Opinion
H12CP13020609B
01-27-2016
In re Tjayda J. [1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed January 28, 2016
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Glenn Woods, J.
Before this court is the petition for termination of parental rights of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF or Department) in the interest of Tjayda J., date of birth October 27, 2011. The child's mother is Kiva S. and the child's father is Tjayda J., Sr.
On April 21, 2015, DCF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parents. The parents were properly served and appeared in court represented by counsel. Both parents contested the petition.
On July 18, 2014, an ex parte order of temporary custody in the interest of Tjayda J. was granted and vested in DCF. On August 5, 2014, the court committed the child to the care and custody of the Department.
On April 15, 2015, DCF filed a petition for termination of parental rights in the interest of the minor child, Tjayda J., alleging that the respondent parents have failed to rehabilitate.
The matter was tried to the court on October 6, 2015. The respondent mother appeared and was represented by counsel. The respondent father was represented by counsel but failed to appear. Counsel had the opportunity to examine and call witnesses. The petitioner, who bears the burden of proof in this matter, introduced twenty-three exhibits and called seven witnesses. The respondent mother testified on her own behalf. The court had the opportunity to observe the physical size, appearance, demeanor, dress, attitude, and general hygiene of the respondent mother and observe her reactions to the evidence as presented. Further, the court closely observed all the witnesses and determined the validity, cohesion, and the credibility of their testimony.
The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction over the matter, that there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child, and the parties do not claim these proceedings implicate the Indian Child Welfare Act. The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence and testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respective parents, Kiva S. and Tjayda J., Sr.
The court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence, as of the date of the petition. Practice Book § 35a-7(a) .
I
FACTS
A
Procedural History
On January 5, 2012, a neglect petition was filed on behalf of Tjayda J. The court adjudicated the minor child neglected and issued an order of protective supervision on August 17, 2012 for a period of nine months ending on May 17, 2013. The court also reviewed, approved, and ordered final steps for the respondent parents.
On August 2, 2013, another neglect petition was filed on behalf of Tjayda J. On November 21, 2013, the court adjudicated the minor child uncared for and issued an order of protective supervision until February 21, 2014. On December 5, 2013, following a hearing, the court approved and ordered final specific steps for the respondent parents.
On January 9, 2014, the court ordered that protective supervision in the best interest of the minor child be extended until further order of the court. On April 23, 2014, the court ordered that protective supervision be extended for six months until October 23, 2014.
On July 18, 2014, the court granted an ex parte motion for order of temporary custody accompanied by an affidavit from DCF in the interest of Tjayda J. The court found that the child was in immediate danger from his surroundings; that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of the child; that temporary care and custody of the child would be vested in DCF; and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child were made by the state.
On July 25, 2014, a preliminary hearing was held whereby the court, in the interest of Tjayda J., sustained the order of temporary custody. At that hearing, the court also reviewed, approved, and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents.
On August 5, 2014, a hearing was held resulting in the court committing the minor child, Tjayda J., to the care and custody of the Department. The court also reaffirmed the specific steps previously outlined in the Order of Temporary Custody (OTC).
The petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, filed a petition for the termination of parental rights of Tjayda J. on April 21, 2015, alleging that the respondent parents had failed to rehabilitate. On May 21, 2015, a hearing was held wherein the court confirmed service of said petition. The court also defaulted the respondent father for his failure to appear, advised the respondent mother of her rights, and approved the permanency of termination of parental rights and adoption in the best interest of the minor child, Tjayda J., as to father. Mother entered a pro forma denial of the allegations in the petition for termination of parental rights.
In a hearing on June 23, 2015, the court approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption of Tjayda J. The court also found that based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Department made reasonable attempts to achieve the plan.
B
Mother
Kiva S. was born in New York City on October 11, 1973. She left high school in the 9th grade. She has a minimal employment history having held a job for a year as a school bus monitor in New York.
Mother has given birth to nine children. Her first child, Marcus S., whose father is Clive S., was born in 1992. Kiva S. and Clive S. were never married. Due to mother's substance abuse and inability to provide adequate supervision of Marcus, New York Child Protective Service (NY CPS) removed Marcus S. from her care and placed him in foster care. After six months, N.Y. CPS revoked commitment of Marcus S. and custody was transferred to his father with whom he continues to reside.
Mother gave birth in New York to Charisma and Cashmere in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Their father is Mr. B. and Kiva S. was not married to him. After the couple separated, mother moved to Connecticut as she did not want to raise her children in New York.
Kiva S. met Tjayda J., Sr. while living in Connecticut. Beginning in 2007 they had five children together. Their relationship was violent and they are not currently living together.
Mother returned to New York in 2008 and lived there until July of 2011, during which time N.Y. CPS became involved with the family. She moved back to Connecticut with her children and Connecticut DCF investigated and substantiated allegations of educational neglect originally made by N.Y. CPS, and further found physical neglect of her children.
Records from Community Health Services indicate that Kiva S. received mental health services from August 19, 2003 to September 7, 2006. She was diagnosed with cannabis dependency; depressive disorder not otherwise specified; nondependent alcohol abuse; and psychotic disorder not otherwise specified.
Kiva S. has a history of marijuana and alcohol abuse dating back to her teenage years. She has received treatment for her substance abuse issues since 1994.
Kiva S. currently resides at the Saratoga Interfaith Family Shelter in Queens, NY. Since 2014, she has moved at least five times to different shelters and has stayed with some church members she met in New York City.
On December 9, 2014, Kiva S. gave birth to Tjayda Immanuel Kevon J. who remains in her care. Due to her past history in New York and Connecticut, her case is being monitored by New York Administration for Children's Services (ACS) CPS. N.Y. ACS CPS assigned Kiva S.'s case to an agency that provides services related to community counseling, community advocacy, housing advocacy and monthly home based visits to ensure family functioning and child safety. Kiva S. has been receptive to such services.
Kiva S. was admitted to Camelot Counseling Center on January 12, 2015 where she has been in weekly counseling for substance abuse, women support groups, mental health therapy, group coping daily skills, parenting, anger management, domestic violence and drug testing. All of her drug testing results have been negative at Camelot Counseling Center.
Kiva S. recently completed training as a home health aide and currently has one client with whom she works.
Mother is in need of stable housing. She has an extensive history of noncompliance with rules and regulations at shelters in Hartford, New Haven, and Waterbury during the period of 2012-2014. Since October of 2011, she has moved at least fourteen times. She has been residing in a homeless shelter since January of 2015.
C
Father
Tjayda J., Sr. is forty-nine years old. He has a history of criminal convictions, which include robbery, larceny, criminal trespass, failure to appear, assault, carjacking, interfering and resisting arrest, sale of illegal drugs, possession of narcotics, carrying a dangerous weapon, escape, burglary and probation violation.
Tjayda J., Sr. has a history of substance abuse. He has failed to successfully complete any inpatient or outpatient substance abuse programs and he has not produced any documentation that would indicate such completion.
From March 5, 2012 to December 12, 2012, Tjayda J., Sr. attended Community Health Services but was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. From February 19, 2013 to December 6, 2013, he received mental health treatment for depression and anxiety at UCONN Outpatient Psychiatric Services, but he failed to attend the program on a consistent basis and did not complete the treatment. DCF reported that it has no information as to whether he continued receiving services and/or medication after December of 2013.
Father and mother have a history of domestic violence dating back to 2006. Tjayda J., Sr. entered the Radiance Innovative Services Domestic Violence Offenders Group on August 21, 2012 and did not complete the program until June of 2013.
Tjayda J., Sr. does not contribute to the emotional, financial or educational needs of his son. He has been transient since Tjayda J. came into DCF care in July of 2014. He reported that he currently resides in Queens, NY. He has not been in contact with DCF and did not visit his child from January 23, 2015 to April of 2015. He provided no explanation for his whereabouts or why he was missing for those three months. He has not provided DCF with an address since January of 2015. He has also not provided DCF with any information regarding service providers or of his intention to avail himself of any services in Connecticut or New York to address his specific steps. He has remained transient and does not consistently maintain contact with DCF to inquire about Tjayda J.'s health and welfare.
D
Child
Tjayda J. was born on October 27, 2011 to Kiva S. and Tjayda J., Sr. in Hartford, Connecticut. The child was placed in a DCF legal risk foster home in July of 2014 after he came into the care of the Department. This has been his only placement. The home is a two-parent household and Tjayda J. is the only child in the home. The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt Tjayda J. if he becomes available for adoption.
