheless, there must be evidence in the record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a [DJF] commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. [Citations.] A [DJF] commitment may be considered, however, without previous resort to less restrictive placements. [Citations.]" (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) "`[A]n appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law." (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432.)
We review the commitment order in light of the purposes of juvenile delinquency law, which in summary are "twofold: (1) to serve the `best interests of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and `enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and community, and (2) to `provide for the protection and safety of the public . . . [Citations.]" (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615.)
The purposes of the juvenile delinquency laws have been more fully articulated in In re Carl N., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th 423, as follows:
"The statutory declaration of the purposes of the juvenile court law is set forth in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 202. [Citation.] Before the 1984 amendment to [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 202, California courts consistently held that `"[j]uvenile commitment proceedings are designed for the purposes of rehabilitation and treatment, not punishment." [Citations.] California courts treated a commitment to [DJF] as `the placement of last resort for juvenile offenders. [Citation.]
"However, `[i]n 1984, the Legislature replaced the provisions of [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 202 with new language which emphasized different priorities for the juvenile justice system. [Citations.] [Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 202, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 202(b)) now recognizes punishment as a rehabilitative tool. [Citation.] That subdivision provides in part: `Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court who are in need of protective services shall receive care, treatment, and guidance consistent with their best interest and the best interest of the public. Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter. (§ 202(b), italics added.)
"`Section 202 also shifted its emphasis from a primarily less restrictive alternative approach oriented towards the benefit of the minor to the express "protection and safety of the public" [citations], where care, treatment, and guidance shall conform to the interests of public safety and protection. [Citation.] [Citation.] `Thus, it is clear that the Legislature intended to place greater emphasis on punishment for rehabilitative purposes and on a restrictive commitment as a means of protecting the public safety. [Citation.] It is also clear, as the Court of Appeal recognized in In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473, that a commitment to [DJF] `may be made in the first instance, without previous resort to less restrictive placements.
"`[T]his interpretation by no means loses sight of the "rehabilitative objectives" of the Juvenile Court Law. [Citation.] Because commitment to [DJF] cannot be based solely on retribution grounds [citation], there must continue to be evidence demonstrating (1) probable benefit to the minor and (2) that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. However, these must be taken together with the Legislatures purposes in amending the Juvenile Court Law. [Citation.]" (In re Carl N., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 432-433.)
As noted by our Supreme Court, "[u]nder [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 202, juvenile proceedings are primarily `rehabilitative (id., subd. (b)), and punishment in the form of `retribution is disallowed (id., subd. (e))." (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.) "Within these bounds, the court has broad discretion to choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public," including commitment to DJF. (Ibid.) "Given these aims, and absent any contrary provision, juvenile placements need not follow any particular order under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 602 and section 777, including from the least to the most restrictive. [Citations.] Nor does the court necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering the most restrictive placement before other options have been tried. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
That is, punishment is permissible for rehabilitative purposes, such as holding the minor accountable for his actions, but not for retribution. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (b) & (e).)
A juvenile court has a number of dispositions that are within its discretion. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (e).) In determining disposition, the juvenile court "shall consider, in addition to other relevant and material evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minors previous delinquent history." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.5.) In this case, all three factors were clearly presented in the probation officers report and were considered by the court. Also, a juvenile court should not commit a minor to DJF "unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJF]." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734.) Here, the juvenile court made findings of probable benefit to Tyrone L. for a commitment to DJF, which, as discussed herein, were supported by substantial evidence in light of the egregious and violent nature of his offenses and his lack of remorse.
Applying these standards, we hold the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. At the dispositional hearing the juvenile court noted it had considered the probation officers report dated November 14, 2007, two victim impact statements and a juvenile hall observation report. In his report, the probation officer acknowledged that Tyrone L., a 17-year-old, had no previous criminal history. However, the probation officer recommended a commitment to DJF, rather than other alternatives, because Tyrone L. took no responsibility for his actions, showed no remorse for the victim, and would have raped the victim had she not resisted. Further, the probation officer believed a DJF commitment was appropriate "based on the seriousness of the underlined charges, the level of sophistication exhibited by [Tyrone L.], and the need to protect the victim as well as the public." The victim impact statements provided by Heather C. to the juvenile court reported that she suffered from fear that Tyrone L. might return to harm her. She had difficulty sleeping and her grades had declined due to the resulting stress and anxiety from the incident. The juvenile hall observation report indicated that Tyrone L. had been cooperative and adjusted well during his time in juvenile hall.
We reject Tyrone L.s suggestion that the probation report did not adequately apprise the juvenile court of information needed for disposition in this case.
