Opinion
No. COA14–654.
01-20-2015
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Charlene Richardson, Assistant Attorney General, for the State. Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Kathleen M. Joyce, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant. Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe, for petitioner-appellee Holly Hill Hospital.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Charlene Richardson, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Kathleen M. Joyce, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe, for petitioner-appellee Holly Hill Hospital.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Where the trial court failed to make any findings as to whether respondent posed a risk of physical debilitation to himself in the future, the order of the trial court involuntarily committing respondent is vacated and remanded for further findings of fact.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On 22 December 2013, Kermit Thompson (respondent) was admitted to Holly Hill Hospital. Dr. Yi–Zhe Wang (Dr. Wang), an employee of the hospital, was informed that respondent had been brought to the hospital because he was “very agitated” and refused to leave a Walmart store. Dr. Wang was later informed that respondent had developed a fever of 103 degrees. Hospital staff decided to transfer respondent to WakeMed Hospital for treatment, but Dr. Wang was informed that respondent refused to go to WakeMed.
On 26 December 2013, Dr. Shahzad Ali (Dr. Ali) of WakeMed filed an Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary Commitment. Dr. Ali's petition described respondent as a 50–year–old male who was transferred to WakeMed from Holly Hill. Dr. Ali alleged that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. In support of this allegation, Dr. Ali observed “signs and symptoms of psychosis including delusional thought process, ideas of reference, and psychomotor agitation.” The petition also alleged that respondent's family reported “aggressive speech and posturing toward them” prior to his admission to Holly Hill.
On 26 December 2013, Dr. Ali completed an “Examination and Recommendation to Determine Necessity for Involuntary Commitment” form for respondent. That same day, a magistrate in Wake County entered a custody order for respondent. Respondent was held at WakeMed for treatment, and taken back to Holly Hill just after midnight on 31 December 2013, where he was evaluated by Dr. Wang. Dr. Wang recommended inpatient commitment for 30 days, noting that respondent was “very paranoid” and “refused medication[.]”
On 3 January 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 122C–268(a) and 122C–286(a), to determine the need for involuntary commitment. Dr. Wang testified that respondent “appeared to be agitated[,]” but that he did not complete full evaluations of respondent, because “he was so agitated.” When Dr. Wang subsequently attempted to reevaluate respondent, respondent acted “very anxious, panicky” and asked for an attorney. Dr. Wang testified that respondent's voice was very elevated and fast, that he had a “flat affect,” that he appeared “very disheveled” and his “hygiene [was] very poor[,]” and that he had been diagnosed with influenza. Dr. Wang concluded that respondent has “bi-quality disorder with severe paranoia, and very elevated increased agitation[,]” and that “he has been refusing any treatment—refusing any psychiatric treatment, and also refusing treatment for his fever and influenza.” Asked whether respondent would be dangerous to himself, Dr. Wang responded, “Yes[,]” but did not describe any specific danger.
Respondent's father, Kermit Gene Thompson (Mr. Thompson), lives several miles from respondent and visits him regularly. Mr. Thompson testified that respondent had been previously hospitalized, that respondent had previously had problems taking his medication, that respondent had once spent the night on his porch because he had locked himself out of his house, and that Mr. Thompson had discovered burned pots on respondent's yard, likely due to respondent's tendency to leave pots on his stove boiling with nothing inside but water. Mr. Thompson observed that respondent had burns, due to his tendency to boil water to sterilize everything with which he eats.
Respondent testified on his own behalf that he was capable of living independently in his own home. He testified that he did not like taking his prescribed psychiatric medication.
Respondent moved to dismiss at the close of the petitioner's evidence, and again at the close of all of the evidence. The trial court denied these motions, and ordered that respondent be involuntarily committed for a term of 60 days.
Respondent appeals.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal of a commitment order our function is to determine whether there was anycompetent evidence to support the “facts” recorded in the commitment order and whether the trial court's ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerous to self or others were supported by the “facts” recorded in the order. In re Underwood, 38 N.C.App. 344, 347–48, 247 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1978) ; In re Hogan, 32 N.C.App. 429, 433, 232 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1977). We do not consider whether the evidence of respondent's mental illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent and convincing. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the competent evidence offered in a particular case met the burden of proof. In re Underwood, supra, 38 N.C.App. at 347, 247 S.E.2d at 781.
Matter of Collins, 49 N.C.App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980). We must affirm the trial court's commitment order if there was any competent evidence to support its findings of fact, even if contrary evidence may exist in the record.
III. Analysis
In his sole argument, respondent contends that the trial court erred in committing him against his will. We agree.
In order to commit a person against his will for being a danger to himself, the trial court must determine:
I. That he would be unable, without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and
II. That there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational, of actions that the individual is unable to control, of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or of other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the individual is unable to care for himself[.]
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3(11)(a)(1) (2013).
At trial, Dr. Wang testified that respondent refused to go to the hospital to be treated for a fever of 103 degrees. Dr. Wang testified that he was informed of respondent's refusal by a nurse at Holly Hill Hospital. Respondent contends that this was not competent evidence, as it was admitted solely for the purpose of showing how Dr. Wang formed his expert opinion. Nonetheless, we hold that this testimony was admitted, and was competent evidence for the purpose of the court reaching a finding that respondent refused medical treatment. Further, respondent's father testified that respondent said that he “wasn't going to ever take medicine anymore.” Respondent's father testified concerning an incident during which respondent was locked out of his home, and spent the night on his front porch, intending to be let in by his father, who did not reside there. Respondent's father also testified concerning visits to respondent's home, when respondent's father saw “pots burning in the yard .... just burning[.]” Respondent's father also commented that respondent's stove had been burned black, and that he believed respondent to be at risk for harm due to his use of fire. The evidence at trial, taken together, supported the trial court's findings that respondent did not show “self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities[.]”
However, the standard of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3(11) further requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given [.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3(11)(a)(1)(II). The trial court's findings of fact are completely silent on this point. Of the trial court's findings, none address prospective concerns with regard to respondent's future probability of physical debilitation. We have previously held that, where the trial court fails to make findings concerning whether a respondent is a danger to himself in the future, we cannot uphold a commitment order. In re Whatley,–––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 736 S.E.2d 527, 531 (2012).
The trial court failed to make the required findings of fact that there was a reasonable probability of the respondent suffering serious physical debilitation in the near future unless adequate treatment is given. We vacate the order of the trial court, and remand for further findings of fact on this issue.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Opinion
Appeal by respondent from order entered 6 January 2014 by Judge Eric C. Chasse in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 November 2014.