Opinion
91760
Decided and Entered: October 17, 2002.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent Comptroller which denied petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits.
Seelig Ungaro, New York City (Philip H. Seelig of counsel), for petitioner.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), for respondents.
Before: Cardona, P.J., Mugglin, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT
Petitioner, a court officer, applied for accidental disability retirement benefits for an injury that he sustained immediately after physically restraining and removing an unruly prisoner from the courtroom where he was working. Respondent Comptroller denied petitioner's application because the incident involved a risk inherent in petitioner's employment and did not constitute a qualifying accident as that term is used in Retirement and Social Security Law § 605-a. As we have often noted (see Matter of Arcuri v. New York State Local Retirement Sys., 291 A.D.2d 621, 622; Matter of Jonigan v. McCall, 291 A.D.2d 766, 766; Matter of Staley v. New York State Local Retirement Sys., 290 A.D.2d 721, 722-723), such an accident presupposes "`a precipitating accidental event * * * which was not a risk of the work performed'" (Matter of Penkalski v. McCall, 292 A.D.2d 735, 736, quoting McCambridge v. McGuire, 62 N.Y.2d 563, 567-568).
Here, petitioner's injury occurred as the result of his having restrained a person who was threatening the peace and security of a court proceeding, and such activity was a regular though infrequent part of his duties. Petitioner testified that his primary function was to provide courtroom security, which entailed physical security when necessary, that he had received training at the Court Officers' Academy in restraining individuals, and that he was required to carry a gun while on duty. While the specific outburst which required petitioner's intervention here may have been abrupt and unexpected, the maintenance of order by restraining unruly persons in the courtroom was a recognized part of his normal duties. Thus, there is substantial evidence supporting the Comptroller's determination that petitioner's injury "resulted from a recognized risk inherent in petitioner's normal duties and thus was not an accident within the ambit of the statute" (Matter of Fabiano v. Regan, 88 A.D.2d 687, 688; see Matter of Penkalski v. McCall, supra at 736; Matter of Michalczyk v. New York State Local Retirement Sys., 286 A.D.2d 852, 853; Matter of Hoyt v. Regan, 93 A.D.2d 937, 938).
Mugglin, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur; Cardona, P.J., not taking part.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.