Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. J7918.
SIMS, Acting P.J.
Wendy D. (appellant), the mother of T.U. (the minor), appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating appellant’s parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request for a bonding assessment. Appellant also claims the failure by the juvenile court to apply the statutory exception to termination of parental rights based on appellant’s relationship to the minor (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) requires reversal of the order terminating her parental rights. Disagreeing with those claims, we shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 29, 2005, Nevada County Human Services Agency (HSA) filed an original juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the 20-month-old minor. That petition alleged in part that the minor was at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm because of appellant’s serious substance abuse problem. According to the petition, the minor had been living with the minor’s father.
The minor’s father is not involved in this appeal.
The juvenile court sustained an amended petition, adjudged the minor a dependent child, removed the minor from parental custody, and ordered appellant to comply with the requirements of her reunification plan. That plan granted appellant weekly supervised visits with the minor at appellant’s request. Thereafter, appellant visited sporadically with the minor, who was placed with the minor’s paternal grandparents.
A report by the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) noted that during one visit observed by the CASA, appellant was “emotionally needy.” The CASA also had learned that allegedly after visiting with appellant, the minor “remains upset for a time . . . .” Another CASA report noted that, when the minor visited with his maternal grandmother, appellant also visited the minor.
On June 15, 2006, the juvenile court terminated appellant’s reunification services. The court ordered visitation between appellant and the minor to be at least once monthly, arranged by HSA and at appellant’s request. The court also scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
The report prepared by HSA for the section 366.26 hearing noted the minor appeared to be “thriving” in the care of the minor’s paternal grandparents and needed the permanency afforded by adoption. Accordingly, HSA recommended termination of parental rights and adoption of the minor. As to visitation with the minor, the report also stated that appellant visited the minor while the minor was seeing the minor’s maternal grandparents. The report observed that, according to the paternal grandparents, when the maternal grandparents could not pick up the minor for a visit, appellant arranged for a visit “but then fail[ed] to show.”
Appellant and the minor’s maternal grandparents testified at the November 27, 2006, section 366.26 hearing. Appellant told the juvenile court that she opposed terminating her parental rights. Appellant acknowledged the informal nature of her visitation pattern with the minor. Appellant and the minor’s maternal grandparents testified the relationship between appellant and the minor was a good one, the minor called appellant “mommy,” and appellant engaged in parenting-like activities with the minor.
Appellant twice requested that the juvenile court order preparation of a bonding study to assess the relationship between appellant and the minor. The court denied appellant’s requests. Appellant’s counsel also argued that appellant opposed the proposed termination of appellant’s parental rights, appellant had established a parental relationship with the minor, and counsel also asked the court to apply the statutory exception for adoption based on that relationship.
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor and also found it likely the minor would be adopted. In a lengthy, comprehensive written decision, the court stated in part as follows: “The Court recognizes that for the last few months (perhaps since learning of her pregnancy) [appellant] had been consistent in her visitation with [the minor], who is now three [years] old. Prior to that, her visitation was less, and at times not at all. However, [appellant] has never progressed from supervised to unsupervised visits, nor has she obtained permanent housing (and will not in her Harbor House program for 90 days to 2 years), nor has she entered into and completed a substance abuse program, all of which the Court considers a significant failure. [Appellant] remains in complete denial as to any substance abuse issue and treatment. [Appellant] produced no evidence of employment or other resources to meet [the minor’s] needs. [¶] The Court acknowledges, though, that in cooperation with the child’s grandparents, [appellant] has been nurturing and has at least in part provided for some of the child’s needs to be taken care of, and for feeding and guidance and discipline. However, this Court does not believe that it has adequate evidence to conclude that, in addition to those overall positive visits and the connection between the mother and the minor (which leads the minor to call her mommy) that there is, in fact, the type of relationship here between the mother and the minor which would outweigh this child’s right to have a stable home. [¶] [The minor] has been within the custody of the Court for nearly half of his three year life, with no immediate prospect of return to the mother. During most of that time [appellant] has had at all times available to her through her reunification plan the possibility of unsupervised visits and of reuniting with her child, as well as necessary substance abuse treatment programs, but she has not availed herself of these opportunities. Instead, she allowed the termination of her reunification services without contest assuming adoption would proceed. Her only request was for post-adoptive contact to be arranged through The Consortium for Children. [¶] [The minor] now has a stable home environment, committed prospective adoptive parents, strong attachments and growing bonds to his adoptive home. It would be detrimental to deny [the minor] the permanency of his current placement.”