The child is very bonded to his foster parents as he calls them " mom" and " dad" and relies on them for daily support and comfort. The foster parents have facilitated visits for Tjayda J. with his teenage sisters who are also in the care of the Department. They are also reaching out to the adoptive family of Tjayda J.'s four other siblings.
Tjayda J. is a four-year-old boy who presents as a mature child for his age and displays age appropriate behavior. He is articulate in communicating his thoughts and feelings to his foster parents. He is very social, talkative and outgoing with his peers and other adults who are a part of his life. He enjoys laughing, watching cartoons, using an electronic tablet and playing with his toys. Tjayda J. is a healthy eater. His presenting aggressive behaviors have diminished greatly since being placed in his foster home. He used to swear constantly when he was first placed but this behavior has ceased.
Tjayda J.'s foster parents feel that in order for him to work through some of his attachment and trauma therapy issues he needs to have as few caregivers as possible. They believe it to be in his best interest that things be streamlined and his world kept smaller until his attachment issues are resolved. Tjayda J. is learning that his foster parents are the primary people to whom he relates on a daily basis and that he can trust them to meet his needs. They have stated that the interventions and work with professionals like the occupational therapist and trauma therapist may be too much for him at this time.
Tjayda J. presently resides in the most stable environment he has experienced: his pre-adoptive placement. The foster parents have been very supportive of him and have assisted in visitation with his biological parents, travelling as far as New York City for these visits. Tjayda J. refers to his foster parents as " mom" and " dad." He calls his biological mother " Kiva." The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt him if he is eligible for adoption.
" Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by [General Statutes § 17a-112] . . . Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 500, 78 A.3d 797 (2013), overruled on other grounds by In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015); see also Practice Book § 35a-7(b) (" In the discretion of the judicial authority, evidence on adjudication and disposition may be heard in a nonbifurcated hearing, provided disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded").
II
ADJUDICATORY PHASE
A
Reasonable Efforts
In order to terminate parental rights the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that DCF " has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . . unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing . . . or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required . . ." § 17a-112(j)(1).
DCF has involvement with this family dating back to 1994 in Connecticut and New York. On January 5, 2012, DCF filed Neglect Petitions on behalf of Tjayda J. at the Connecticut Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. On August 17, 2012, the Department placed the child under an Order of Protective Supervision, which was extended three times through October 23, 2014.
DCF initially entered mother to the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center (ADRC) at Coventry House on July 2, 2014. On July 10, 2014, mother left the program and fled to New York for fear that the Department would remove the child from her care. On July 15, 2014, DCF purchased a bus fare for mother, father and the child to travel from New York to Connecticut to see their other children. Mother and child did not board said bus as arranged by DCF. On July 16, 2014, the Department contacted N.Y. CPS and filed a report of abuse/neglect, which was accepted.
On August 5, 2014, Tjayda J. was committed to DCF and remains in a pre-adoptive foster home.
Since 2003, the Department has worked with mother to help her obtain mental health services. From August 19, 2003 to September 7, 2006, mother has received mental health services from Community Health Services.
DCF referred mother to Coventry House for individual counseling from October of 2011 to March of 2012 and from July 2, 2014 to July 15, 2014.
DCF referred Kiva S. to Circle of Life Transitional Shelter from July 26, 2012 to October 18, 2012 where she completed nine sessions of Domestic Violence Group Psychoeducation. From January of 2013 to July of 2013, mother engaged in individual counseling at Family Intervention Center in Waterbury. From November 21, 2013 to April 25, 2014, Kiva S. was referred by DCF to four different programs, none of which she successfully completed. They were Catholic Charities, Hill Health Center in Hartford for individual therapy, Inter-Community Mental Health, and Restoring Strength to Families.
Subsequently, in 2014 and 2015, the Department scheduled visits between mother and Tjayda J. by arranging bus tickets and transportation between New York and Connecticut.
In order to terminate parental rights, the Court must find by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent. § § 17a-112(j) and 17a-112(j)(1). Our courts have consistently held that in determining the meaning of " reasonable efforts to . . . reunify"; § 17a-112(j); " [t]he word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 668, 6 A.3d 86, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10 A.3d 1051 (2010); see also In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 618, 621, 9 A.3d 413 (2010). " [TIhe department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 205, 15 A.3d 194 (2011) (quoting In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552-53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009)); see also In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011).