At the dispositional hearing, Tyrone L. made a statement to the juvenile court. He indicated that on the day of the assault, he was mad for getting kicked out of his house and he just wanted to steal Heather C.s cell phone and sell it for money. He said that he had no intention of raping her. After getting caught, he assumed he would not be sentenced very harshly since it was his first arrest and he was "just getting in trouble for robbery." He was surprised by the allegations in this case that he intended to rape Heather C., but he said he could "understand what shes talking about" because if someone had done something like that to his sister he would have been "mad" like the people who chased him. The juvenile court asked Tyrone L. why he was kicked out of his house. Tyrone L. replied that he did not get along with his stepfather and his relationship with his mother was strained as a result, so he "just stayed away from [his] mom" and would live at his friends houses. Tyrone L. said, "Im sorry for making [Heather C.] think that I was going to do something that I really didnt intend to do."
Defense counsel argued at the dispositional hearing that because it was a first offense, and because Tyrone L. had done well in juvenile hall, the court should make a commitment to "the Crossroads facility as opposed to sending this young man straight to [DJF] on a first petition." The prosecutor argued that Tyrone L. did not just rob someone, but he "made statements of an intent to sexually assault [Heather C.], and then immediately afterwards, he broke into a laundry room" in broad daylight to brazenly accomplish his intent. If all he wanted was the cell phone, he had ample opportunity to take it — but he did not do so until after Heather C. successfully fought off the rape attempt. In light of the egregious acts of Tyrone L. in committing such serious felonies under the circumstances shown at trial, the prosecutor argued that Tyrone L. should be sent to DJF.
The juvenile court fully agreed with the prosecutor and adopted the probation officers recommendation. The juvenile court emphasized that the evidence clearly showed Tyrone L. entered the laundry room with the intent to rape Heather C., and if she had not fought back, the violent sexual assault would have continued until his intention was carried out. Under the circumstances before it, the juvenile court found that Tyrone L.s continuance in his mothers home would be contrary to his welfare, and that local programs would be ineffective in his rehabilitation. The juvenile court further stated that it was "fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualification of [Tyrone L.] are such as to render probable [Tyrone L.] will be benefitted by the reformatory, educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJF]."
On this record, Tyrone L. has failed to demonstrate the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJF. As shown by the facts and circumstances of this case that were considered by the court at the dispositional hearing, including the factors documented in the probation report, Tyrone L. lacked remorse and failed to take responsibility for having brazenly and violently attacked a female victim he obviously intended to rape. Circumstances indicating that a less restrictive placement would be ineffective or inappropriate include the need to hold Tyrone L. accountable for his actions and the protection and safety of the community from crime. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a) & (b); see, e.g., In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473 [commitment to [DJF] appropriate for first offense of carjacking and armed assault].) The probation officer stated as follows in his report: "In order to hold [Tyrone L.] accountable for his actions, local programs were considered as possible dispositions; however, based on the seriousness of the underlined charges, the level of sophistication exhibited by [Tyrone L.], and the need to protect the victim as well as the public, it is not felt the open Camp Erwin Owen setting or the Kern Crossroads Facility would be appropriate. It is felt [Tyrone L.] is in need of an extended stay in a secure and structured environment." The juvenile court plainly agreed with this assessment and determined that the more structured and restrictive environment offered at DJF would better facilitate Tyrone L.s rehabilitation as well as promote the interest of public protection. There was no abuse of discretion.
We emphasize that Tyrone L. is a serious danger to the community. The record before the juvenile court established that he not only attacked Heather C. with the intent of raping her, including breaking into a locked laundry room to accomplish his intent, but when she offered resistance to his sexual assault he violently twisted her neck. It is remarkable the victim was not raped or killed. These facts, and his patent lack of remorse, strongly supported the commitment to DJF.
II. Imposition of Maximum Confinement Time Not an Abuse of Discretion
The juvenile court found each of Tyrone L.s four sustained offenses to be a felony, stayed sentencing on two of the offenses, imposed consecutive sentencing for the remaining offenses, and committed Tyrone L. to the maximum confinement time of seven years. Tyrone L. asserts that the juvenile court imposed the maximum confinement period without properly exercising its discretion based on the facts and circumstances of the case. We disagree.
Under section 731 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as construed by this court, "the juvenile court must determine the maximum period of confinement to [DJF] based on the facts and circumstances." (In re Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1542.) "[T]his maximum may not be more than that for a comparable adult, but may be less. The maximum period of confinement set by the court is not a determinate term, it is the ceiling on the amount of time that a minor may be confined in [DJF], and recognizes that the committing court has an interest in and particularized knowledge of the minors it commits to [DJF]." (Ibid.) "[S]ection 731 [of the Welfare and Institutions Code] unmistakably requires the trial court to set a maximum term of physical confinement in [DJF] based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter. The court must set the term in all cases where it is committing a minor to [DJF] and it must exercise its discretion in making the determination of what that term will be." (In re Carlos E., supra, at p. 1543.) Although no express recitation is required, it has been held that the record must reflect that the juvenile court considered the facts and circumstances of the case in setting a maximum period of confinement in DJF. (In re Jacob J. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 429, 438.)
