Opinion
No. 2-770 / 02-0240.
Filed April 30, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, KRISTIN L. HIBBS, Judge.
Respondent appeals an adverse ruling on Petitioner's petition for declaratory judgment. AFFIRMED.
Stephen Jackson and Stephen Jackson, Jr. of Jackson Jackson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Daniel Bray and Chad Kepros of Bray Klockau, P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Robert Barry appeals from the trial court's ruling on a petition for declaratory judgment filed by his former spouse, Mary Ann Barry. He contends the trial court wrongfully interpreted a satisfaction of judgment and thereby modified the terms of the party's dissolution decree, and that he should not be estopped from claiming personal property awarded to him in the dissolution decree. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The parties were granted a dissolution of their marriage on December 1, 1995. The decree awarded substantial amounts of property to each party. On October 2, 1996 Robert filed an application to cite Mary for contempt of court. He listed nine items awarded to him in the decree that Mary had in her possession and had not delivered to him. They were:
a. One-half of the coin collection of the parties;
b. One-half of the contents of the four safe deposit boxes to which the Petitioner has access;
c. His respective personal clothing and affects (sic);
d. Child's silver cups (2);
e. The birth certificate and citizenship papers located in the safe deposit box;
f. USLICO stock certificates;
g. The Volkswagen automobile;
h. A chiming clock; and
i. Carved cowboy and Indians.
Hearing on the contempt application was held on December 23, 1996. The court entered on order on January 13, 1997 finding the birth certificate, chiming clock and a carved character had been provided to Robert, Mary had been uncooperative in carrying out the terms of the decree, and she had failed to divide the coin collection and account for the ULISCO stock certificates. The court left the record open to see if Mary was in fact "waiting for direction," directed her to do certain things, and scheduled further hearing for March 31, 1997. On February 28, 1997 Robert filed a document captioned "MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 179.B OF IOWA RULES CIVIL PROCEDURE," indicating he had transferred the ULISCO stock without the certificate, the Volkswagen was turned over, the coins divided, and the silver cups returned. On the same day the court dismissed the contempt action.
On June 26, 1997 Robert filed a satisfaction of judgment as follows:
COMES NOW, the Respondent, Robert John Barry, and hereby acknowledges receipt of all of the personal property and monies due him under the terms of the Decree of Dissolution previously entered in this cause. The Linn county Clerk of Court is hereby directed to enter this Satisfaction of Judgment as a full and complete satisfaction on the records of the Clerk of Court.
The satisfaction was signed by Robert and notarized. Robert and his attorney recall some coins being exchanged about the same time as the satisfaction, however there were no negotiations at the time and, in fact, Mary only became aware of the satisfaction when a filed copy was sent to her. Mary insists the satisfaction was signed without any contemporaneous delivery of property and was aimed at a mutual resolution of all remaining disputes between the parties.
After June 26, 1997, Mary cashed the Ameritas Policy that was awarded to Robert in the decree; cashed the "Norwest CD" (actually a regents bond and a treasury note) and gave the proceeds of the note to the parties' son, John; kept the A.M.A., Principal Financial, Equitable of Iowa, and Royal Sun Alliance insurance policies that were awarded to Robert and paid the premiums; and sold the Standex, Hubbell, Schlumberger and Jones Cable stock awarded to Robert in the decree. Prior to June 26, 1997, Robert cashed a "Small Cap Fund" awarded to him in the decree.