DCF has referred mother to many services over several years to assist her in an effort to reunify with her son. The Department has offered her substance abuse referrals for inpatient and outpatient treatment, substance abuse evaluations, random drug testing, therapy services, domestic violence services, parent education, supervised visitation and transportation, local and Greyhound bus passes, supportive housing, home visitation, advocacy and case management.
The court finds the Department has made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with her son.
Despite numerous efforts by DCF to offer Tjayda J., Sr. mental health services, he has not followed through with said services. Father was referred to the Department to Community Health Services (CHS), where he attended from March 5, 2012 to December 12, 2012. Father was unsuccessfully discharged from CHS. On February 19, 2013, Tjayda J., Sr. completed an intake at UConn Outpatient Psychiatric Services. He did not attend the program on a consistent basis and left the program.
On June 26, 2013, father again completed an intake at UConn Outpatient Psychiatric Services and was prescribed medication for depression and anxiety; however, he missed his follow-up appointments and ceased treatment in late 2013.
The Department referred father for substance abuse evaluation and drug screens at the ADRC in Hartford. Father failed to attend the program.
DCF referred father to Radiance Innovative Services Domestic Violence Offender Group in July of 2012. This program is intended to aid father in the healthy development of a child's self-esteem, educational achievement, and lifelong social interaction. Father started the program on August 21, 2012 but did not complete it until June of 2013.
Reasonable efforts to reunify father with Tjayda J. are no longer appropriate. Father has not attended the many services offered by DCF to address his mental health, substance abuse, parenting, domestic violence and housing concerns. Tjayda J., Sr. has no future plan for himself, his wife, or his son. He cannot assume a responsible parenting role in Tjayda J.'s life at this time or in the near future as he has not availed himself of services offered by DCF to improve his circumstances so that he can assume a responsible role in his child's life.
The court finds the Department has made reasonable efforts to reunify father with his son.
B
Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights
Each statutory basis set out in § 17a-112(j)(3) is an independent ground for termination. See In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). " During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112[(j)(3)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The [C]ommissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds . . . Section [17a-112(j)(3)] carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judgment of the legislature, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of parental rights in the absence of consent . . . Because a respondent's fundamental right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 500-01. " [T]he failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003). The court finds that the Department has sustained its burden of proof as to the following grounds.
1
Ground (B)(i)--Failure to Rehabilitate with a Child who Has Been Found by the Superior Court to Have Been Neglected or Uncared for in a Prior Proceeding as to Tjayda J. by Kiva S.
Pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) " a trial court can terminate parental rights if the court finds that 'the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to [General Statutes § ]46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . .'" In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 503 (quoting § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)). The issue in the present case is whether the respondent mother, Kiva S., has " achieve[d] such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ." § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). In considering personal rehabilitation under the provisions of § 17a-112(j), " [t]he critical issue is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001). Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent. In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986).
In the instant case, at the time of Tjayda J.'s removal, the presenting problems with mother were mental health and substance abuse issues, an extensive history with the Department, transience, lack of parenting skills and domestic violence. Mother failed to comply with the steps ordered by the court to facilitate the return of her child, Tjayda J.
On September 7, 2006, mother was discharged for noncompliance from CHS where she received mental health services. After reentering the program at Coventry House to treat substance abuse and mental health issues, mother left on July 15, 2014 fearing that the Department would remove Tjayda J. from her care.
Mother withdrew from therapy services provided by Catholic Charities on January 14, 2014. In February and March of 2014, mother did not successfully complete individual therapy sessions at Hill Health Center in Hartford. After one therapy session at Inter-Community Mental Health on April 29, 2014, mother did not attend any more sessions.
On February 3, 2014, the Department referred mother to the Restoring Strength of Families program intended to help mother identify opportunities and enroll in a GED program. Mother did not obtain her GED; however, she has recently secured part-time employment as a home health aide with one client.
Kiva S. continues to reside in shelters in New York. She has been referred to a number of programs by DCF such as the Jewish Board of Family and Children Services in Brooklyn, N.Y. for domestic violence; Woodhull Medical Center in Brooklyn, N.Y. for mental health and substance abuse, and St. Christopher Ottilie Family Services for parenting. Mother has not participated in any of the aforementioned services.
