Opinion
Nos. T11-CP03-011754-A, T11-CP03-011755-A
May 25, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On August 16, 2004, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, ("DCF"), filed petitions pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Shaunda S., Walter R. and Anthony N. to their child, Tre N., and to terminate the parental rights of Shaunda S. and Stanley H. to their child, Alexis S. The petitions were amended on September 28, 2004. Respondent fathers failed to appear for trial and defaults were entered against them. Respondent mother contests termination of her parental rights. Trial of this matter took place before this court on February 6, 7, 9 and 28, 2006 at the Regional Child Protection Session at the Middlesex J.D. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
Mother was also known as Shaunda R., Shanda R., Shaundra S., and Shauna W. at various times. She will be referred to herein as Shaunda S.
Walter R. is the legal father of Tre and Anthony N. is the putative father of Tre.
The statutory grounds alleged against all four respondents as to both children were (1) abandonment, in the sense that the parents have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)); (2) that the children, Tre and Alexis, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)); and (3) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)).
On November 10, 2003, DCF received a referral alleging that Courtney S., the adopted daughter of Debby S., had been sexually abused. On November 12, 2003, DCF invoked a 96-hour administrative hold as to Courtney as well as to Tre and Alexis for whom Debby S. was legal guardian. On November 14, 2003, Orders of Temporary Custody were issued (Taylor, J.) and DCF filed neglect petitions on behalf of Tre and Alexis alleging that the children were denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally and that they were permitted to live under conditions injurious to their well-being. On May 24, 2004, Tre and Alexis were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF (Taylor, J.). On November 4, 2004, commitment was maintained until further order of the court (Graziani, J.). On August 16, 2004, the petitions for termination of parental rights were filed. On September 28, 2004, amended petitions were filed.
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the children.
"The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 107 (1995).
The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 196 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo R., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, 668 A.2d 1353 (1996).
Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage involves the issue of whether the evidence presented establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 33-3(a), [now P.B. § 35a-7] in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, the trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa R., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987).
I. FACTS
At trial, the petitioner introduced the social studies and addenda, psychological evaluation, DCF narratives, Kentucky probate records, and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of DCF social workers Michael Clark, Marcy Hogan and Jessica Fitzgerald; Debra S., legal guardian; Jessica Reiser, Ph.D., and Lisa Hardcastle, therapist. Respondent mother, Shaunda S., testified on her own behalf and called as a witness Barbara P. Berkowitz, Ph.D. The child's attorney participated fully, but introduced no exhibits or testimony. The credible evidence admitted at trial supports the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
In August 1997, Debra S. ("Debby") was employed at the Brighton Center in Newport, Kentucky where she worked as an after-school coordinator. The Brighton Center ran several programs for single women and young mothers to provide them with education, parenting skills and childcare. Debby S. was in the process of adopting a child when she learned from the head teacher in the infant room that one of the young mothers in the program wanted to put her child, Tre, up for adoption. Debby S. had covered in the infant room on occasion and knew the mother by her married name as Shaunda R., as opposed to Shaunda S. Debby spoke with Shaunda that day. Mother, then nineteen, told Debby that she did not want to keep Tre, who was then fifteen months old, and was planning to go to the Cabinet for Families and Children in Kentucky about giving him to them. When Debby told Shaunda that she would be interested in Tre, Shaunda said that Debby could come over that night and get him. Debby, and her husband Willie S., went to Shaunda's apartment in Covington, Kentucky that night. They stayed and visited a while, took Tre and left. Shaunda gave them a high chair, diaper bag, some clothing and a couple of toys. Debby S. testified that she and Shaunda had a verbal agreement that Tre would live with Debby and that eventually she would adopt him legally. Debby testified that Tre was good, did not cry a lot and was an easy child. In September 1997, Debby and Willie S. were given legal guardianship of Tre by the probate court in Kenton County, Kentucky. Debby had agreed that Shaunda could visit Tre any time she wanted. Debby testified that Shaunda did visit fairly often at first, but then less frequently (about every weekend for a couple of months), and then visitation tapered off to the point where she visited only on special occasions.
In approximately June 1998, Shaunda came to Debby again, told her that she was seven months pregnant and asked Debby if she was interested in taking this baby as well. At first Debby declined, but then had a change of heart. As they talked further, Debby said she would take the new baby under certain conditions: that Shaunda allow Debby to go to all remaining prenatal appointments; that Debby be present for the birth; and that Debby name the child. Shaunda agreed to these conditions. After the birth, Debby brought Shaunda and the baby, Alexis, back to her own house. Debby had asked Shaunda to stay for a week to help with the baby, but Shaunda left after a few days saying she couldn't take the routine. Debby had agreed that Shaunda could visit Alexis, but Shaunda did not have much to do with her and rarely visited.
Between August 1997 and September 1999, Debby's relationship with mother was fine and they occasionally got together for birthdays, Halloween or Christmas. During that time, Debby took Shaunda's oldest daughter, Charann, occasionally on weekends and once for a few months to help Shaunda. In September 1999, Debby decided to move to Connecticut. She had been having difficulties in her marriage, and she wanted to go to school. She took Tre and Alexis and moved to Windsor Locks. Courtney stayed with Debby's husband, Willie S., in Kentucky. After a few months of living with a friend, Debby moved to Enfield into the home of her boyfriend James S. Debby had informed mother of her move to Connecticut and mother did not object to the move. Debby told mother that she could get contact information from Willie S. who had Debby's address and phone number. Debby lived at the same location in Enfield until March 2004.
In 2000, mother initiated probate court proceedings in Kentucky in an effort to regain guardianship of Tre and Alexis. She initially did have custody restored, but Debby brought proceedings in another court and the parties reached a settlement at Campbell County Circuit Court in which Debby retained custody and the parties agreed to go to mediation. The mediation never took place. During the course of the Kentucky probate action in June and July 2000, Shaunda had Debby's contact information.
During the time period from December 1999 through March 2004, mother called Debby S. and the children two times to see how the children were doing. One of the calls was near Tre's birthday and she had called to wish him a happy birthday. Tre and Alexis did not ask for mother or speak about her. They both believed Debby S. was their biological mother and referred to her as mother. Mother sent no cards, gifts or letters during that entire time period. The children were enrolled in school under their regular names. In summer, 2000, while the probate proceedings were pending, Debby brought Tre and Alexis back to Kentucky for a visit. Mother saw Tre during this visit.
