Opinion
NUMBER 2018 KJ 0227
06-01-2018
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF F.T.
Hillar C. Moore, III Otha C. Nelson, Jr. Brittnay Jordan Stacy L. Wright Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks Madisonville, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, F.T.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the Juvenile Court in and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
Docket Number JU111326
Honorable Pamela Taylor Johnson, Judge Presiding
Hillar C. Moore, III
Otha C. Nelson, Jr.
Brittnay Jordan
Stacy L. Wright
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Appellee,
State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks
Madisonville, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
F.T. BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McDONALD AND CHUTZ, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J.
The juvenile, F.T., was charged by petition in juvenile court with eleven counts of simple burglary, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:62 (counts 1 through 11). He denied the allegations. He filed a motion to suppress an inculpatory statement he made to police, which was denied. At the adjudication hearing, the State dismissed counts 2 through 11; the juvenile court adjudicated F.T. to be a delinquent for the charged offense on count 1 (simple burglary). The juvenile court ordered that disposition be deferred for six months and that F.T. be placed on supervised probation for six months pending final disposition. The juvenile court further ordered that F.T. participate in the Crime Prevention Clinic, that he perform thirty hours of community service, and that he pay restitution in the amount of fifty dollars. F.T. now appeals, designating one assignment of error. We affirm the adjudication and judgment of disposition.
In the companion case to the instant matter, State in the Interest of F.T. (2018 KJ 0226), a separate petition was filed, charging F.T. with simple burglary; felony theft (more than $750.00 but less than $5,000.00); and attempted theft of a motor vehicle. F.T. was adjudicated a delinquent for one count of simple burglary, but the juvenile court dismissed the other two counts. F.T. committed the offenses on the same day, and both cases were tried together in a single adjudication hearing. F.T.'s adjudication in the companion case is likewise affirmed this date.
FACTS
On April 29, 2017, Shainla Montgomery was at her home on King Wall Drive in Baton Rouge. Upon hearing car doors slamming, she looked out of her window, and, she saw two individuals in her parked truck, one of whom she identified as F.T. When Shainla opened the door, F.T. and the other person saw her and ran. They got into a red car and left. According to Shainla, a small amount of cash was taken from the console of her truck. F.T. was brought to the police station on the same day (April 29) for questioning. After being Mirandized, F.T. admitted to the simple burglary.
Ms. Montgomery's first name is spelled both "Shainla" and "Shalaina" in the transcript. We use the spelling that conforms with Ms. Montgomery's testimony when she was asked to state her name.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, F.T. argues that the juvenile court erred in ruling that his inculpatory statement was admissible. Specifically, F.T. contends that an inculpatory statement he made to a police officer was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
A juvenile may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana. LSA-Ch.C. art. 872. When a juvenile court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the juvenile court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not adequately supported by reliable evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So. 2d 272, 280-81. However, a juvenile court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State in Interest of C.H., 2015-1024 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/15), 183 So. 3d 567, 570.
F.T. argues that his statement to Detective Justin Pear of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office should have been suppressed because it was not made knowingly and voluntarily. Specifically, F.T. contends that Detective Pear merely administered the Miranda warnings to him and "took no effort to change the procedure from that used with adult offenders." F.T. avers Detective Pear not only failed to allow him the opportunity to speak with an interested adult, but he failed to ascertain if F.T. had the educational ability to understand the rights he was waiving. F.T. further asserts that the State failed to establish that the "circumstances surrounding the interrogation were less than coercive."
Louisiana Children's Code article 881.1(B) provides the following factors a court is to consider when ruling on the admissibility of a juvenile's confession: (1) the age of the child; (2) the education of the child; (3) the knowledge of the child as to both the substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and to remain silent; (4) whether the child is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or an attorney; (5) whether the child was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) the methods used in the interrogation; (7) the length of the interrogation; (8) whether or not the child refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the child has repudiated an extra-judicial statement at a later date. There is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian must be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes a statement. Instead, a totality of the circumstances standard is used as the basis for determining the admissibility of juvenile confessions. See State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d 485, 486-90; State v. Harper, 2007-0299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So. 2d 592, 604, writ denied, 2007-1921 (La. 2/15/08), 976 So. 2d 173; and C.H., 183 So. 3d at 571.
The adjudication hearing took place on August 23, 2017. While the minutes indicate defense counsel withdrew his motion to suppress F.T.'s statement, the transcript reflects that the motion to suppress hearing was combined with the adjudication hearing. See C.H., 183 So. 3d at 570.
At the adjudication hearing, Detective Pear testified that on April 29, 2017, he was investigating a string of vehicular burglaries in Oak Hill Subdivision and nearby streets, including an apartment complex at 5960 Siegen Lane. According to Detective Pear, Chalmette Avenue is about one-and-one-half miles from 5960 Siegen Lane. Detective Pear further indicated that King Wall Drive was about "half a mile" from Chalmette Avenue. Detective Pear testified that the three suspects, apprehended in a stolen red vehicle, were F.T. and two other suspects.
Detective Pear testified that prior to making contact with F.T. at the Kleinpeter Substation, he was made aware that F.T. had already been Mirandized. Detective Pear had also been informed that deputies had contacted the parents of each one of the subjects earlier that day. When he met with F.T., who was alone, Detective Pear identified F.T. as a juvenile and Mirandized him again. Detective Pear was asked by the prosecutor to recite and, in fact recited, what he had told F.T., namely, the entire litany of the Miranda warnings. Detective Pear indicated that he had no concerns that F.T. did not understand what he was saying, and that F.T. had no questions about his rights. Detective Pear also indicated that when Mirandizing minors, he makes sure they understand every part before his continues. Detective Pear indicated that he did not make any threats or promises to F.T., and that he spoke to F.T. for about ten minutes. Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court ruled that any statements made by F.T. would be admissible. According to Detective Pear, F.T. stated that the two other suspects who were also present at the substation were with him during the burglaries. Detective Pear testified that F.T. admitted to committing burglaries that night, but denied committing later burglaries (perpetrated by the other two suspects, according to F.T.) at an apartment complex on Siegen Lane.
On the predicate, defense counsel asked, "He was fourteen, right?" Detective Pear responded, "Yes sir." Our review of the record reveals that while F.T. was, in fact, fourteen years old at the time of the adjudication hearing, he was thirteen years old at the time of the offense.
Detective Pear indicated that he did not record F.T.'s statement. However, the testimony of a police officer alone can be sufficient to prove that the juvenile's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State ex rel. J.M., 99-1271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/30/99), 743 So. 2d 228, 229-231. The limited timeframe between the juvenile's arrest and his confession is strongly indicative of a lack of coercion. Moreover, the presence of an attorney or parent at the time F.T. made his statement was not required. Harper, 970 So. 2d at 604; State in Interest of J.J.M., 2016-347 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 11/9/16), 207 So. 3d 609, 616-17. The totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that F.T.'s statement to Detective Pear was freely and voluntarily given. Accordingly, we find no error in the juvenile court's denial of F.T.'s motion to suppress his statement. See J.J.M., 207 So. 3d at 617-18 (finding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the statement of a juvenile, who was thirteen years old and had completed seventh grade at the time of his waiver and police statement). See also C.H., 183 So. 3d at 570-71 (affirming the denial of a thirteen-year-old juvenile's motion to suppress where the juvenile confessed to an officer without the presence of an attorney or parent).
The assignment of error is without merit.
ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION AFFIRMED.