Opinion
2018 KJ 0226
06-01-2018
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF F.T.
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Brittnay Jordan Otha Curtis Nelson, Jr. Stacy L. Wright Assistant District Attorneys Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks Madisonville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant F.T.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ON APPEAL FROM THE JUVENILE COURT OF EAST BATON ROUGE
NUMBER JU111325, DIVISION B, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE PAMELA TAYLOR JOHNSON, JUDGE Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
Brittnay Jordan
Otha Curtis Nelson, Jr.
Stacy L. Wright
Assistant District Attorneys
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana Katherine M. Franks
Madisonville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
F.T. BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McDONALD, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
Disposition: ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION AFFIRMED.
CHUTZ, J.
The juvenile, F.T., was charged by petition in juvenile court with simple burglary, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62 (count 1); felony theft (value of $750 or more but less than a value of $5,000, a violation of La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3) (count 2) (prior to the 2017 amendment); and attempted theft of a motor vehicle, a violation of La. R.S. 14:67.26(C)(1) and La. R.S. 14:27 (count 3). He denied the allegations. He filed a motion to suppress an inculpatory statement he made to the police, which was denied. Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated F.T. to be a delinquent for the charged offense on count 1 (simple burglary). The juvenile court dismissed the charges in counts 2 and 3. The juvenile court ordered that disposition be deferred for six months and that F.T. be placed on supervised probation for six months pending final disposition. The juvenile court further ordered that F.T. participate in the Crime Prevention Clinic, that he perform thirty hours of community service, and that he pay restitution in the amount of fifty dollars. F.T. now appeals, designating one assignment of error. We affirm the adjudication and judgment of disposition.
The companion case to the instant matter is State in the Interest of F.T. (2018 KJ 0227), in which a separate adjudication of F.T. as a delinquent is also affirmed. In that case, F.T. was charged in a separate petition with eleven counts of simple burglary and was adjudicated a delinquent for one count of simple burglary. The State dismissed the other ten counts. F.T. committed the offenses on the same day, and both cases were tried together in a single adjudication hearing.
FACTS
On or about April 28, 2017, thirteen-year-old F.T. was on Chalmette Avenue in Baton Rouge. He approached a parked Lexus, owned by Eunice Harold, who had just gone inside to change her shoes and, as such, left her vehicle unlocked. F.T. went inside the Lexus and took three cell phones, a pair of glasses, and credit cards. A short time later, Harold confronted F.T. with video footage of him in her Lexus. She asked F.T. to return what he had taken. The following morning, one of Harold's cell phones was returned.
F.T. was brought to the police station the following day (April 29) for questioning after being apprehended in a stolen vehicle. After being Mirandized, F.T. admitted to committing burglaries in Oak Hills Subdivision and surrounding areas.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, F.T. argues that the juvenile court erred in ruling that his inculpatory statement was admissible. Specifically, F.T. contends that his statement was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
The juvenile may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana. La. Ch. Code art. 872. See La. Ch. Code art. 881.1(A). When a juvenile court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the juvenile court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not adequately supported by reliable evidence. State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81; State in Interest of C.H., 2015-1024 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/15), 183 So.3d 567, 570. However, a juvenile court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751; C.H., 183 So.3d at 570.
F.T. argues that his inculpatory statement to Detective Justin Pear of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office should have been suppressed because it was not made knowingly and voluntarily. Specifically, F.T. contends that Detective Pear merely administered the Miranda warnings to him and "took no effort to change the procedure from that used with adult offenders." F.T. avers Detective Pear not only failed to allow him the opportunity to speak with an interested adult, but also failed to ascertain if F.T. had the educational ability to understand the rights he was waiving. F.T. further asserts that the State failed to establish that the "circumstances surrounding the interrogation were less than coercive."