In the end of 2000, Courtney, who had originally stayed in Kentucky, also came to Connecticut to live with mother and James S. Courtney was severely sexually abused in the home of Debby S. and James S. Tre and Alexis were also abused and neglected, although to a lesser extent than Courtney, and also witnessed the abuse of Courtney. In March 2004, Debby was arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child and conspiracy to commit sexual assault with respect to Courtney. Debby was incarcerated at that time and remained incarcerated at the time of trial.
A. Respondent Mother — Shaunda S.
Respondent mother, Shaunda S., was born in Fort Thomas, Kentucky on January 7, 1977. Mother was abused physically and emotionally by her alcoholic step-father. She had a difficult adolescence in which she ran away from an abusive home and spent time in group homes. She began using marijuana at the age of fifteen. Mother's father and sister are crack cocaine addicts as are a paternal aunt and uncle. Mother married Walter R. at the age of fifteen and shortly thereafter gave birth to her first daughter, Charann R. Mother and Walter R. separated in 1995 and mother met Anthony N. On May 31, 1996, mother gave birth to Tre N. as a result of her relationship with Anthony N. Mother and Walter R. were divorced in October 1997. Walter R. has not had any contact with Tre since he was approximately eighteen months old and Anthony N. has not had any contact with Tre since he was approximately eight months old. Mother voluntarily gave Tre to Debby S. when he was fifteen months old. Mother then became involved with Stanley H., gave birth to Alexis in August 1998, and immediately voluntarily gave the child to Debby S. Mother subsequently began a relationship with Corey W. and married him, but they divorced after a few months due to domestic violence in the relationship.
In 2000, mother attempted to gain custody of Tre and Alexis, but then failed to pursue mediation and Debby retained guardianship. Mother knew that the children were in Connecticut with Debby S. and that they had not been adopted as originally intended, but did not seek further contact with them. Mother stated that several people told her she should contact an attorney and pursue the matter in probate court, but she never did. Indeed, it was not until August 2004 that mother contacted DCF about the children who had been in DCF care since November 2003.
Mother has a criminal record including convictions in March 2004 for passing bad checks and in 1999 for possession of marijuana. On February 24, 2001, mother was involved in a domestic violence incident with another individual, Jamone S., to whom she was engaged and with whom she had lived for two years according to the police report. During the incident which occurred on the 4th Street Bridge in Newport, Kentucky, mother was physically grabbed by the hair and thrown to the ground by Jamone S. She told the police officer that she was also punched in the mouth while tying to get back on her feet and the officer observed visible cuts to mother's mouth. The following day, Jamone made a statement to the police in which he alleged that mother scratched him in the face and that she was the aggressor in the incident. The reports from both dates reflect that Charann was present in the home.
Mother currently resides in a nicely furnished two-bedroom apartment in Newport, Kentucky with her daughter Charann and mother's current boyfriend, Rick S. She has worked full-time for the past year at Travelodge in Newport, Kentucky. Social worker Fitzgerald met with mother and Rick S. at mother's apartment on November 1, 2005. Rick S. refused to sign releases despite the fact that he was informed that this would impact mother's ability to work toward reunification. His demeanor was combative and his comments caused others in the home to escalate emotionally. He did not have an understanding of Tre and Alexis' special needs, but only stated that they were with strangers and that they belonged "with their own." Rick S. did cooperate with parenting classes, but has not complied with DCF's request for a substance abuse evaluation and drug screen or couples counseling. He denied having a criminal record contrary to the information gathered by DCF. He has been uncooperative and evasive with DCF such that DCF was unable to make an adequate assessment of him and his role in mother's home.
B. Respondent legal father of Tre — Walter R.
Respondent legal father, Walter R., has not had any contact with DCF which has been unable to locate him. Mother was married to Walter R. at the time of Tre's birth, however they were separated and mother has stated that Tre's father is Anthony N. Mother has not provided any information regarding Walter R. except to offer information that he has not had contact with Tre since he was eighteen months old. Notice of these proceedings by publication was made in the Kentucky Post on November 15, 2004. Service by publication was confirmed on December 23, 2004.
C. Respondent putative father of Tre — Anthony N.
Putative father Anthony N. has not had any contact with DCF and petitioner has been unable to locate him. Mother has not provided any information about Anthony N. other than the information that he too has had no contact with Tre since he was approximately eight months old. Notice of these proceedings by publication was made in the Kentucky Post on November 15, 2004. Service by publication was confirmed on December 23, 2004.
D. Respondent putative father of Alexis — Stanley H.
Stanley H., with whom mother had a short term relationship, has had no contact with DCF and DCF has been unable to locate him. Mother has not provided any information regarding Stanley H. other than to say that he has never had any contact with Alexis. Notice of these proceedings by publication was made in the Columbus Dispatch on December 8, 2005 and confirmed on January 3, 2006.
E. DCF's Efforts to Locate Mother
DCF worker Michael Clark was initially assigned to the case in December 2002 to investigate allegations that Tre was being physically abused by James S. In 2003, he again was assigned to investigate new allegations of inappropriate sexual contact between James S. and the children, especially Tre. In November 2003, DCF received allegations of sexual abuse of Courtney by James S. As a result of the investigation, DCF executed a 96-hour hold on the children on November 13, 2003. At that time, Debby S., who had previously stated that she was the adoptive mother of all three children, stated that Courtney was adopted and acknowledged that she only had guardianship of Tre and Alexis. She stated that their mother was Shaunda R., but was otherwise generally uncooperative with DCF. When Clark learned that there was a biological mother who had residual rights regarding the children, he began to conduct a search to locate the parents. Using the name Shaunda R., he performed an internet search in Kentucky, a Kentucky Department of Corrections search and a search of the Commonwealth of Kentucky Campbell Circuit Court with no results. He also made an inquiry of the Kentucky child protection service agency with no results for Shaunda R. In view of the failed efforts to locate mother in Kentucky, notice by publication was authorized and appeared in a newspaper with circulation in the Newport, Kentucky area. Ex. 11. Clark testified that the children had already been in Connecticut for two and a half to three years and he did not know where else to look.
