Opinion
NO. 2015 CA 1062
09-01-2016
SUCCESSION OF ULYSSE DAIGLE, JR.
Benjamin L. Johnson Donaldsonville, Louisiana Counsel for Appellant Shentelle Daigle Marvin Gros Jeffrey M. Heggelund Donaldsonville, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee Dorothy Daigle
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Ascension
State of Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit
Case No. 16,967 The Honorable Jason Verdigets, Judge Presiding Benjamin L. Johnson
Donaldsonville, Louisiana Counsel for Appellant
Shentelle Daigle Marvin Gros
Jeffrey M. Heggelund
Donaldsonville, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
Dorothy Daigle BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, AND THERIOT, JJ. McDONALD, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, Dorothy Daigle, awarding her compensation from the estate of the decedent, Ulysse Daigle, Jr., and ordering the dismissal, with prejudice, of the reconventional demand filed by the defendant-appellant, Shentelle Daigle, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of the decedent. For the following reasons, we vacate the award of compensation, reverse the dismissal of the reconventional demand, and remand in order for the trial court to determine the proper compensation due under La. C.C.P. art. 4274 and to allow for amendment of the reconventional demand.
The decedent is identified in the record both as "Ulysse" and "Ulysses." Because the petition refer to the decedent as "Ulysse," we will use that reference throughout.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The decedent, Ulysse Daigle, Jr., was severely injured in a work-related accident in May of 2007. As a result of his injuries, Ulysse was fully interdicted pursuant to a judgment of interdiction entered by the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court on February 18, 2010. The judgment of interdiction named Ulysse's mother, Dorothy Daigle, and Ulysse's son, Brandon Daigle, as co-curators of Ulysse's person and estate. Ulysse's father, Ulysse Daigle, Sr., was appointed as undercurator. On September 6, 2011, Ulysse's father died, and Ulysse's daughter, Shentelle Daigle, was thereafter appointed as undercurator.
Brandon initially opposed Dorothy's appointment as the sole curatrix, as she allegedly filed the petition of interdiction without the knowledge of any of Ulysse's children, and he sought to have Dorothy removed as curatrix and himself named as sole curator. In re Interdiction of Ulysse Daigle, Jr., docket no. 15,452, Division C, Twenty-Third Judicial District Court.
Following entry of the judgment of interdiction, Dorothy continued to care for Ulysse until January of 2014, when he was admitted into the hospital. Ulysse died on May 19, 2014, thereby terminating the interdiction. See La. C.C. art 397. Thereafter, on June 2, 2014, Dorothy filed and recorded an affidavit of lien and privilege against Ulysse's estate, alleging she had not been compensated for services rendered to Ulysse from May of 2007 until May of 2014, which she valued in the sum of $252,000.00. On June 4, 2014, Shentelle filed a petition for possession in In Re Succession of Ulysse Daigle, Jr., which was allotted to Division "A" of the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court.
On September 18, 2014, Dorothy filed a petition for payment of services, naming as the defendant the succession of Ulysse Daigle, Jr., through its duly appointed administratrix, Shentelle Daigle. Dorothy's petition was also allotted to Division "A" of the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court. Dorothy asserted that during the course of her care for Ulysse, she had entered into an agreement with Shentelle and Brandon whereby she was to be compensated $3,000.00 per month for her care of Ulysse in lieu of placing him in a nursing home. Shentelle, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of the decedent, answered the petition and denied any liability on the part of the estate to compensate Dorothy. Further, Shentelle filed a reconventional demand, asserting that Dorothy had misappropriated some of Ulysse's assets during the period of interdiction and could not account for them as required by law. Shentelle sought from Dorothy the value of the allegedly misappropriated assets.
The matter proceeded to trial on March 20, 2015. Thereafter, by judgment dated April 10, 2015, the trial court ordered the succession of Ulysse Daigle, Jr. to compensate Dorothy in the amount of $65,250.00. The trial court's award reflected compensation for services by Dorothy in caring for Ulysse at a rate of $2,250.00 per month for 29 months, representing the time period from September of 2011 until January of 2014, as well as the time period from April of 2014 until May of 2014. The trial court also ordered the dismissal of Shentelle's reconventional demand, with prejudice, due to non-joinder of a necessary party, the co-curator, Brandon. Shentelle now appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Shentelle raises six assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in its application, for the bases of finding for Dorothy Daigle, of an alleged agreement between Dorothy and Ulysse's children that was not approved by the court that heard the interdiction.
2. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine the existence, terms, and enforceability of the alleged agreement.