The Sixth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the decision in In re Jacob J., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 429, and held an appellate court faced with a silent record should apply the normal principles of appellate review and presume the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion under section 731 of the Welfare and Institutions Code when stating the maximum period of confinement in its order of commitment to DJF. (In re Julian R. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1416.) The California Supreme Court has recently granted review of In re Julian R. (In re Julian R., supra, , review granted Feb. 27, 2008, S159282.) We find it unnecessary to decide which view is correct as the present record adequately reflects the juvenile court considered the facts and circumstances.
Here, the record confirms that the juvenile court considered the facts and circumstances of the case when it exercised its discretion to commit Tyrone L. to a maximum period of confinement of seven years in DJF. This is not a case in which the juvenile court sentenced a minor to a maximum term based solely on the fact that it constituted the maximum term an adult would face. (See In re Carlos E., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1533.) Nor is this an instance in which the record was silent on the facts and circumstances that were considered by the juvenile court. Rather, the juvenile court explained at the dispositional hearing, just before announcing its disposition, that it had (1) considered the matters set forth in the probation officers report and agreed with the recommendation therein, and (2) concluded that Tyrone L.s explanation at the dispositional hearing that he was just trying to steal the cell phone was untruthful and that the true facts were as described in the prosecutors closing argument — i.e., Tyrone L. intended to rape Heather C.
In one respect the juvenile courts disposition departed from the probation officers report. The recommendation of the probation officer was to sentence Tyrone L. to the maximum term permitted on all four felonies, yielding an aggregate confinement period of eight years eight months. The trial court imposed the six-year term for assault with intent to rape, and the one-year term for robbery, but stayed sentencing on the other two felonies, resulting in a seven-year maximum confinement period.
Since the juvenile court expressly relied on the probation officers report and recommendation in exercising its discretion regarding an appropriate disposition for Tyrone L., we now consider the significant contents of that report. While the probation officers report stressed the egregious and violent nature of Tyrone L.s offenses and his lack of remorse, it also contained a host of other relevant facts and circumstances, including Tyrone L.s age, his lack of a prior criminal record, his family background, his behavior and performance at school, and statements offered by Tyrone L. and his mother. The probation officers report indicated the officer considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances, but a particular disposition was recommended based on the need to hold Tyrone L. accountable for his actions, the seriousness of the offenses, the level of sophistication exhibited by Tyrone L., the need to protect the victim as well as the public, and Tyrone L.s lack of remorse. Based on these considerations, the probation officer concluded that an "extended stay" was appropriate in the secure and structured environment of DJF, and recommended that the juvenile court commit Tyrone L. to the maximum term permitted for the offenses: "Given the overall circumstances and the facts of this case, the maximum term and sentencing is appropriate and will be recommended."
Based on this record, we conclude the juvenile court properly considered the facts and circumstances when it exercised its discretion to commit Tyrone L. to the maximum period of confinement of seven years. No abuse of discretion was shown.
We reject Tyrone L.s suggestion that the juvenile court was unaware of its discretion to impose a confinement period that was less than the maximum an adult could receive. Nothing in the record supports such a suggestion. Moreover, the juvenile court expressly stated "the available confinement time is seven years." (Italics added.) The use of the term "available" indicates the court did not believe it was mandatory. Additionally, the dispositional minute order specifically cited Welfare and Institutions Code section 731 in setting forth the seven-year confinement period.
III. Juvenile Court Erred in Imposing Probationary Conditions
Tyrone L. contends, and the People concede, the probationary "no contact" condition imposed by the juvenile court must be stricken. We agree. Commitment to DJF removes a ward from the direct supervision of the juvenile court. (In re Allen N. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 513, 515.) "In general, once a child is committed to [DJF], supervision of the childs rehabilitation is a function solely for [DJF], not the juvenile court." (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399, fn. 8.) Consequently, when a minor is committed to DJF, a juvenile courts order that imposes discretionary conditions of probation constitutes an impermissible attempt to regulate or supervise the minors rehabilitation. (In re Allen N., supra, at p. 516.) Accordingly, we will strike the juvenile courts "no contact" order.
DISPOSITION
The "no contact" order is stricken, but in all other respects we affirm the disposition ordered by the juvenile court.