Opinion
No. 18-2418
April 25, 2019, Filed
In re: DERAY SMITH, Movant, Pro se, Coldwater, MI.
For CATHERINE S. BAUMAN, Warden, Respondent: John S. Pallas, Office of the Attorney General of Michigan, Lansing, MI.
ORDER
Deray Smith, a Michigan prisoner proceeding pro se, moves this court for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
In 2004, a jury in the Wayne Circuit Court convicted Smith of first-degree felony murder and armed robbery. The trial court sentenced Smith to life imprisonment without parole. On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Smith's convictions. People v. Smith, No. 254523, 2006 Mich. App. LEXIS 1624, 2006 WL 1293477 (Mich. Ct. App. May 11, 2006), perm. app. denied, 477 Mich. 910, 722 N.W.2d 821 (Mich. 2006) (mem.).
In 2009, after unsuccessfully seeking state post-conviction relief, Smith filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Smith v. Rapelje, No. 2:09-cv-14876 (E.D. Mich.). The district court dismissed Smith's habeas petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Smith appealed, and this court denied him a certificate of appealability.
Smith now moves this court for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). In support of his motion, Smith relies on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), which prohibited mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders. Smith, who was eighteen years old when he committed his crimes, asserts that his sentence should be vacated based on the scientific research on brain development suggesting that penal consequences for young people should be approached differently.
We may authorize the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition if the applicant makes a prima facie showing that his proposed claim "relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). "A prima facie showing, in this context, simply requires that the applicant make a showing of possible merit sufficient to 'warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.'" In re Watkins, 810 F.3d 375, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 432-33 (6th Cir. 2004)). This prima facie showing "is not a difficult standard to meet." In re Lott, 366 F.3d at 432.
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" 567 U.S. at 465. Miller requires a sentencing court "to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480. The Supreme Court has held that Miller announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law retroactively applicable on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).
Smith seeks to extend the rule announced in Miller to offenders who were eighteen years old at the time of their crimes. See Cruz v. United States, No. 11-CV-787, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52924, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (holding that Miller applies to eighteen-year-olds). Other circuits have held that whether a new rule "extends" to an applicant "goes to the merits of the motion and is for the district court, not the court of appeals." In re Williams, 759 F.3d 66, 72, 411 U.S. App. D.C. 257 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2017) ("It is for the district court to evaluate the merits of the second or successive habeas petition in the first instance. This includes 'whether the invoked new rule should ultimately be extended in the way the movant proposes' or whether his 'reliance is misplaced.'") (quoting In re Arnick, 826 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2016) (Elrod, J., dissenting)); In re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2016) ("[I]t is for the district court to determine whether the new rule extends to the movant's case, not for this court in this proceeding."). Smith has made a prima facie showing that his proposed claim relies on Miller to warrant authorization of a second or successive habeas petition; we leave the merits of that habeas petition to the district court.
Accordingly, we GRANT Smith's motion for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.