Opinion
No. 1-969 / 01-0699
Filed February 20, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, John G. Linn, Judge.
Respondent appeals a district court ruling denying his application to modify his dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Douglas E. Johnston, Muscatine, for appellant.
Timothy K. Wink, Columbus Junction, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Kirk Bliven appeals the district court order denying his application to modify his dissolution decree. He contends the district court erred in (1) deviating from the child support guidelines and (2) ordering him to pay petitioner's attorney fees. Belinda Crossley (f/k/a Belinda Bliven) cross-appeals seeking appellate attorney's fees. We affirm as modified.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
The marriage of Kirk and Belinda was dissolved on June 4, 1984, in the state of North Dakota. Pursuant to the dissolution decree, Belinda was awarded physical care of the parties' minor child, Dustin, born December 27, 1982. Kirk was ordered to provide medical insurance for Dustin and to pay $140.00 per month in child support. In September 1997, Kirk's child support obligation was increased to $358.00 per month.
Kirk is employed full-time at the Louisa County Secondary Road Department where he earns $30,264.00 gross annual income. He resides with his girlfriend and her two sons. Belinda is employed with Domfeld Farms where she earns $8,400.00 gross annual income as a farm laborer. In addition, she operates an automobile detailing business which generates approximately $3,000.00 gross annual income. Belinda resides with her eight-year-old son Dalton for whom she receives sporadic child support payments of $260.00 per month.
Belinda broke her ankle in an automobile accident on March 27, 2000. She was hospitalized for approximately two weeks and was incapacitated for some time thereafter. In May 2000, Dustin moved out of Belinda's home and began residing with her relatives. In September 2000, Dustin began living with Kirk on a part-time basis, residing with Kirk during the week and staying with Belinda's relatives on the weekends. Shortly thereafter, Kirk filed a petition requesting appointment as guardian of Dustin. The district court granted the order awarding Kirk physical care of Dustin. Dustin attained the age of majority on December 27, 2000.
On October 23, 2000, Kirk filed a petition to register and modify the terms of the North Dakota dissolution decree claiming a substantial change in circumstances had taken place since the entry of the original decree. In relevant part, Kirk requested child support from Belinda beginning January 25, 2001, which was three months after Belinda was served notice of the action, and a retroactive adjustment or credit for child support payments made between September 1, 2000 to January 26, 2001. Following a hearing on March 21, 2001, the district court entered its order denying Kirk's request to modify the custody provisions of the dissolution decree. Applying the child support guidelines, the district court determined Belinda's obligation for Dustin would be $121.45 per month, for the months of April and May 2001. The district court however denied any obligation on the part of Belinda to pay child support for Dustin finding special circumstances necessitated deviation from the child support guidelines. The court also awarded Belinda attorney's fees. Kirk appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
Modification of dissolution decree actions are tried in equity and review is thus de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4; In re Marriage of Trickey, 589 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We have a duty to examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1981). We give weight to the fact-findings of the trial court, especially when considering credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(7); In re Marriage of Wood, 567 N.W.2d 680, 681 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
III. Deviation from Child Support Guidelines.
Kirk contends the district court erred in deviating from the child support guidelines and relieving Belinda of any child support obligation for her son. Kirk further argues the district court erred in its determination of the duration of Belinda's child support obligation.
The purpose of the child support guidelines is to provide for the best interests of the children by recognizing the duty of both parents to provide adequate support for their children in proportion to their respective incomes. In re Marriage of Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Iowa 1998). Although the guidelines cannot accommodate all specific facts of individual cases, they will normally provide reasonable support. Id. The amount of support provided by the guidelines is presumed to be correct. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cottrell, 513 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Iowa 1994). The guideline amount may however be adjusted upward or downward if the court finds an adjustment necessary to provide for the needs of the child and to do justice between the parties under the special circumstances of the case. Id.
The district court determined special circumstances existed in this case justifying a downward deviation from the child support guidelines. In particular, the court noted a moderate award of child support would greatly compromise Belinda's well-being as her income is extremely modest. Belinda currently works two jobs in an attempt to avoid state assistance, a goal she has maintained since 1997. Belinda has another son in her care for whom she intermittently receives child support. As the district court observed, forcing Belinda to pay child support might force her back onto the welfare rolls. Furthermore, the district court found Dustin's needs could be adequately met by his father and family relatives until his graduation from high school in May 2001. Belinda's relatives have been caring for Dustin since May 2000, providing him with an automobile and accommodations on the weekends. Moreover, the court observed Dustin could provide for some of his own financial needs as a healthy, able-bodied adult.
While we agree with the district court that deviation from the child support guidelines is justified in this case, we do not agree Belinda's obligation for Dustin should be completely negated. "Both parents have a legal obligation to support their children, not necessarily equally, but in accordance with his or her ability to pay." In re Marriage of Reedholm, 497 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (citing Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Gonzales v. Gable, 474 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)). Under the Iowa Child Support Guidelines, the minimum support required, even for persons with no income, is $50.00 per month. In re Marriage of Barker, 600 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Iowa 1999). We conclude Belinda's support obligation should be $50.00 per month.
We also conclude the district court erred in determining the duration of Belinda's child support obligation. The district court determined Belinda's support obligation should begin in April 2001 and terminate upon Dustin's graduation from high school in May 2001. However, as Kirk correctly contends and Belinda concedes in her brief, Belinda's child support obligation actually could begin on January 25, 2001, three months after she was served notice of this action. See Iowa Code § 598.21(8)(k) ("a modification proceeding may be retroactively modified only from three months after the date the notice of the pending petition for modification is served on the opposing party"). Because Dustin has not been under Belinda's care since May 2000, we conclude her support obligation should be retroactive to the earliest date authorized by the statute. Accordingly, Belinda's support obligation shall be $50.00 per month for the months of January through May 2001.
IV. Belinda's Trial Attorney's Fees.
The district court awarded Belinda $500 in attorney's fees. Kirk contends this award was an abuse of the district court's discretion. We disagree. Attorney fees are not awarded as a matter of right. In re Marriage of O'Rourke, 547 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). An award of attorney's fees is based on the parties' respective needs and ability to pay. In re Marriage of Lattig, 318 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). The district court has considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees. In re Marriage of Schettler, 455 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). We will not interfere unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. O'Rourke, 547 N.W.2d at 867. Seeing no abuse of discretion in the district court's award, we affirm on this issue.
V. Belinda's Appellate Attorney's Fees.
Belinda requests an award of appellate attorney fees. When determining whether to award attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the district court's decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage of Wood, 567 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). After considering these factors, we award Belinda $1,500 in appellate attorney's fees.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed as modified.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.