Summary
affirming alimony award where wife “gave up her home and job when she married [husband]”
Summary of this case from Huegli v. HuegliOpinion
No. 2-363 / 01-1382
Filed March 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
Both parties appeal from the district court's property and alimony awards in a dissolution. AFFIRMED.
R. Thomas Price of Price Pearson, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
James Kramer of Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good Mulholland, P.C., Fort Dodge, and David Wollenzien of Wollenzien Law Office, Manson, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
In this appeal from a dissolution decree, we must decide whether the district court's property and alimony awards were equitable. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Marty Salter and Mark Egli were married for about six years before they sought a divorce. Marty was fifty-two and Mark was fifty-one at the time of the dissolution.
When the parties met, Marty was enrolled in a Ph.D. program at Georgia State University and was also teaching. She owned a home purchased for her by her parents which she used to obtain a $10,000 home equity loan. She was otherwise debt-free. Mark was a teacher at an Iowa high school, earning about $22,000 per year. He owned a 1/5 share of a 320-acre farm he inherited from his father and some cattle and farm equipment. He had several debts.
When the parties married, they decided to live in Iowa, as Mark had just been offered the job of principal at his high school. Marty sold her home in Georgia and realized a profit of $70,000, which she placed in the parties' joint account. These and other funds were used to build a new home at a cost of between $190,000-$200,000 and to pay off Mark's debts.
The parties accumulated retirement income before the marriage. Marty transferred her contributions from an account in Georgia to an individual retirement account. She forfeited the employer contributions to her account. Both parties added to their retirement funds during the six-year marriage.
Marty obtained a teaching position at Iowa Central Community College. Mark, meanwhile, pursued a master's degree and additional credits and ultimately became the superintendent of the school district, earning $78,000 per year.
At trial, Marty sought a return of the $70,000 she received from the sale of her Georgia home, credit for the lost value of her Georgia retirement plan, one-half interest in Mark's cattle operation, appropriate interest in the pensions, alimony of $1000 per month for five years, and attorney fees.
The district court set aside to Mark his interest in the farm. The court ordered the new home sold, with expenses, profits and/or losses to be shared equally. The court then allocated Marty's pension and other funds to her and Mark's to him. The court awarded Marty a van and $8,000 that she had withdrawn from a joint checking account when the action was filed. The court gave Mark $23,839.00 in proceeds from the sale of cattle and all the farm equipment. The court awarded Marty reimbursement alimony of $21,000, to be paid in monthly increments of $350 over sixty months. Mark was ordered to pay $1000 of Marty's attorney fees. Both parties have appealed.
II. Alimony
The fighting issue is alimony. Marty contends she should have received substantially more than the court awarded, to compensate her for her contributions to the marriage. Mark responds that Marty deserves no alimony because this was a marriage of limited duration, both were financially secure when they married, and Marty is well-educated and able to maintain gainful employment.
Alimony awards are discretionary. In re Marriage of Grady-Woods, 577 N.W.2d 851, 854-55 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). In determining whether alimony is appropriate, a court will consider a number of factors, including the length of the marriage, the age, health and education of the parties, work experience, the property distribution, and the feasibility of the party seeking support to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. See Iowa Code § 598.21(3) (1999).
Contrary to Mark's assertion on cross-appeal, we believe some alimony was appropriate. Marty gave up her home and job when she married Mark. See In re Marriage of Garst, 573 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). For at least the first few years of the marriage, she earned less than she earned in Georgia.
The parties disagree on precisely how much Marty earned before her marriage, with Mark contending the figure was between $27,000 and $29,000 and Marty contending it was $38,000 annually.
When Marty married Mark, she also gave up an opportunity for further educational advancement. Although Mark contends she did not establish she intended to return to a Ph.D. program, his own testimony reveals she had begun such a program in Georgia and had looked into a program in educational technology in Iowa. Cf. In re Marriage of Erickson, 553 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (noting this was not a case where one party sacrificed education or career solely for the benefit of the other).
Additionally, the property distribution favored Mark. Mark testified he was willing to share any increases in his retirement account and to divide the cattle sale proceeds equally. The district court elected not to divide the retirement accounts and gave all the cattle sale proceeds to Mark.
Finally, given the disparity in the parties' incomes at the time of trial, Marty could expect a decrease in her standard of living at least in the short term. Under these circumstances, we believe the statutory spousal support factors warrant some type of award, however it is characterized. In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Iowa 1998) (award "reflects the disparity in the parties' relative needs and earning capacities upon the dissolution of their marriage.").
Although we believe an alimony award was appropriate, we are not persuaded Marty should get more than the $21,000 she was awarded. Marty was educated, gainfully employed, and only minimally dependant on Mark for financial stability during their relatively short marriage. For these reasons, we decline to increase the support award.
III. Property
Marty also seeks a substantially greater property award. The district court cogently explained its reasons for declining to adopt Marty's request. We find its award equitable, particularly when considered in conjunction with the alimony award.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees
Marty requests appellate attorney fees. An award rests within our sound discretion. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 1996). Given our affirmance of the alimony award, we believe Marty has sufficient funds at her disposal to pay her own attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.
Miller, J., concurs; Vogel, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I concur with the majority, except the portion of its opinion dealing with property division. Marty brought $70,000 from the proceeds of the sale of her home in Georgia to the marriage. The district court determined this was a gift from Marty's parents. Mark came to the marriage with a one-fifth interest in three hundred twenty acres of farm land, some livestock and farm equipment, all of which he received from an inheritance. He leaves the marriage with all his premarital assets still intact. Yet because Marty's asset was converted to cash and commingled in a joint account, she leaves the marriage substantially penalized.
Premarital property does not merge with and become marital property simply by virtue of the marriage. In re Marriage of Miller, 452 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). It is however a factor in achieving equity. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1)(b); In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 199, (Iowa Ct.App. 1998).
The proceeds of the sale of Marty's house were deposited in the parties' joint checking account and used in part to pay off Mark's premarital debts of approximately $11,500. The balance was invested in the construction of the parties' new home. While the trial court credits Mark with contributing the proceeds of the sale of his premarital livestock to the parties' joint assets, Mark testified less convincingly. On direct examination Mark stated:
So the money, that 12 to 13,000 that came from the sale of that cow heard, again, I would assume went into our joint checking and our records are so poor that we're not sure exact figures, except that that money went into our account and when I purchased cattle later, I used the loan.
When later asked how any equity from the sale of the home should be divided, Mark answered, "She could have it all, if there was equity in the house." If there was a loss on the house, Mark proposed it be divided. He also offered to give Marty half of the sale of the current cattle, and share any increases he had made in his IPERS account.
Mark leaves this short marriage with his premarital farm assets intact. Marty leaves with less, because the district court faulted her for converting her premarital asset to cash, paying off Mark's premarital debt and investing in a joint residence. The court also seemingly faulted Marty for entering into this marriage, which the court called "a recipe for failure," as the relationship was begun over the internet and each had been married previously. Such assignment of fault has no place in Iowa's dissolution law, which simply strives to make equitable property distributions.
I would grant Marty the return of her premarital $70,000 to more equitably account for both parties' premarital and subsequent joint assets.