DCF worker Hogan took over the case from Clark and was assigned from November 26, 2003 through May 3, 2004. Hogan testified that after she was assigned to the case, she continued the search for mother conducting further internet searches, and searches of the Department of Social Services, Department of Corrections, the death registry and property records. Hogan obtained paperwork from the probate court in Kentucky establishing that Debra S. was the legal guardian of the children. She searched under both Shaunda and Shonda and under the last names of R. and S., which she obtained from the probate records. Debby S. told Hogan that she had no phone number or address or any way to contact mother. Hogan conducted a search for the whole state of Kentucky, including Newport, under the last names of R. and S. with no results. The children were under an order of temporary custody and placed in a safe home the entire time Hogan had the case. DCF was looking for a preadoptive home for the children who were very guarded and beginning to make disclosures including physical abuse and being hit with a belt.
DCF worker Jessica Fitzgerald took over the case May 4, 2004 and conducted additional efforts to locate mother. Because the children were committed to DCF on May 24, 2004, DCF was able to obtain birth certificates for them, a process which took four months. The birth certificates showed that Tre was born in Ohio and Alexis in Kentucky and listed mother's name as Shaunda R. for Tre, and Shaunda S. for Alexis. Fitzgerald conducted further internet searches, contacted the bureau of vital statistics and the Cabinet for Families and Children for Kentucky. She contacted two police departments and was ultimately able to obtain three different social security numbers and three dates of birth for mother. She had not yet located mother when, on August 19, 2004, mother contacted DCF. Mother apparently called Debby S. for Alexis's birthday on August 9, 2004 and learned that the phone was disconnected. She then learned through a friend of her mother's, who knew Willie S., that the children were in DCF care in Connecticut. Mother appeared in Connecticut, and expressed an interest in the children. An interstate compact study was ordered and conducted. The study did not recommend placement of the children with mother citing mother's use of aliases, her criminal history and her lack of stability, noting that she had moved many times. The study noted that the children had found stability with the foster parents and recommended against disrupting that stability. On November 1, 2005, Fitzgerald traveled to Kentucky for the purpose of assessing mother's situation and conducting a home visit. Mother's live-in boyfriend, Rick S., denied having a criminal record, but Fitzgerald was able to determine that he did have convictions for robbery in the second degree, sale of cocaine near a school, spousal abuse and escape. Fitzgerald found mother's apartment not suitable for return of the children since each child needed to have his or her own bedroom. There were concerns that if they shared a room, Tre and Alexis might engage in inappropriate conduct with each other as a result of the sexual abuse they experienced or witnessed. Overall, Fitzgerald had concerns for the children's safety and did not believe it would be in their best interest to move them to Kentucky. Mother traveled to Connecticut about every other month for court hearings and was excused from attending some hearings. DCF reimbursed her for travel and expenses. As recommended by the children's therapist, Mother has provided information for the children's life books to assist them in addressing heir identity issues.
F. Specific Steps
Specific steps were issued by the court on November 14, 2003. Respondent mother's specific steps required her to do the following: keep all appointments set by or with DCF; cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem; keep the children's whereabouts and her own whereabouts known to DCF, her attorney and the attorney for the children; participate in parenting, individual and family counseling to address treatment goals; accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF; submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations made regarding treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing; sign releases; secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income; no substance abuse; no further involvement with the criminal justice system and cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole; immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of her household; maintain the children within the State of Connecticut during the duration of the case except for temporary travel out of state with the authorization of DCF or the Court in advance; cooperate with the children's therapy; and visit the children as often as DCF permits.
With regard to compliance with the specific steps, mother has complied with some, but not all of the specific steps. Although mother completed a substance abuse evaluation, which did not recommend further treatment, she has not complied with the requirement for a hair test. Mother attended six sessions of counseling with Dr. Weiss from February through April 2005. Although mother successfully completed this initial counseling, DCF was concerned that mother's counseling had not addressed certain issues including her history of past relationships, domestic violence, her family history of substance abuse and particularly issues concerning the children's special needs as severely abused children. Dr. Berkowitz's report was released to Dr. Weiss who agreed to provide mother with additional therapy. However, after he received Dr. Berkowitz's report, the additional therapy never took place and mother was discharged for failure to return. She has failed to successfully participate in couple's counseling.
After her initial contact with DCF in August 2004, mother has kept her whereabouts known to DCF. Mother also maintained employment and adequate housing for herself and Charann.
Mother visited with the children once during an introductory meeting with Dr. Berkowitz. The children believed that they were the biological children of Debby S. and did not know mother or that they even had a different biological mother. When they were told of the arranged meeting with mother by Dr. Berkowitz, Alexis was highly anxious and afraid that mother would take her away from foster parents. Tre was excited to see mother and thought that he might remember her when he saw her even though he had seen her only for sporadic visitation when he was still in Kentucky and he had not seen her at all in the four-year period since he came to Connecticut. The children underwent additional therapy addressing the meeting with mother.
On September 10, 2004, the court (Graziani, J.) denied mother's request for visitation based on the recommendation of the children's therapist. In view of the children's fragile state and the seriousness of the allegations of physical and sexual abuse against Tre and Alexis, their therapist did not believe visitation would be appropriate and recommended against it. Subsequent attempts to obtain visitation were also denied based on the recommendation of Dr. Reiser. In June 2005, mother met with Dr. Reiser so that Reiser could answer questions about the children's psychological condition. Mother was informed that she could call Reiser anytime with questions about the children. Reiser testified that mother called once, to ask about certain gifts she wished to bring them for Christmas.
G. The Children 1. Tre N.
Tre N. was born May 31, 1996. His mother turned him over to the care of Debby S. when he was fifteen months old. When he was placed in DCF care and began therapy with Lisa Hardcastle, she described him as hypervigilant and incredibly anxious. He was whiney, irritable, depressed and moody. He was tearful and cowered when adults approached him. He avoided eye-contact and showed signs of physical neglect and abuse. Tre has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and also demonstrates significant attachment difficulties.
Tre is adjusting well at his foster home and his foster parents are ably meeting all of his physical, medical, educational, and emotional needs. As observed by Dr. Reiser and Dr. Berkowitz, Tre has a very positive bond with the foster parents, as well as with Alexis. He is safe, secure and happy living at his foster home and has expressed a desire to remain there and to be adopted by what he calls his "forever family." Tre has never asked to see his biological mother, although in response to questioning, Tre said he would like to see mother once or twice a year. He has clearly stated his position from the time he first came into DCF care that he does not wish to have any contact with Debby S. in view of the abuse and neglect he suffered while living with her and James S.