On August 26, 1999, Mary filed her action for declaratory judgment and Robert counterclaimed. They both sought interpretation of the satisfaction of judgment. Mary contended successfully that the satisfaction ended the issue of property exchange because Robert had indicated he was no longer making any claim to property in Mary's possession, and Robert contended the satisfaction only spoke to the items listed in his contempt action. On January 10, 2002, the court declared that Mary had the right to retain all property in her possession on the date Robert signed the satisfaction of judgment (June 26, 1997). It went on to identify the items as follows:
These items include those already liquidated including the Ameritas life insurance policy #845016; the Gabelli equity trust (decree value, $15,277); Gabelli equity trust (decree value, $5713); Schlumberger shares (decree value, $5,713); Hubbell shares (decree value, $6,999); Standex shares (decree value, $1,080); and a treasury note (decree value, $10,000) and Regents bond (decree value, $5,000) [Norwest Bank CD"] as well as, the Royal Sun Alliance policy ("McAbee Insurance"), Principal Financial Life insurance policy #2399869; Equitable of Iowa #UF006833; the A.M.A. insurance Policy #896569-0000904730; Hubbell 127 shares; and Jones Cable TV.II. Scope of Review. Whether an action for declaratory judgment is legal or equitable turns on the nature of the case as well as the relief sought. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Forst, 205 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa 1973). Where, as here, the action was tried below as an equitable proceeding, our review is de novo. Denning v. Denning, 185 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Iowa 1971). We give weight to fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g).
III. Analysis. Robert first contends the court effected a modification of the property division of the decree. He argues the decree is self-executing, the division of property created new title or ownership interests, and filing a satisfaction could not change those interests. He cites Sieren v. Bauman, 436 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1989), correctly for the proposition that the property division in the decree is self-executing with respect to the creation of new title or ownership interest. The decree, by awarding the accounts and insurance policies to Robert, gave title to those items to him even if previously held jointly by the parties or solely by Mary. However, that does not end the inquiry. The trial court found Robert had released his interest to Mary, and he also should be estopped from making any claim.
A. The Satisfaction of Judgment. Although captioned as a satisfaction of judgment, the document is written in terms of a release of a claim. Having decided the decree effectively titled those items in Robert, we now find he could release any claim to Mary. See Sullivan Sav. Inst. v. Young, 55 Iowa 132, 134, 7 N.W. 480, 480-81 (1880) (holding the waiver of a legal right is a sufficient consideration to support a contract). Is that what he intended? He says the circumstances clearly indicate he was only acknowledging the receipt of the property disputed in the contempt action. She says the broader circumstances indicate a wish to end all disputes and settle the matter once and for all.
The trial court found Robert was aware when he signed the satisfaction that the enumerated items were still in Mary's possession. The trial court also found that Robert was aware title was either jointly held or still in Mary's name. Although pursuant to Sieren this was not the case, we cannot fault the finding that Robert believed title was still so held. We believe the total circumstances support Mary's position. Robert signed the "satisfaction" four months after he had received the items disputed in the contempt action. Nothing was pending when it was filed. He had already acknowledged receipt of the disputed items in his February 28, 1997 filing. The parties had continued to exchange items up until June 26, 1997. The trial court had the benefit of observing the parties and we respect its conclusions as to the intention of the parties.
B. Waiver. The trial court found that Robert should be estopped from claiming any personal property under both waiver and promissory estoppel. Even if we conclude Robert did not intend to waive his claim to the items in question, promissory estoppel applies. The elements of promissory estoppel are: 1) a definite agreement; 2) proof that the party seeking to enforce the agreement reasonably relied on the agreement to her detriment; and 3) a finding that the equities support enforcement of the agreement. In re Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755, 756-57 (Iowa 1994). Robert signed a document stating he had received all personal properties and monies due him under the terms of the decree. There are no ambiguities in the document. The satisfaction was signed a year and a half after the entry of the decree and after contentious disputes over division of property. Mary relied on the satisfaction to her detriment. She sold assets to set up a financial plan. Robert is estopped from making any further claim to personal property awarded in the dissolution decree.
C. Attorney Fees. Mary requests an award of appellate attorney fees. An award of attorney fees on appeal is not a matter of right, but rests within the discretion of the court. In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Iowa 1996). We award Mary no attorney fees on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
Miller, J., concurs, Sackett, C.J., dissents.
I would reverse and remand. I do not see the satisfaction signed by Robert as a release of claim to property awarded him in the decree.