2
Ground (B)(i)--Failure to Rehabilitate with a Child who Has Been Found by the Superior Court to Have Been Neglected or Uncared for in a Prior Proceeding as to Tjayda J. by Tjayda J., Sr.
Tjayda J., Sr. has also failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. As already outlined in this decision, he was unsuccessfully discharged from Community Health Services in 2012 and he has not engaged in any further services since that time.
Father has also failed to comply with mental health services with UConn Outpatient Psychiatric Services that he began in 2013. He missed his follow-up appointments following a June 26, 2013 intake, and ceased treatment in late 2013. DCF reported that it has no information as to whether he continued receiving services and/or medication after December of 2013.
Father did not attend a scheduled initial appointment for substance abuse evaluations and drug screens at the ADRC originally scheduled to start on January 21, 2014. As a result, father is also not participating in random urine screens.
The Department referred father to the same programs as it had done for mother in New York, focusing on domestic violence, mental health, substance abuse, and parenting. Like Kiva S., Tjayda J., Sr. has not participated in any of these services.
Father does not have his own housing as he continues to reside in a shelter. He is also unemployed.
3
Ground (E)--Failure to Rehabilitate with a Child Under the Age of Seven as to Tjayda J. by Kiva S.
Tjayda J. was born on October 27, 2011 and is less than seven years old. He is a neglected child in that mother has unaddressed mental health, substance abuse, housing, and domestic violence issues that currently prevent her from providing a safe and stable environment for the child. The facts identified by the court in Ground (B)(i) which demonstrate Kiva S.'s failure to rehabilitate are incorporated into Ground (E) and show her failure to achieve a sufficient degree of permanent rehabilitation that would allow her to assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
Further, mother's personal rights to Tjayda Jacquin S-J., date of birth February 28, 2007; Tjayda Jacquel S-J., date of birth February 28, 2007; Kyemorah S-J., date of birth March 17, 2009; and Tjayda Jacquey S-J., date of birth June 19, 2010, were terminated on May 7, 2014 pursuant to a termination of parental rights filed by the Commissioner of DCF.
The court finds that the respondent mother has failed to rehabilitate within the meaning of the statute.
4
Ground (E)--Failure to Rehabilitate with a Child Under the Age of Seven as to Tjayda J. by Tjayda J., Sr.
Tjayda J., Sr. has unaddressed mental health, substance abuse, housing, and domestic violence issues that also currently prevent him from providing a safe and stable environment for the child. The same facts outlined by the court which comprise the allegations in Ground (B)(i) against father are incorporated into Ground (E) and show his failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation that would allow him to assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
Further, Tjayda J., Sr.'s parental rights to Tjayda Jacquin S.-J., date of birth February 28, 2007; Tjayda Jacquel S.-J., date of birth February 28, 2007; Kyemorah S.-J., date of birth March 17, 2009; and Tjayda Jacquey S.-J., date of birth June 19, 2010, were terminated on May 7, 2014 pursuant to a termination of parental rights filed by the Commissioner of DCF.
The court finds that the respondent father has failed to rehabilitate with the meaning of the statute.
III
DISPOSITION
The court finds that the petitioner has satisfied the requirements of § 17a-112(j)(1) and (3) and termination of mother's and father's parental rights have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Before deciding whether or not to terminate parental rights, the court is required to make findings on seven criteria set out in § 17a-112(k). " In arriving at (the decision of whether to terminate parental rights], the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors" outlined in § 17a-112(k). In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 362, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). " [T]hose seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered . . . There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 47, 907 A.2d 126, cert. granted on other grounds, 280 Conn. 947, 912 A.2d 480 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). The court concludes that it is in the best interest of the child, Tjayda J., to terminate the parental rights of Tjayda J., Sr. and Kiva S. See, In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 107, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence, namely evidence of best interests of subject children, for court to terminate parental rights of respondent). Pursuant to statute, the court makes the following findings regarding the Department's petition to terminate the respondents' parental rights, as of the last day of evidence. Practice Book § 35a-9.
A
General Statutes § 17a-112(k) Criteria (1) " The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent . . ."