2. Alexis S.
Alexis S. was born August 9, 1998. She was placed into Debby S.'s care immediately upon her birth pursuant to an agreement between Shaunda S. and Debby. The child believed Debby S. was her biological mother. When Alexis was placed in DCF care at the age of five, she was very guarded, careful about what she said and to whom she spoke. According to Alexis's therapist, it appeared that Alexis held a favored position in the home and was not abused as severely as Tre or Courtney, but nevertheless witnessed a substantial amount of abuse. Alexis had fears of becoming a victim and did disclose some physical abuse, but she was very guarded in discussing or disclosing the abuse. Alexis made negative comments about Courtney, who had been mistreated the most, referring negatively to her skin color. Incredibly, neither Tre nor Alexis had an understanding that they were African American. They did understand that Courtney was African American, as her skin was slightly darker than theirs. After working with their therapists, the children now understand that they are African American. Alexis and Tre are strongly bonded with each other and with foster parents. The foster home has provided both children with a sense of security and they would like to stay there and be adopted by foster parents. The foster parents are providing exemplary care and more than meeting all of the children's needs. Both children call foster parents Mom and Dad. Foster parents have expressed their desire to adopt Tre and Alexis if they are available for adoption.
According to Hardcastle, the children's therapist for nine months while they were at the safe home (and for some consultations after they were placed with foster parents), the children both sustained and/or witnessed extensive trauma which they were only beginning to disclose after nine months of therapy. Hardcastle assisted them after their meeting with mother to help them process what occurred. During the time she worked with them, the children did not mention their biological mother.
Dr. Jessica Reiser testified that she began therapy with Tre and Alexis in February 2005. She diagnosed both children with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") as a result of the abuse they suffered while living with Debby S. and James S. Reiser found that both children met the DSM IV criteria for PTSD: they experienced an external stressor of a traumatic nature potentially implying death and showed evidence of it through intrusive re-experiencing, i.e., flashbacks. They also experienced emotional avoidance or numbing and autonomic responses such as hypervigilance. Reiser found that both children were constantly on the lookout for danger and both tried not to think about the fear, helplessness and horror they experienced. They both continue to display fear of abandonment and, in Reiser's opinion, have a long way to go to trust that they will be safe and that their foster parents will always be there for them. Reiser testified that the children have made substantial gains with their foster parents and that Tre and Alexis are starting to believe that consistent parenting and love are possible. Reiser opined that it is more likely that the children will be successful if they stay with their foster parents than if they are removed. The children are only recently beginning to realize that they are safe and secure and are beginning to talk about what happened to them. Resier found that Tre does have some memories of being cared for by mother and that the attachment disruption he suffered when mother gave him to Debby S. affected him profoundly particularly since it occurred during the first four years of life, i.e. at fifteen months. While the children did not meet the diagnostic criteria for clinical reactive attachment disorder, they both demonstrated attachment difficulties. Reiser testified that she was continuing to work with the children on the goals of (1) enabling them to learn to feel safe and to trust; (2) learning their own history and making sense of it, including the creation of a life book and understanding their racial identities; (3) exposing them to their memories in order to teach them coping responses so that they can respond appropriately to triggers; and (4) improving their relationship with foster parents and including foster parents in therapy. Reiser testified that through therapy, which included play techniques as well as drawing and talking, the children had come a long way since she first began with them. She stated that the foster parents were very cooperative in the process, had frequent communication with her and sought support when they needed it. She testified that the children had very strong emotional ties with foster parents who are providing for them on a daily basis. The children had an initial honeymoon period with the foster parents during which they were very well behaved and presented with few issues. After they were there for a while, however, they began to feel safe enough to test limits and their behavior became more problematic. For example, Tre began urinating in his room and defecating in his pants and hiding it. Reiser explained that at the same time this conduct occurred, the children were also beginning to address difficult issues in therapy including the physical and sexual abuse. Working together with foster parents, the children's functioning stabilized, but, according to Reiser, they remain fragile and the impact on them of being forced to leave the foster home would be devastating.
Reiser testified that the children feared that mother could appear in their lives at any moment and whisk them away. Reiser testified that Tre has a few memories of mother and that while some are positive, he also has a memory of mother turning him over to Debby and that he was scared and angry because Debby had a mean face and was frightening. Alexis thought she had memories of mother, but had to be reminded that she never lived with Shaunda. Both children perceive mother as a threat, as someone who is trying to take them back, and as one who might make them live with Debby and Jim again or with some other scary person. According to Reiser, the children associate mother with their abuse since mother was the one who placed them with Debby S. in the first place. Reiser testified that it would be detrimental to the children to allow additional time to establish a parent-child relationship with biological mother. She testified that this would prolong their uncertainty and cause them a lot of distress and that they needed permanency "yesterday." Reiser met mother at a case status conference in June 2005 and provided mother with a phone number in case she had any questions. Mother did not call Reiser until December 2005 when she called to ask about Christmas gifts.
H. Psychological Evaluations
The two children and mother were evaluated by Barbara Berkowitz, Ph.D., in December 2004. Berkowitz testified as an expert in the area of psychology with an expertise in child custody cases and child protection. Berkowitz found Alexis to be a rather anxious child who had suffered separation and loss, both of her birth mother and then of Debby S. She found that as a result of her upbringing with Debby S. who convinced her she was Caucasian, she also had identity problems. Berkowitz found that both children desperately need permanency and specialized treatment. With regard to Tre, Berkowitz found that he was more shy and reserved than Alexis and was protective of her. According to Berkowitz, Tre has underlying depression and is fearful of displeasing adult authority figures as a result of his physical and sexual abuse. She found that Tre was very happy in his foster placement and is especially happy to have a father figure and male role model with whom he can enjoy sports and other games. Although she found that initially foster parents were somewhat naive in terms of the children's long term needs, she found that foster parents were wonderful people who were committed to addressing the racial diversity issue and had moved to a church in a different town in order to help provide the children with some racial diversity. Further, there was some racial diversity within foster parents' family which was helpful to that process. Berkowitz found that the interaction between the children and foster parents was very positive and that an attachment was forming. She found that it would be important for the foster parents to continue to have the children seen by a knowledgeable therapist to continue to work on addressing the loss and grieving issues the children face and to assist with their understanding of their biological heritage.
With regard to the children's meeting with mother, Dr. Berkowitz testified that she was aware that DCF had concerns about the children meeting their biological mother whom they did not know because it could create confusion and instability in the children, who did not even know they had a different biological mother who had placed them with Debby S. When Berkowitz informed the children that they would be meeting their biological mother, Alexis responded with anxiety and fear as Debby S. was the only mother she had ever known. Tre stated initially that he did not remember mother, but then thought that he would remember her when he saw her. He had no verbal memories of mother, but Berkowitz believed he might have pre-verbal memories.
The meeting between mother and the children went well in that mother had brought numerous presents for the children since it was around Christmastime. Even though Alexis was very anxious and clung to the social worker initially, she did enjoy opening presents and seemed to have a positive meeting with mother. Dr. Berkowitz viewed the meeting as positive in the sense that it was important for the children to have an understanding of their history and heritage. She found, however, that mother did not have a parent-child relationship with the children. Berkowitz testified that mother is not the psychological parent of the children and that it could be detrimental to the best interest of the children to delay permanency in order to allow a parent-child relationship to develop. She stated that these children need permanency "yesterday," they need to know they are wanted, and they need to feel safe to grieve their losses and move on with their lives.
With regard to mother, Berkowitz testified that mother was responsible in making arrangements to attend the evaluation and was progressing with regard to stabilizing her own life and moving beyond her previous anti-social behavioral features including her criminal conduct. She stated that if mother were going to have any contact with the children in the future, she needed to have education and training regarding their special needs and she needed to grieve her own losses. She testified that mother had resolved some of the issues she had stemming from her own childhood including racial denigration by her step-father and low self-esteem. Mother had also witnessed domestic violence between her mother and her step-father. Berkowitz stated that mother needed to address certain communication issues in her relationship with her boyfriend, Rick.
Foster parents have engaged in therapy with the children and are open to professional in-put. Alexis wanted Dr. Berkowitz to tell the court that she and Tre wished to stay with foster parents forever.
Berkowitz testified that permanency was paramount for the children. She testified that it was not surprising that the children stated that they would be interested in seeing mother once or twice a year, as this would be manageable for them. She testified such an arrangement could be worked out more smoothly post-termination and that the children would not benefit from any delay in termination of mother's parental rights. Unlike many children who are the subject of termination petitions, these children will not experience a loss of their connection to their biological family because there is none. Although Berkowitz believed that any future contact between the children and mother and their half sister, Charann, which is not threatening to them (i.e., post-termination) could be a gain for them, such contact should be left to the recommendations of the children's therapist Dr. Reiser. Berkowitz stated that understanding family and biological history is important to the psychological wellbeing of the children, underscoring the importance of the life book and mother's contribution to the books. Berkowitz testified that guardianship would not be a permanent resolution for the children, but would continue the children's state of psychological limbo.
I. Testimony of Respondent Mother
Respondent mother testified on her own behalf. Shaunda S. denied that she had turned Tre over to Debby after one meeting, and stated that Tre had an overnight visit with Debby before he was given over permanently. Shaunda later found out that there was a Connecticut court case and that the children were in DCF care when a friend of Debby and Willie's in Kentucky told Shaunda's mother. Shaunda stated that she never received notice from DCF or the court. Mother offered a poem (Ex. D) about the separation from her children and stated that she has participated in services. Although she has requested visitation, she has not had it and is disappointed that she has not been able to see the children except for the interactional assessment with Dr. Berkowitz. Shaunda sent Christmas presents and cards to DCF for the children. She is currently working and has a two-bedroom apartment. Mother testified that she has made a lot of mistakes in her life, but believes that she can teach her children not to make the same mistakes.
Mother stated that she wants the children to be happy. She stated that she did not necessarily want them to be removed from the foster family, but that she just does not want them completely out of her family's life. If she were still unable to take them, she would not stand in the way of their adoption, but feels she is now in a better position. Although mother discussed consenting to termination of her parental rights with social worker Fitzgerald on several occasions, mother testified that she did not wish to voluntarily give up her children again.
Mother acknowledged that the child protection records in Kentucky were under the name Shaunda W. and that she was married to Corey W. in 2001 or 2002 for a very short time and then was divorced due to the violent nature of the relationship. She acknowledged that she suspected her prior husband, Walter R., of having inappropriate sexual contact with Charann, yet continued to allow him to see Charann. Mother stated that she had a good relationship with Debby's husband, Willie S., and could have learned the contact information for the children from him at anytime. She confirmed that she had the original phone number for Debby in Connecticut and then received the new number from Willie after Debby moved. She also confirmed that she received a letter Debby sent her in June 2003, and that it was post-marked from Hartford. Mother conceded that she never contacted the police in Connecticut or took any other steps to try to locate the children. As mother's counsel argued, mother was not asking that the commitment be revoked or that the children be returned to her, but was looking for an opportunity to have continued contact with them.
II. ADJUDICATION
The grounds alleged in the petition as to all four respondents are (1) abandonment, in the sense that they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)); (2) that the children, Tre and Alexis, were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and the needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)); and (3) that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with respect to the parents that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the children, and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children (C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)).
A. Location and Reunification — 17a-112(j)(1):
In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory element requiring "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).
With regard to respondent mother, DCF made reasonable efforts to locate her. She was whereabouts unknown when the children first came into DCF care. Initially, DCF had only the information provided by Debby S. who gave DCF the name of Shaunda R. and stated that she thought mother was in Kentucky. DCF thoroughly searched under the name given to them in a number of databases including internet searches, Department of Corrections and court records. DCF later also searched the Kentucky Department of Social Services, the death registry and property records using different spellings of mother's first name and under the last names of both R. and S. which DCF obtained by checking the court records. The search was further complicated by mother's use of different social security numbers. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that these efforts to locate mother were reasonable particularly in view of the fact that the children were in DCF care for many months with no effort by mother to locate them or to communicate with their care providers.
Reunification efforts made by DCF included referrals to service providers who could provide individual counseling, couples counseling, parenting classes and substance abuse evaluation and testing services. Mother did attend a parenting class, but failed to undergo a hair test for substance abuse or couples counseling with her boyfriend, and failed to complete her individual counseling. DCF provided funds for mother's transportation to Connecticut for court hearings and other proceedings. Although DCF would have paid for airfare for mother to fly to Connecticut, mother preferred to take the bus from Kentucky as she did not like to fly. DCF also covered certain other expenses for mother while she was in Connecticut. Additionally, an Interstate Compact study was conducted and social worker Fitzgerald went to Kentucky to make an assessment of mother and her home.