3. The trial court erred in its application of La. C.C.P. art. 4274.
4. The trial court erred in awarding Dorothy compensation based on the evidence presented at trial.
5. The trial court erred in awarding the amount of compensation to Dorothy based on the evidence presented at trial.
6. The trial court erred in dismissing the reconventional demand against Dorothy for failure to join a party.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents us with questions of law, which are reviewed under a de novo standard of review. City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 2012-0078 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 301, 303.
ANALYSIS
The Agreement for Compensation
We begin our analysis by considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Dorothy's claims against the succession. Shentelle maintains that the Dorothy's claims had to be made in the interdiction proceeding. After a de novo review, we find no error by Dorothy in bringing her claim in the succession proceeding, as the interdiction had ended with Ulysse's death. See La. C.C. art. 397.
We next consider whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in rendering judgment in favor of Dorothy based upon the agreement allegedly entered into by Dorothy, Shentelle, and Brandon authorizing Dorothy to receive reasonable compensation for the services she rendered to Ulysse. No such agreement was ever approved by the trial court in the context of the interdiction proceedings.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4566(A) provides that, except as otherwise provided by law, the relationship between interdict and curator is the same as that between minor and tutor, and the rules on tutorship, La. C.C.P. art. 4261, et seq., apply to curatorship. Thus, the following codal provisions are relevant for our purposes.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4263 provides:
A [curator] cannot in his personal capacity or as representative for any other person make any contracts with the [interdict]. He cannot acquire any property of the [interdict], or interest therein, personally or by means of a third person, except as otherwise provided by law.
Contracts prohibited by this article shall be null, and the [curator] shall be liable to the [interdict] for damages resulting therefrom.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4271 provides:
The [curator] shall file a petition setting forth the subject matter to be determined affecting the [interdict's] interest, with his recommendations and the reasons therefor, and with a written concurrence by the under[curator]. If the court approves the recommendations, it shall render a judgment of homolgation. The court may require evidence prior to approving the recommendations.
If the under[curator] fails to concur in the [curator's] recommendations, the [curator] shall proceed by contradictory motion against him. After such hearing and evidence as the court may require, the court shall decide the issues summarily and render judgment.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4274 provides:
The court shall allow the [curator] reasonable compensation for his services annually, which shall not exceed ten percent of the annual revenues of the [interdict's] property, unless increased by the court upon proper showing that this would be inadequate.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dorothy, finding that after Ulysse's interdiction Dorothy had entered inco an agreement with Brandon and Shentelle that entitled Dorothy to reasonable compensation for services rendered to Ulysse prior to his death. In written reasons for judgment, the trial court explained there was "credible" evidence, including testimony from Dorothy and the attorneys involved in the interdiction proceedings that proved the parties agreed Dorothy would be entitled to reasonable compensation for her care of Ulysse. The trial court concluded that this agreement was valid under La. C.C.P. art. 4274 but declined to discuss the propriety of the agreement under La. C.C.P. art. 4271.
It is undisputed that Dorothy acted as Ulysse's primary caretaker throughout the duration of his interdiction. Further, there is some evidence that Dorothy, Shentelle, and Brandon discussed compensating Dorothy for the services she rendered to Ulysse prior to his death. However, the alleged agreement was not approved by the trial court in the interdiction proceedings. Following entry of the judgment of interdiction, Dorothy and Brandon agreed to settle a personal injury lawsuit on behalf of Ulysse and to utilize certain funds from the settlement of that lawsuit to purchase property to accommodate Dorothy and Ulysse. Dorothy and Brandon jointly submitted a motion to approve settlement with an attached proposed order to the trial court in the interdiction proceedings, requesting judicial approval for the purchase of the home and requesting that the remaining proceeds from the lawsuit, in the sum of $256,852.70, be made payable to Dorothy as Ulysse's co-curatrix. However, the purchase of the house was never completed, and the trial court denied the proposed order because of the failure of the co-curators to post bond in accordance with the law. The record before us contains no other pleadings requesting authority to enter into any contracts or agreements affecting the interest of the interdict in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 4271; contains no annual accounts filed by the co-curators under La. C.C.P. art. 4391, wherein the co-curators could have claimed compensation for services rendered to the interdict; and contains no evidence that the trial court in the interdiction proceedings authorized compensation in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 4274.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4391 provides in pertinent part that a co-curator must file an account annually, reckoning from the day of his appointment.