The Department offered mother and father mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence and parenting services to assist them in rehabilitating themselves in an effort to reunify with their child in a timely manner. The parents have failed to avail themselves of almost all services offered. Delays in implementation of these services were due to the parents' lack of participation. The court finds that the timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered by DCF to the respondent parents to be fair and responsible.
(2) " [W]hether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended . . ."
The Department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. (Cum.Sup. 2015). Mother and father were referred to parenting, mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence programs. Visitation was also provided. These services were appropriate and offered on a timely basis.
(3) " [T]he terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order . . ."
The court ordered specific steps for the parents. Mother and father have failed to comply with their obligations under these steps.
(4) " [T]he feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties . . ."
The court finds that the child has developed a close bond and emotional ties with his foster parents. The child seeks his foster family to meet all of his needs, to keep him safe, and for stability. The child is comfortable in his environmental surroundings in his foster home.
(5) " [T]he age of the child . . ."
Tjayda J. is four years old.
(6) " [T]he efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child . . ."
Neither parent has visited Tjayda J. consistently. Mother and father have been offered and provided ample time and services to assist them in rehabilitating and reunifying with the child in a timely manner. The parents have failed to adjust their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be safely returned to their care. Mother and father have made minimal progress as they have failed to comply with all of the services offered to address their mental health, substance abuse, parenting, and stable housing issues. Neither parent resides in his or her own home. Mother and father have not been maintaining frequent contact with Tjayda J. due to the distance involved and as both parents' last known addresses are in homeless shelters in New York.
(7) " [T]he extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."
The court finds that neither parent has been prevented from having a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent, the unreasonable act of any other person, or by economic circumstances. The parents were offered and referred to programs to address mental health, substance abuse, parenting, and stable housing issues. These programs were offered at no cost to the parents. It is a result of the parents' own actions that they have not had a meaningful relationship with their son.
B
Best Interests of the Child
The court is at a point in the dispositional phase of the proceeding where it must determine whether termination of the parental rights of the respondent parents is in the best interest of the child. See In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, pursuant to § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, " by clear and convincing evidence that . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child . . ."
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of the respondent mother, Kiva S., and the respondent father, Tjayda J., Sr., is in the best interest of the child, Tjayda J. In making this decision, the court has considered the child's age, development, well-being, need for continuity and stability, sustained growth, length of stay in the foster home, nature of his relationship with his foster family and with his biological family, and the degree of contact maintained by the biological parents. See, In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).
The court also balanced the child's need for stability and permanency against the distant, uncertain benefit of maintaining a connection with his parents. The court has noted throughout this decision that neither parent has demonstrated a willingness or any ability to provide competent, safe, and nurturing parenting to the child. Neither parent has cared for or supported Tjayda J. or attempted to meet his needs on a daily basis since he was a baby. Tjayda J. does not consider either respondent as his parent. Neither parent has successfully taken advantage of available services in order to improve their circumstances so they can assume a responsible role in the child's life. Neither parent has been able to put the child's interest ahead of their own interests.
Tjayda J. needs a permanent and stable living environment in order to grow and develop in a healthy manner. The child refers to his foster parents as " mom" and " dad" and seeks them out for daily comfort and support. The child refers to his birth mother by her first name. There is no reasonable possibility that either respondent will be able to serve a meaningful role as a parent within a reasonable period of time. The court finds that Tjayda J. is bonded to his foster family and enjoys a significant degree of mental and emotional stability in their care. His foster family has expressed a desire to adopt him should he become available for adoption.
The best interest of the child will be served by terminating the parental rights of the respondent parents so that Tjayda J. can be adopted and provided with the love, care, permanency, and stability that he requires.
IV
ORDERS
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered all of the evidence and statutory requirements, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent parents, Kiva S. and Tjayda J., Sr., with their son, Tjayda J. Further, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of the parental rights of the respondent parents. Finally, the court also finds, by clear and convincing evidence, upon all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parents. Accordingly, the court hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent parents, Kiva S. and Tjayda J., Sr. It is further ordered that the Commissioner of DCF is appointed statutory parent of the child, Tjayda J. Finally, the court orders DCF to file a status report within thirty days of the filing of this decision.
SO ORDERED.