Mother claims that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to locate her and to reunify her with the children. She claims that because she lived continuously in the same city, if DCF had made reasonable efforts, they would have located her. Although mother faults DCF for searching only under the name of Shaunda R. initially, this is the only name DCF had for mother since that was the name provided by Debby S. Early in the case DCF did provide for notice by publication in the Kentucky Post, a newspaper in Cincinnati, Ohio, having circulation in Newport, Kentucky. As set forth above, DCF's efforts to locate mother also included numerous internet searches, searches of various state agencies including the Department of Social Services, Department of Corrections and child protection services as well as death records and property records. These efforts to locate mother were reasonable.
Mother also claims that once she contacted DCF, the Department failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification and did not allow for contact between mother and the children. Mother did meet the children through the evaluation process with Dr. Berkowitz. At the time, as a result of mother's own conduct, the children did not even know they had a biological mother other than Debby. On the recommendation of therapists Hardcastle and Reiser, in view of the children's fragile mental state, no further visitation was permitted as the children viewed mother as a threat to their safety and because they feared she would take them away from their foster family. Moreover, social worker Fitzgerald flew to Kentucky to meet with mother and conduct a home visit of her apartment. Mother's live-in boyfriend, however, became combative and the worker left. He also refused to sign releases or undergo any substance abuse evaluation, testing, or couples counseling. He falsely denied having a criminal record. Thus DCF was not able to fulfill its requirement of investigating any members of a household which is being considered as a placement for children in DCF care.
In In re Shaiesha O., the appellate court recently found that the court must look to events prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made, 93 Conn.App. 42, 887 A.2d 415 (2005). In that case, the petitioner filed a termination of parental rights petition with regard to respondent father several months after DCF was notified that respondent might be the child's biological father, but one week prior to notifying father that paternity testing showed he was, in fact, the child's father. There, DCF had known of the possibility of paternity for several months and filed the termination petition even before notifying father of the results and without having made any efforts at reunification.
In contrast here, despite making reasonable efforts to locate mother, DCF did not learn mother's whereabouts until August 2004 when she contacted DCF. Tre and Alexis had been in DCF care since November 2003. They were in a safe home initially and after a lengthy placement process, were placed with foster parents in August 2004. The children had been committed to the care and custody of DCF in May 2004 following the parents' default for failure to appear in connection with the neglect petition. It was not unreasonable for DCF to initiate termination proceedings when it was unable to locate parents for many months. Once mother did contact DCF, the termination petition was amended and refiled in September 2004. DCF alleged in September 2004, that mother and fathers were unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. DCF established by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the filing of the petition, mother was unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Specifically, mother's having previously given her children over to another for adoption purposes and then having failed to maintain any contact with them such that they did not know she existed, established that mother would be unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Subsequent reunification efforts by DCF included an interstate study which recommended against reunification, paying for mother's travel to Connecticut on a number of occasions, referring mother for services and making a home visit to Kentucky, among other things. Although these reunification efforts occurred after the filing of the petition, that was a function of the timing of mother's contact with DCF and not as a result of DCF prematurely filing a TPR petition. In any event, the court finds that as of the filing of the petition, mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. at 42.
With regard to respondent fathers, they have not played any role in the lives of the children at any time during their lives. They did not appear in this matter and never had any contact whatsoever with DCF. DCF took reasonable steps to try to locate fathers including questioning mother and Debby S., conducting internet and various agency searches and telephone record searches in both Kentucky and Ohio. Thus DCF made reasonable efforts to locate these fathers who do not know the children, who never provided any financial assistance to them and who never made any contact with DCF or the children's caretakers regarding the welfare of the children. Under all the circumstances, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate fathers and that as of the filing of the petitions, they were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
B. Abandonment: C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
Petitioner has alleged as to both respondent mother and fathers that they have abandoned Tre and Alexis.
"Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare. In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 14, 438 A.2d 801 (1981)." In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993); In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 394, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112. Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App., 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).
With regard to respondent mother, she initially gave Tre to Debby S. on very short notice and with no transition. Mother disputes that there was no transition, but testified that Tre had spent a weekend with Debby S. before turning him over to her. Even if the court were to credit mother's testimony, one weekend visit with a complete stranger cannot be considered a transition. Mother gave Tre to someone she barely knew, and who the child did not know at all on the basis of a verbal agreement that she could visit whenever she wanted and that the child would be adopted. She did not go through the State of Kentucky and had no analysis by the Kentucky child protection services as to whether Debby would be an appropriate mother for Tre. Although she did visit Tre initially, ultimately visitation diminished and she rarely saw him. With regard to Alexis, mother turned her over to Debby S. immediately at birth with the same lack of any legal arrangement, never providing any care for her and rarely visiting. Since turning the children over, she has not been part of their lives. Mother acquiesced in their move to Connecticut in 2000. Indeed, the children did not even know (or, in Tre's case, remember) that they had a biological mother who was not Debby S. They thought Debby S. was their biological mother. During the years the children were in Connecticut, respondent mother did not send any cards, letters or gifts to or for the children and only called Debby S. twice. She did not contact DCF until after the children were in the care of DCF for nine months. Mother was simply not part of the children's lives to any degree and indeed, had turned them over to someone who severely abused them. See In re Deana E., et al., 61 Conn.App. 185, 194, 763 A.2d 37 (2000).
As of the adjudication date, respondent mother had not made any significant effort at any time to contact her children. As of 2000, mother knew that the children had never been adopted by Debby S. but remained under Debby's guardianship. In 2000, years before the children were placed in DCF care, mother did attempt to have guardianship of the children reinstated to her. However, she later agreed to have the children remain with Debby and failed to pursue a mediation which the court had ordered by agreement. Once mother agreed to have the children remain with Debby, and Debby and the children were in Connecticut, mother essentially abandoned all efforts at further contact. As the attorney for the children argued, perhaps if mother had maintained some small degree of contact with Debby and the children, she might have discovered the abuse to which the children were subjected, underscoring the tragic aftereffects of mother's decision to turn the children over to someone she hardly knew. Mother's efforts to maintain contact with the children up through 2000 cannot be viewed as anything other than sporadic. Such efforts, as set forth above, are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. at 53. Up through 2000, mother showed "some interest" in her children and their welfare, but the degree of interest shown was not reasonable under the circumstances. As set forth above, indicia of interest, concern and responsibility include "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. at 129. The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights cases is not whether a parent has shown "some interest" in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. at 36. Even assuming that up through 2000, mother had a desire for occasional visiting contact, such contact does not amount to a "reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the children's welfare." In any event, after 2000, mother showed no interest in the welfare of the children. Thus as of September 28, 2004, mother had not maintained a reasonable degree of interest concern or responsibility for the welfare of her children. The court therefore concludes that this ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence as to respondent mother.