We find that the trial court legally erred in rendering judgment in favor of Dorothy based upon the existence of an alleged agreement between the co-curators and undercurator that was not approved by the trial court in the interdiction proceedings. Having found that the trial court legally erred in rendering judgment in favor of Dorothy on this point, we vacate the award of compensation, and we need not consider Shentelle's alternative assignments of error concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment. Even though it was error for the trial court to award Dorothy compensation based on an alleged agreement between her, Shentelle, and Brandon, it does not mean that she is not entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 4274. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4274 provides for reasonable compensation for services rendered not to "exceed ten percent of the annual revenues of the [interdict's] property, unless increased by the court upon proper showing that this would be inadequate." In determining the amount of compensation that Dorothy was due, the trial court failed to consider any of these items. Instead, the trial court erred by only considering the amounts in the purported agreement. For these reasons, we remand this matter for the trial court to consider the appropriate compensation due to Dorothy in accordance with the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 4274 for her services as a curator for Ulysse. See Succession of Richard, 499 So.2d 1031 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986).
The Non-Joinder of a Party
Shentelle asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her reconventional demand against Dorothy for failure to join a party. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 641 provides:
A person shall be joined as a party in the action when either:
(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.
(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action and is so situated that the adjudication of the action in his absence may either:
(a) As a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.
(b) Leave any persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 641-46 were amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 662 § 1. Prior to these amendments, the party described in Article 641 was referred to as an "indispensable" party, and there could be no adjudication unless all indispensable parties were joined in the action. This language no longer appears in Article 641, but the article still mandates the joinder of the person described in Article 641 as a party to the suit. Stephenson v. Nations Credit Financial Services Corp., 98-1688 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1011, 1018. The peremptory exception of non-joinder of an indispensable party may be raised by the parties or by the trial court or appellate court on its own motion. See La. C.C.P. art. 927.
In this case, Brandon was named as a co-curator of the decedent along with Dorothy, but was not named as a defendant-in-reconvention in Shentelle's reconventional demand. The trial court noticed on its own motion that Brandon was not named as a party, and thereafter dismissed Shentelle's reconventional demand for non-joinder of an indispensable party. The trial court explained that "if one of the co-curators would be liable for lack of an accounting, the other co- curator would be equally as liable and was an indispensable party." We find no error in this finding; however, when the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed. La. C.C.P. art. 934. Thus, we reverse dismissal of the reconventional demand for failure to join an indispensable party, and we remand the case in order for the trial court to allow Shentelle an opportunity to amend the reconventional demand.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court's judgment awarding compensation to Dorothy Daigle from the estate of the decedent and remand the case for a determination of the proper compensation due to her in accordance with the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 4274. We reverse the dismissal of the reconventional demand filed by Shentelle Daigle, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of the decedent, for failure to join an indispensable party, and remand the case for the trial court to allow Shentelle Daigle, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of the decedent, an opportunity to amend the recoventional demand. Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to Dorothy Daigle and one-half to Shentelle Daigle, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of the decedent.
VACATED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. THERIOT, J., agreeing in part, concurring in part, and assigning reasons.
I agree with the majority's analysis concerning the issue of non-joinder of an indispensable party and join in that portion of the majority's opinion reversing the trial court's judgment dismissing the reconventional demand of the appellant, Shentelle Daigle, in her capacity as duly appointed administratrix of the succession of the decedent, Ulysse Daigle, Jr., and remanding this matter to the trial court to allow Shentelle an opportunity to amend her reconventional demand. Furthermore, I agree with the result reached by the majority overturning the trial court's judgment awarding compensation to the appellee, Dorothy Daigle, for the services she rendered to the decedent as his curator, notwithstanding the fact that I differ from the majority in my analysis of this issue and in my interpretation of the record and controlling law.
As an initial matter, to the extent that the majority believes the trial court had the authority to award compensation in the instant succession proceedings under La. C.C.P. art. 4274, it seems unnecessary to remand this case to the trial court with an attending order for the trial court to determine the proper compensation due to Dorothy in accordance therewith. In written reasons for judgment, the trial court did state it found there was an agreement reached between the children of the decedent and Dorothy pertaining to compensation for the services rendered by Dorothy to the decedent as his curator. However, the trial court did not award compensation to Dorothy based upon the validity of such an agreement between the co-curators and undercurator, which would have required judicial approval by the trial court in the interdiction proceedings according to La. C.C.P. art. 4271. Rather, the trial court ultimately decided to award compensation to Dorothy based upon its finding that Dorothy was entitled to compensation pursuant to the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 4274, stating, in no uncertain terms, that "[t]his [c]ourt finds compensation for Dorothy's services valid under La. C.C.P. art. 4274, negating the need to delve into the propriety of an agreement under La. C.C.P. art. 4271."
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 4271, which is made applicable to the interdiction context by La. C.C.P. art. 4566, requires court approval for actions affecting an interdict's interest. Specifically, La. C.C.P. art. 4271 states, in relevant part: "The [curator] shall file a petition setting forth the subject matter to be determined affecting the [interdict's] interest, with his recommendations and the reasons therefor, and with a written concurrence by the under [curator]. If the court approves the recommendations, it shall render a judgment of homologation." --------
Based upon the supposed authority of La. C.C.P. art. 4274, the trial court went on to analyze the evidence presented and determined that the estate of the decedent should be ordered to compensate Dorothy in the total amount of $65,250.00, which reflected compensation to Dorothy for her services to the decedent as his curator at a rate of $2,250.00 per month for twenty-nine months. The trial court found this award to be appropriate and congruent with the evidence pertaining to the valuation of the care and services Dorothy provided to the decedent. Because the trial court already purported to rely upon La. C.C.P. art. 4274 in rendering its judgment in favor of Dorothy, it seems superfluous to remand this case to the trial court with an order for the trial court to determine the appropriate compensation due to Dorothy under La. C.C.P. art. 4274.
Although I interpret the trial court's judgment as based upon the codal authority of La. C.C.P. art. 4274, I nevertheless agree with the majority that the trial court's judgment cannot stand as a matter of law. In my view, the trial court did not have a legal or factual basis to award Dorothy compensation in the instant succession proceedings under La. C.C.P. art. 4274, because I believe that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure recognizes the exclusive means for a curator to raise and justify a claim for curator's fees, which were not followed in this case.
The record reflects that Dorothy proceeded against the estate of the decedent, following the termination of the interdiction, by filing an affidavit of lien and privilege against the estate of the decedent and then filing the underlying petition for payment of services against Shentelle, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of the decedent. Dorothy did not present any evidence sufficient to prove the validity of her claim for compensation from the estate of the decedent according to the rules and regulations governing curatorship. I find it dispositive, for purposes of the proper application of La. C.C.P. art. 4274 in this case, that Dorothy failed to present any evidence tending to establish that she filed an annual accounting during the interdiction or filed a final accounting following the termination of the interdiction, through which she could have requested and been awarded curator's fees by the trial court in the context of the interdiction proceedings.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 4569(A) imposes the aforestated annual and final accounting requirements upon a curator with responsibility for the affairs of an interdict as follows:
A curator with responsibility for affairs of the interdict shall file an account annually, upon the termination of his office, and at any other time ordered by the court. A curator with responsibility for the person of an interdict shall file a personal report describing the location and condition of the interdict annually, upon the termination of his responsibilities, and at any other time ordered by the court. At the time of filing, the curator shall send copies of any required account or personal report by first class United States mail postage prepaid to the undercurator and any successor curator. The provisions of Articles 4393 and 4398 shall apply to accounts by curators.The Official Revision Comments (2000) to La. C.C.P. art. 4569 note that "Article [4569] changes the law by mandating the filing of a final account or personal report at the termination of every curator's appointment." La. C.C.P. art. 4569-Cmt (a).
In my opinion, Louisiana law does not permit a former curator to directly petition the succession of a formerly interdicted decedent for an award of curator's fees absent evidence of initial compliance with the rules and regulations governing curatorship, including the requirements set forth by La. C.C.P. art. 4569. In reaching my decision on this point, I take guidance from In re Poynot, 389 So.2d 106 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1980), wherein curators of a previously interdicted decedent sought reversal of a judgment that annulled the homologation of the curators' provisional accounting, which, in pertinent part, authorized the payment of curators' fees. The curators in that case filed the provisional accounting during the life of the interdict, but the judgment of homologation was not entered until after the decedent's death. In re Poynot, 389 So.2d at 106-07. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment setting aside the homologation of the curators' provisional accounting. In re Poynot, 389 So.2d at 107. The court noted that curatorship ends upon the death of the interdict, see La. C.C.P. art. 397, but explained that "[t]he remedy for the former curators is to file a final account, to be served upon the succession representative or the heirs." Id.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the majority's decision to overturn the trial court's judgment awarding compensation to Dorothy from the estate of the decedent. Unlike the majority, however, I would not remand this case for a determination of the proper compensation under La. C.C.P. art. 4274, and would instead reverse and render judgment in favor of Shentelle, in her capacity as duly appointed administratrix of the succession of the decedent, based upon the evidence in the record.