The juvenile court ordered appellant’s parental rights terminated.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by failing to exercise its discretion to order a bonding study. According to appellant, such a study was necessary because the only evidence available on the issue of her relationship with the minor was the testimony presented at the section 366.26 hearing. Appellant also asserts she had made continuing efforts to maintain a parental relationship with the minor.
As appellant suggests, the standard of review of the juvenile court’s decision whether to order a bonding assessment is abuse of discretion. Because the juvenile court is accorded wide discretion, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal “unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) In applying this standard, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision and determine whether that court reasonably could have refrained from ordering a bonding study. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.)
The record contains a CASA report that is based both on the CASA’s own observations and on the observations of others. That report noted appellant’s emotional neediness during visits with the minor, as well as the minor’s remaining upset after visits with appellant. The record also contains ample evidence documenting the inconsistent visitation pattern employed by appellant. According to the paternal grandparents, when the maternal grandparents could not pick up the minor for a visit, appellant called to arrange a visit with the minor at the paternal grandparents’ home “but then fail[ed] to show.”
The record therefore contains sufficient evidence with which the juvenile court could evaluate the nature and strength of the bond existing between appellant and the minor.
It is true that appellant’s testimony conflicted somewhat with other evidence before the juvenile court on the issue of the contact she had with the minor, although she acknowledged the informal nature of her visitation pattern. What is most important, however, is that the juvenile court had the benefit of obtaining substantial information about the nature of the bond existing between appellant and the minor. On this record, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude that a bonding assessment would not have been useful to the court or of assistance to appellant. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.)
The juvenile court is not obliged by statute or case law to order preparation of a bonding assessment. (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) Because the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that there was little, if any, benefit to be gained from ordering preparation of a bonding study, the court acted well within its discretion in not ordering a bonding assessment. (Cf. In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319; In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197.)
II
Citing evidence of regular visitation with the minor and of the existence of a parent-child relationship, appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in failing to apply the statutory exception to adoption contained in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of section 366.26.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child . . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
One of the circumstances under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor is: “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The benefit to the child must promote “the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.) The juvenile court is not required to find that termination of parental rights will not be detrimental due to specified circumstances. (Id. at p. 1372) Even “‘frequent and loving’” contact is not sufficient to establish the benefit exception absent significant, positive, emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
In this case, it is true that appellant made some efforts to visit the minor and it also is true that a relationship existed between them. In fact, in a lengthy decision that was exemplary in its depth, the court acknowledged appellant’s nurturing qualities. However, appellant’s contact with the minor was sporadic, and the minor reportedly became upset after visiting with appellant. More fundamentally, appellant has failed to show how the minor would benefit from continuing their relationship.
Section 366.26 requires both a showing of regular contact and a separate showing that the child actually would benefit from continuing the relationship. In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, interprets the statutory exception to involve a balancing test, and both In re Autumn H., and In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, posit a high level of parental involvement and attachment. Even assuming that those decisions overemphasized the importance of the parental role, the record here does not support appellant’s suggestion that the minor would benefit from continuing a relationship with appellant simply because the minor knows who appellant is and enjoys a parental relationship with her. (Cf. In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.)
Here, the issue was as follows: In light of the minor’s adoptability, would a continued relationship with appellant benefit the minor to such a degree that it would outweigh the benefits the minor would gain in a permanent adoptive home? Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s answer in the negative. On the record before it, the juvenile court could conclude, as it did, that only adoption, which is the preferred disposition (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368), would promote the best interests of the minor.
After it became apparent that appellant would not reunify with the minor, the juvenile court had to find an “exceptional situation existed to forego adoption.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In this case, to the contrary, in its comprehensive and well-reasoned decision the court determined that the minor would not benefit from continuing a relationship with appellant to such a degree that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. Appellant had the burden to demonstrate the statutory exception applied. We conclude that appellant failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating appellant’s parental rights based on its failure to apply the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), exception. (In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 821-822.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating the parental rights of appellant is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON , J. BUTZ , J.