With regard to respondent fathers, none of them was involved in the lives of the children. Walter R. last saw Tre when he was approximately eighteen months old and Anthony N. last saw Tre when he was approximately eight months old. Stanley H. has never been a part of Alexis's life and has never visited with her or seen her. These three respondents have never sent cards, gifts or letters to the children or maintained any contact with them or their caretakers in any way. These respondents have never inquired into the welfare of the children or provided any financial support. They have not maintained any degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the children, let alone a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the children. The court therefore concludes that this ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence as to respondent fathers.
C. Parental Failure to Rehabilitate — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)
The petitioner alleges that respondent mother's and fathers' parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Tre and Alexis were found to be neglected on May 24, 2004, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondents have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render them able to care for the children. The court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Section § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to "the parent of a child who (i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and such parent has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that [within a reasonable time] she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., 250 Conn. at 706 . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn.App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]. In re Sarah Ann R., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 269 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384-85, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent mother nor respondent fathers have achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the ages and needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. at 354; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. at 665; In re Sarah Ann R., 57 Conn.App. at 448.
Although specific steps were issued with regard to mother, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that she failed to fulfill them in a number of significant measures. As described above, respondent mother had engaged in insufficient individual counseling and had not engaged in couples counseling with her boyfriend. She also failed to undergo a hair test. Moreover, her live-in boyfriend, Rick, refused to sign releases, and denied he had a criminal record. In view of mother's history of unstable relationships fraught with domestic violence, this is particularly concerning. Since the time of Tre's birth, mother has been involved in six different unstable relationships. She has been married to Walter R. with whom she had a child when she was fifteen. She had a second child, Tre, by a different man as a result of a short-term relationship while she was still married to Walter R. She had her third child, Alexis, by another man, Stanley H., with whom she had a short-term relationship. She was then married to Corey W. for a few months, but divorced due to domestic violence. She was later engaged to Jamone S. with whom she had a domestic violence incident and she is now living with Rick S., who has a criminal record which includes spousal abuse. This history is particularly concerning in view of the fragile nature of the children and their attachment issues.
Respondent fathers have never contacted DCF and have never expressed a desire to have the children placed with them. They continue to be whereabouts unknown despite DCF's efforts to locate them.
The court concludes by clear and convincing evidence, that as of the adjudicatory date of September 28, 2004, respondents had not brought themselves into a position in which they could provide adequate care for the children. Fathers continued to be whereabouts unknown. Mother did not engage in necessary counseling and couples counseling and did not have appropriate housing for two additional troubled children with specialized needs. Thus respondents did not demonstrate an ability to provide day-to-day care for the children. The court must also consider whether events after the adjudicatory date establish "a degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that the parents may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 230; In re Latifa R., 67 Conn.App. at 749-50 (acknowledging that the court could take facts into account from beyond the adjudicatory period in making its decision in the adjudicatory phase with regard to whether the degree of rehabilitation was sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time). There was no change in fathers' circumstances after the adjudicatory date and they continued to be whereabouts unknown. Mother's conduct after the adjudicatory date does show improvement. To her credit, she has been regularly employed and has maintained stable housing for herself, her boyfriend and Charann. She attended parenting classes and some counseling, although her counseling did not address issues of concern to DCF. She did not have a hair test, but she did undergo a substance abuse evaluation which did not recommend future treatment.
Rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 479-80, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. at 231 (quoting In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000)). Both Dr. Berkowitz and Dr. Reiser testified that the children are in desperate need of permanency and needed permanency "yesterday." Given respondent's current inability to have the children placed with her, any additional time would be unreasonable and detrimental to the children. Tre and Alexis have been in DCF care since November 2003. Here, for children who now have the stability of a wonderful foster home and foster parents who would like to adopt them and who are assisting them in overcoming the tragic circumstances in which they were placed, any additional time for rehabilitation of respondents even under the best of circumstances is not reasonable.
Mother has been able to manage her own life to the extent that she has remained employed, and has maintained adequate housing. She did not, however, have appropriate housing for two additional children with specialized needs. The court finds that respondents are not in a position to provide day-to-day care for the children or to assume a useful role in their lives and that they have not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that they will be in such a position within a reasonable time. Thus at the time of trial, respondents had not rehabilitated to the point where they were in a position to play a constructive role in the day-to-day care of the children.
In assessing rehabilitation, "[t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. at 261; accord, In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 292, 784 A.2d 412 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. at 384-85. The issue is not whether respondent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children. In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. at 180; In re Sarah Ann R., 57 Conn.App. at 448. Tre and Alexis both have specialized needs. As victims of severe physical and sexual abuse, they need continued intensive therapy. Both children have been diagnosed with PTSD and have attachment issues. Mother's history of unstable relationships raises grave concerns about her ability to provide a stable home for these special needs children. Both children desperately need and deserve a safe, stable and nurturing environment. Expressing love for a child and visiting with a child occasionally is vastly different from being able to care for the particular needs of a child on a day-to-day basis, even with supports in place. As Judge Brenneman stated in In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), "Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying her a safe, permanent home with proven competent care-takers because her biological mother has tried hard but continues to be incapable of providing such a home for her." Here, respondent parents have not made sufficient efforts to rehabilitate and remain unable to provide the day-to-day care these children need within a reasonable time. The children now have a foster family with whom they have thoroughly bonded. The family is committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
Thus, in its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that respondent mother and fathers remain unable to successfully parent the children and lack the ability to assume a responsible position in the children's lives within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proven respondents' failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
D. No Ongoing Parent-child Relationship — § 17A-112(J)(3)(D)
This ground is established when there is no ongoing parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and where allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.
No ongoing parent-child relationship contemplates a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent or that no relationship has ever developed between them, or that the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645-46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980); In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). In any case, "the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). The mere recognition of an individual as a parent will not defeat this ground. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 708-09, 438 A.2d 1101 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801, 487 A.2d 564 (1985). The presence or absence of positive feelings on the part of the child is determinative, In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 240, 754 A.2d 169 (2000).