Louisiana Children's Code article 881.1(B) provides that a court is to consider the following factors when ruling on the admissibility of a juvenile's confession: (1) the age of the child; (2) the education of the child; (3) the knowledge of the child as to both the substance of the charge, if any has been filed, and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and to remain silent; (4) whether the child is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends, or an attorney; (5) whether the child was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) the methods used in the interrogation; (7) the length of the interrogation; (8) whether or not the child refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the child has repudiated an extrajudicial statement at a later date. There is no absolute requirement that an attorney or guardian must be present with a juvenile suspect at the time he makes a statement. Instead, a totality of the circumstances standard is used as the basis for determining the admissibility of juvenile confessions. See State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 486-90; State v. Harper, 2007-0299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So.2d 592, 604, writ denied, 2007-1921 (La. 2/15/08), 976 So.2d 173. See C.H., 183 So.3d at 571.
The adjudication hearing took place on August 23, 2017. While the minutes indicate defense counsel withdrew his motion to suppress F.T.'s statement, it appears from the transcript that the motion to suppress hearing was combined with the adjudication hearing. See C.H., 183 So.3d at 570.
At the adjudication hearing, Detective Pear testified that on the evening of April 28, 2017 and the early morning of April 29, 2017, he was investigating a string of vehicular burglaries in Oak Hills Subdivision and nearby streets, including an apartment complex at 5960 Siegen Lane. According to Detective Pear, Chalmette Avenue is about one-and-one-half miles from 5960 Siegen Lane. Detective Pear testified that on the afternoon of April 29, 2017, he received a call about three suspects related to the vehicular burglaries, one of whom was F.T. The suspects were apprehended in a stolen red vehicle and were waiting at the Kleinpeter Substation.
Eunice Harold, who lived on Chalmette Avenue, testified at the hearing that on April 28, 2017, F.T. had entered her parked Lexus while a lookout, who was with F.T., stayed outside of the Lexus. These actions by F.T. and his accomplice were captured by Harold's home video surveillance. According to Harold, three phones, a pair of glasses, a Sam's card, credit cards, and a small amount of money were taken from her Lexus.
Detective Pear testified that prior to making contact with F.T. at the Kleinpeter Substation, he was made aware that F.T. had already been Mirandized. Detective Pear had also been informed that deputies had contacted the parents of each one of the subjects earlier that day. When he met with F.T., who was alone, Detective Pear identified F.T. as a juvenile and Mirandized him again. Detective Pear was asked by the prosecutor to recite and, in fact recited, what he had informed F.T., that is, the entire litany of the Miranda warnings. Detective Pear indicated that he had no concerns that F.T. did not understand what he was saying, and that F.T. had no questions about his rights. Detective Pear also indicated that when Mirandizing minors, he makes sure they understand every part before his continues. Detective Pear indicated he did not make any threats or promises to F.T., and that he spoke to F.T. for about ten minutes. Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court ruled that any statements made by F.T. would be admissible.
On the predicate, defense counsel asked, "He was fourteen, right?" Detective Pear responded, "Yes sir." It appears from our review of the record that F.T. was, in fact, thirteen years old. --------
According to Detective Pear, F.T. stated that the two other suspects, who were also present at the substation, were with him during the burglaries. Detective Pear testified that F.T. admitted to committing burglaries in Oak Hills Subdivision, but denied committing later burglaries (perpetrated by the other two suspects, according to F.T.) at an apartment complex on Siegen Lane.
Detective Pear indicated that he did not record F.T.'s statement. However, the testimony of a police officer alone can be sufficient to prove that the juvenile's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State ex rel. J.M., 99-1271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/30/99), 743 So.2d 228, 229-31. Moreover, the presence of an attorney or parent at the time F.T. made his statement was not required. See Fernandez, 712 So.2d 486-90; C.H., 183 So.3d at 571; State in Interest of J.J.M., 2016-347 (La. App. 3d Cir. 11/9/16), 207 So.3d 609, 616-17. The totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that F.T.'s statement to Detective Pear was freely and voluntarily given. Accordingly, we find no error in the juvenile court's denial of F.T.'s motion to suppress his statement. See J.J.M., 207 So.3d at 617-18 (finding the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress statement of juvenile, who was thirteen years old and had completed the seventh grade at the time of his waiver and police statement). See also C.H., 183 So.3d at 570-71 (affirming the denial of thirteen-year-old juvenile's motion to suppress where juvenile confessed to an officer without the presence of an attorney or parent).
The assignment of error is without merit.
ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION AFFIRMED.