Opinion
WR-96,121-01
10-17-2024
IN RE TEXAS DEPARMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ex rel. KEN PAXTON, Relator
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TRAVIS COUNTY
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have before us a motion for leave to file an application for writ of mandamus filed by the Honorable Kenneth Paxton, Attorney General of the State of Texas, on behalf of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Relator in this case. Therein, Relator asks this Court to order Respondent, the Honorable Judge Jessica Mangrum of the 200th District Court of Travis County, Texas, to vacate the Temporary Restraining Order she issued this day regarding the execution of Real-Party-in-Interest Robert Leslie Roberson, III, or, in the alternative, to vacate the order ourselves. Because this case involves a death sentence, it was proper for Relator to file the motion and petition in this Court. Cf. Padilla v. McDaniel, 122 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Real-Party-in-Interest Roberson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in February 2003. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Roberson's conviction and death sentence. See Roberson v. State, No. AP-74,671 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 20, 2007) (not designated for publication). Our mandate issued October 22, 2007.
This Court denied relief on Roberson's initial post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, filed under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071. Ex parte Roberson, Nos. WR-63,081-01, -02 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2009) (not designated for publication). On the same day, we dismissed as a subsequent application a document styled, "Notice of Desire to Raise Additional Habeas Corpus Claims." Id.
In 2016, Roberson filed in the convicting court a second subsequent 11.071 application. After we remanded the claims for review on the merits, the convicting court held a hearing and recommended that this Court deny relief. Thereafter, we denied relief on all of the claims raised. Ex parte Roberson, No. WR-63,081-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (not designated for publication). In July 2024, the convicting court scheduled Roberson's execution for October 17.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent dates in this opinion refer to the year 2024.
Roberson filed a third subsequent 11.071 application in August, which we dismissed for failing to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071, Section 5. Ex parte Roberson, No. WR-63,081-04 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2024) (not designated for publication). Roberson soon filed a fourth subsequent 11.071 application in October, but after "thoroughly review[ing] the application and entire record," we found that this application also failed to satisfy Article 11.071, Section 5. Ex parte Roberson, No. WR-63,081-05 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 16, 2024) (not designated for publication). As of the date of this opinion, Roberson has no pending 11.071 applications.
Yesterday, October 16, the Texas House of Representatives' Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence issued a subpoena commanding "any peace officer of the State of Texas" to "summon Robert Roberson, located in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, to appear before the Committee" at the Texas Capitol Building on October 21-four days after Roberson's scheduled execution date.
Today, October 17, Members of the Texas House of Representatives sought injunctive relief in the 200th District Court of Travis County. After a hearing, Respondent issued a Temporary Restraining Order from the bench, enjoining TDCJ from carrying out the death warrant.
Relator promptly brought this mandamus action challenging the Temporary Restraining Order. Relator argues that the Order circumvents this Court's decision and disobeys this Court's mandate.
Leave to file is granted. "The Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort in this state in criminal matters. This being so, no other court of this state has authority to overrule or circumvent its decisions, or disobey its mandates." State ex rel. Wilson v. Briggs 351 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961). Therefore, "[a]ny order by another state court which purports to stay a scheduled execution circumvents [this Court's] decision and disobeys our mandate." State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389, 395-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The effect of Respondent's order was to stay Roberson's execution, circumvent our decision, and disobey our mandate. See id. at 395. Respondent's Temporary Restraining Order is therefore subject to this Court's mandamus authority. See id.
Accordingly, pursuant to this Court's mandamus authority and effective immediately, Respondent's Temporary Restraining Order is hereby vacated. No motions for rehearing will be entertained. The Clerk of this Court is instructed to issue mandate immediately.
Newell, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Richardson, Walker and McClure, JJ., joined.
Today the court grants mandamus relief under the theory that a civil court's injunction to enforce a legislative subpoena cannot interfere with the carrying out of a death warrant in a criminal case. But I believe the scenario presented in this case is sufficiently distinguishable from our previous cases dealing with the interaction between civil and criminal causes of action that we should file and set the case for an opinion on the issues raised. Because the court does not, I dissent.
This Court has held that a civil case that has the effect of staying an execution is a criminal law matter subject to our jurisdiction. The suit at issue in Holmes sought to avoid the execution in the underlying criminal case altogether through clemency proceedings and we held that the suit seeking a clemency hearing could not enjoin the execution.However, the injunction at issue here is not brought by the defendant to vindicate the defendant's rights. Rather, our Legislature seeks to vindicate its own authority to subpoena witnesses for testimony before it. Such a claim, raises a separation of powers issue by its very nature. And that issue is not present in our precedent cases.
State ex. rel. Holmes v. Honorable Cr. Of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Id. at 395-96; see also State ex. rel. Wilson v. Briggs, 351 S.W.2d 892 (1961).
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 301.024(a) ("A general investigating committee may issue process to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of books, records, documents, and instruments required by the committee . . . A committee may issue process to a witness at any place in this state.").
Tex. Const. art. II, § 1.
Indeed, this distinguishing factor also raises the issue of whether we have mandamus jurisdiction because the Legislature brought the proceeding on its own behalf to protect its statewide subpoena power. The propriety of the civil injunction to vindicate our Legislature's authority makes this arguably as much a civil matter as a criminal one.
Smith v. Flack, 728 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (noting that the Texas Constitution "grants this Court power to issue writs of mandamus when a criminal law is the subject of the litigation").
Given these distinctions, I think the more prudent course of action would not be to grant mandamus relief outright. Instead, this Court should file and set this case and order briefing from the parties. Perhaps after we have fully fleshed out these issues the Court will ultimately hold that mandamus relief is appropriate. But given the unprecedented nature of the circumstances present in this case, I believe we should at least explain our reasoning to the Texas Legislature as well as the citizens of Texas.
Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.