In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish as to respondents (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) that the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship would harm the interests of the child, In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between the children Tre and Alexis and respondent parents. Neither child even knew they had a biological mother other than Debby S. and they believed she was their biological mother until they were placed in DCF care. They met their mother on one occasion in December 2004 and consider their foster parents to be their psychological parents. Mother has not provided day-to-day care for Tre since he was fifteen months old and mother has never provided day-to-day care for Alexis. She contacted them by phone two times in four years. Neither child speaks of respondent mother during therapy sessions. Initially, neither child had any memories or even a recollection of mother, although prior to meeting mother during the psychological evaluation, Tre felt he might recognize mother if he saw her. While Tre may have had some pre-verbal positive memories of mother he had a specific negative memory of mother turning him over to Debby S. As Dr. Berkowtiz testified, mother did not have a parent-child relationship with the children. Thus, there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between mother and Tre and Alexis.
Respondent mother may be well-intentioned to the extent that she has expressed her love for the children and a desire to maintain a connection to them. However, when she had the responsibility of caring for them on a daily basis, she was unable to do so and turned them over to Debby S. with the intention that they be adopted. As a result of her own conduct, including failure to maintain contact with them and Debby S., she did not serve as a parent for Tre and Alexis. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. at 241. Respondent mother has never met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of seven-year-old Alexis and has not met Tre's needs in over eight years. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 525.
With regard to respondent fathers, they have not been involved in the lives of the children. Walter R. has not seen Tre since he was approximately eighteen months old and Anthony N. has not seen Tre since he was approximately eight months old. Stanley H. has never been a part of Alexis's life and has never visited with her or seen her. None of them has ever provided day-to-day care for the children or maintained any contact with them or their caretakers in any way. Neither Tre nor Alexis has any memories of respondent fathers. Fathers have never had a parent-child relationship with the children. The children do not know respondent fathers and have never expressed a desire to see them.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow respondents further time for the reestablishment of a parent-child relationship with children who are in a stable, nurturing foster home would be detrimental to the best interest of the children. Tre and Alexis are now ten and seven years old. They have been in a pre-adoptive foster home together since August 2004. According to the testimony of both Dr. Berkowitz and Dr. Reiser, in view of the children's need for permanency, it would be detrimental to them to allow additional time in which mother or respondent fathers could attempt to establish a parent-child relationship, particularly with respondents they do not know.
Thus, the court finds that the petitioner has proven this statutory ground for termination as to respondents Shaunda S., Walter R., Anthony N. and Stanley H. by clear and convincing evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including February 28, 2006, the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed. "`If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.' [In re Eden F, 250 Conn. at 689]." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 103. "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k)]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. at 528 (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833, 733 A.2d 298 (1999)). The seven factors "serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104. The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section. The court makes the following seven written findings:
(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the children by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF offered services including parenting education, substance abuse testing and counseling. Respondent mother engaged in some services, including parenting, but failed to engage in others including a hair test. Fathers, who are whereabouts unknown, have not participated in services.
(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.
(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to respondent mother. As set forth above, there was compliance by respondent mother as to some steps, but failure to comply with others. DCF has fulfilled its obligations to facilitate reunification of the family.
(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the children do not have a bond with their biological mother whom they have seen only once in December 2004. Prior to meeting her in December 2004, they were unaware that they had a biological mother other than Debby S. They do not have any emotional bond with fathers whom they do not know. The children do have a strong emotional bond with each other and with the foster parents with whom they have lived since August 2004. The children have adjusted very well in their foster family and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the children need. The foster parents are committed to the children and would like to adopt them.
(5) As to the ages of the children, the court finds that Tre N., born May 31, 1996, is almost ten years old and Alexis S., born August 9, 1998, is now seven. The court further finds that these children require stability of placement and continuity of care and that the children's attorney and the guardian ad litem both recommend termination.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The Appellate Court has also noted, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).
(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; the court finds that respondent fathers have not maintained any contact with the children or DCF and mother has not maintained regular and consistent contact with the children. The court further finds that respondents are unable to assume a responsible parental role in the children's lives. Giving them additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to be reunited. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989); In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn. 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).
(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties. Mother suggests that Debby's move with the children to Connecticut interfered with her ability to maintain a meaningful relationship with the children. However, mother was aware of the move before it occurred and acquiesced in the decision. Although she had the information in order to maintain contact or visits with the children, she did not maintain the relationship, or even call on a regular basis, even after she was aware that Debby had not adopted the children. Mother did not pursue mediation after it was ordered by agreement of the parties, or any legal remedies in Connecticut. Further, while the mother's financial means were limited, economic factors did not prevent regular, continuing contact with the children.
With respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Shaunda S. and Walter R. and Anthony N. to Tre N., and Shaunda S. and Stanley H. to the child Alexis S., is in the best interest of the children. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Tre and Alexis. The children have already endured many difficulties in their lives, including the trauma of being abandoned by their mother and then either witnessing or being severely physically and sexually abused by their caretakers who are serving sentences in connection with their criminal conduct. The children are now in a foster home where they are very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to them. They are making great progress in therapy. Although mother wishes to maintain a relationship with them, she had no relationship with them and they were unaware of her existence until a meeting in December 2004. Mother was unable to assume a responsible parental role for the children and voluntarily gave them to Debby S. with the intention that they be adopted. Following a series of short-term relationships, mother is now living with a man who refused to undergo substance abuse testing or treatment and who refused to sign releases or cooperate with DCF and the Interstate study recommended against placement of the children with mother in Kentucky. Although mother loves the children and would like to visit with them, she has not put herself in a position to be able to care for them.
In view of the fact that respondent fathers are whereabouts unknown and have not been involved in the children's lives, termination of their parental rights is in the children's best interest.
In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the children's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents; and their genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the children's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the children's best interest.
With regard to permanency, the court considers the testimony that the foster parents are committed to adopting the children. These children are entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as their parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the children and the guardian ad litem recommend termination.
After considering the children's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and fathers is in the children's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Shaunda S. and Walter R. and Anthony N. to the child Tre N., and Shaunda S. and Stanley H. to the child Alexis S., are hereby terminated. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the children.
With regard to the permanency plans for the children, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as to each child and finds that such plans are in the best interest of the children. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans. Permanency plans shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered.