Opinion
C041339.
7-29-2003
In re STEVEN S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN S., Defendant and Appellant.
The juvenile court found that Steven S. (the minor) came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because he "did unlawfully drive and take" a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); further section references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise specified). The minor was adjudged a ward of the court, ordered to participate in the work project for 10 days, and placed under house arrest with electronic monitoring for another 30 days.
On appeal, the minor claims there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he violated section 10851. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.
FACTS
We summarize the evidence in that light most favorable to the juvenile courts finding. (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 630; In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1328.)
At around 5:30 a.m. on April 3, 2002, Sacramento Police Officer Michael Smith and two other officers went to a residence to investigate a report that two subjects were "stripping" a car. Smith saw a black 1998 Acura Integra in a garage with the hood up. One person was standing in front of the car, and the minor was in the drivers seat with the engine running. The person in front of the car closed the hood, and the minor started to back the car out of the garage. When the officers ordered them to put their hands up, the minor stopped the engine and climbed out the window because he could not open the door of the car, which was still partially inside the garage.
Officer Smith asked who owned the car, and the minor replied it was stolen. Smith observed that the ignition was completely removed, as was the plastic casing on the steering column, and the car alarm had been pulled out from the wheel well and clipped. The garage contained tools and engine parts.
Officers later learned that the car had been stolen in Modesto sometime after 10:00 p.m. on April 2, the night before it was found with the minor in the drivers seat. The owners of the car had not given anyone permission to drive it, and they did not know either the minor or the other person who was with the car when it was found in Sacramento.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the evidence does not support the juvenile courts finding that he took and drove the car. In his view, there was no evidence he had been in Modesto either the night before, or on the morning of, the theft and no other evidence connected him to the taking. According to the minor, "it was just as likely that [the other person in the garage] took the car from the victims home in Modesto and then got [the minor], who lived down the street, to help him after the fact." He further argues that moving the car back a few feet in the garage should not be considered driving it because he did not use or operate the car to transport himself or others.
To establish a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), the prosecution must prove that a person drove or took a vehicle belonging to another person without the owners consent, with the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title to, or possession of, the vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851; CALJIC No. 14.36; People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180.)
There was no evidence that the minor was seen taking the car. However, as we will explain, when asked about the car, the minor immediately acknowledged that it was stolen, and his possession of the car soon after it was stolen is sufficient to support his conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 10851. (See In re Robert V. (1982) 132 Cal. App. 3d 815, 821, 183 Cal. Rptr. 698 ["Once the unlawful taking of the vehicle has been established, possession of the recently taken vehicle by the defendant with slight corroboration through statements or conduct tending to show guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction of Vehicle Code section 10851"].)
The minor not only was in possession of the car a few hours and many miles away from the location where it was stolen, he was in the drivers seat operating the vehicle. He admitted knowing the car was stolen, and it was found in what could be called a "chop shop" — a location where stolen cars are stripped of their parts. Considering (1) the relatively short time that had elapsed between the theft of the car and its recovery, (2) the substantial distance it was driven after the theft (Modesto to Sacramento), and (3) the minors admission that the car was stolen, a reasonable trier of fact could infer the minor was the thief who took the car and drove it to the "chop shop" or he aided and abetted the theft. (Pen. Code, § 31; People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 433, 975 P.2d 1071; People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 530-532.)
Sufficient evidence also supports the finding that the minor unlawfully drove the stolen car within the meaning of section 10851. In addition to the inference that the minor drove the stolen car from Modesto to Sacramento, he was observed backing the car out of the garage, and his movement ceased only because he was ordered to stop by officers. He knew the car was stolen, and parts already had been removed from the car, thus indicating the minor intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of its possession.
The cases relied upon by the minor for the proposition that the evidence is insufficient either do not support his argument or are distinguishable.
In People v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 165 (Green ), the People conceded at trial that the evidence Green drove a car four days after it was stolen, and acted in a manner indicating a consciousness of guilt, was not sufficient to support a finding that he took the car. (Id . at pp. 172-173, 175-176.) Nevertheless, Green concluded the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for unlawfully driving the car in violation of section 10851. (Id. at pp. 180-182.)
People v. Joiner (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 946 (Joiner), reversed a section 10851 conviction because the only evidence connecting Joiner with the stolen car was the fact that parts from the stolen car were found in another vehicle after Joiner " repaired" it. (Id. at pp. 959-960, 962.) Therefore, "while the evidence would establish that Joiner was at some point in possession of stolen property, no evidence shows he was the actual thief of the [car]." (Id. at p. 962.)
Here, in contrast to the situations in Green and Joiner, the car was stolen in Modesto and found a few hours later, many miles away in Sacramento; the minor was observed backing the car out of a "chop shop"; and he readily admitted that the car was stolen. This was enough to infer that he was the actual thief or aided and abetted the theft.
In People v. Kelley (1937) 27 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 771, 70 P.2d 276 (Kelley), the issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Kelley "drove" a car within the meaning of the statute prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). While intoxicated, Kelley got into a wrecked car, "started the motor, engaged the gears in reverse, and, while others shoved, aided in backing the [car] some four or five feet." (Id. at p. 772.) Noting that the case involved an "emergency situation[]" (id. at p. 773), Kelley concluded "the act of the defendant in moving the car, which was in no condition to drive, did not amount to driving the car upon the highway" for purposes of the DUI statute. (Id. at p. 775; but see Henslee v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1985) 168 Cal. App. 3d 445, 214 Cal. Rptr. 249 [after an officer awakened the intoxicated Henslee, whom he found asleep in a running but parked car, Henslee put the transmission into "drive," attempted to leave, but was able to move the car only a few inches before stopped by the officer; this was sufficient to constitute driving for purposes of the DUI statute (Henslee v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 168 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 448, 451-452)].)
Here, there was no emergency, the car was operable, defendant was driving it out of the garage until he was stopped by officers, and we are not dealing with the DUI statute.
Lastly, the minor cites People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 973 P.2d 512 (Martinez), for the proposition that substantial movement of the car was required to find that he unlawfully drove it within the meaning of section 10851. But Martinez is a kidnapping case — discussing the applicable standard of asportation for Penal Code section 208, subdivision (b) — not a case involving driving within the meaning of section 10851. (Id. at pp. 229, 232-238.)
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that the minor violated section 10851 by taking and driving a stolen vehicle.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
We concur: KOLKEY, J., ROBIE, J. --------------- Notes: Vehicle Code section 10851 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense . . . ."