Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. Nos. 2655DEP, 2656DEP
NEEDHAM, J.
Santos Z. (father) appeals from an order that terminated the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over his children, Savannah and Simon. As part of its exit orders, the court granted sole physical and legal custody to the children’s mother, Sierra Z., and denied visitation to father. Father argues that the order terminating jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence and that the “no visitation” order must be reversed as to Simon. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is the sixth appeal by father in this juvenile dependency case. Because the parties are well-versed in the proceedings, we provide only an outline of the lengthy factual and procedural background.
Mother and father were married in 2002, and mother gave birth to Savannah and Simon in 2004 and 2005. The marriage was marred by many instances of domestic violence. In May 2007, mother obtained a restraining order against father, but her mental health deteriorated.
In August 2007, the juvenile court declared Savannah and Simon to be dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c) and removed them from their parents’ physical custody. Father appealed. In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the jurisdictional order and reversed the dispositional order. (In re Savannah Z., (July 28, 2008, A119217) [nonpub. opn.].) We concluded that because father was a noncustodial parent at the time of removal, the court should have proceeded under section 361.2, subdivision (a). (Ibid.)
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Visitation with father had been ordered at the dispositional hearing. In February 2008, during the pendency of the first appeal, the juvenile court granted the section 388 petition of respondent Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) and terminated father's visitation as detrimental to the children. Father appealed for the second time, claiming the court had violated his due process rights when it refused to appoint an additional therapist to evaluate whether visitation should be allowed. (In re S.Z. (Dec. 19, 2008, A120966) [nonpub. opn.].) This court affirmed the order granting the section 388 petition and terminating visitation. (Ibid.)
On April 29, 2008, the juvenile court held a six-month review hearing and terminated father’s reunification services, giving rise to his third appeal. (In re Savannah Z. et al., A121551.) That appeal was dismissed after father’s appellate counsel filed a letter stating there were no appellate issues.
In December 2008, the court held an 18-month status review hearing at which the children were placed with mother, who was doing very well, under a family maintenance plan. The court made findings under section 361.2 as required by the remand in the first appeal, and determined that placement with father would be detrimental. The court also denied father visitation, concluding there was “clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to the children[.]” Father did not file a section 388 petition, but appealed for a fourth time. (In re Savannah Z. et al. (Nov. 20, 2009, A123806) [nonpub. opn.].) This court affirmed. (Ibid.)
At a family maintenance review hearing held in May 2009, the court granted mother an additional six months of family maintenance services and ordered that “[a]ll prior orders remain in full force and effect[.]” Father filed his fifth appeal, challenging the continuation of the “no visitation” order of December 2008 as unsupported by any evidence that visitation would be detrimental. (In re Savannah Z. (May 13, 2010, A125548) [nonpub. opn.].) We again affirmed, primarily because father did not file a section 388 petition demonstrating a change in circumstances: “Section 388 provides that a parent seeking a change or modification of ‘any order of court previously made’ must file a petition demonstrating a ‘change of circumstance or new evidence...’ (§ 388, subd. (a).) As a result, the Department had no burden to present evidence regarding visitation at the May 2009 hearing. Instead, it was father who was required to file a section 388 petition to modify the December 2008 order denying visitation. [Citations].” (Ibid.)
This brings us to what ought to be the final chapter of this dependency case. On December 9, 2009, the juvenile court conducted another family maintenance review hearing and terminated dependency jurisdiction, awarding sole physical and legal custody to mother and denying visitation to father. (See § 362.4.) Father had not filed a petition under section 388 seeking a change in the prior visitation orders, nor did he appear at the hearing itself or offer to present evidence regarding visitation. The social worker’s report prepared in connection with the review hearing stated that both children’s therapists believed visitation would not be appropriate. Father’s trial counsel objected that “visitation has not been proven detrimental to the children.”
The record on appeal does contain a document filed by the Department on July 31, 2009, which purports to respond to a section 388 motion filed by father. No copy of that motion is contained in the record. At the December 9, 2009 review hearing at issue in this case, county counsel stated, without objection by father’s counsel, that no section 388 motion was pending.
Father again appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Father agues in a cursory way that the order terminating jurisdiction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support that order. He offers no analysis and cites no authorities in support of this contention and we consider it waived. (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Father’s real argument is that the juvenile court should not have issued an exit order allowing no visitation as to Simon absent a finding that visitation would be detrimental. He further contends the Department failed to present substantial evidence of detriment.
These claims rest on the premise that the court must reexamine a previous visitation order every time a family maintenance review hearing is held under section 364. As we explained in our decision in his most recent prior appeal, this is not the case. “Under section 364, the only issue before the court is ‘whether continued supervision is necessary.’ Absent a section 388 petition (or some other form of prior notice), it cannot modify previous orders at a section 364 review hearing.” (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 35; see also In re Elaine E. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 809, 815 [at § 364 review hearing, noncustodial father was not entitled to argue that supervised visitation should be changed to unsupervised visitation absent a petition under § 388].) Father did not file a petition under section 388 or otherwise give notice that he was seeking modification of the “no visitation” order.
Other cases have recognized that when the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction with exit orders, a parent may be entitled to a hearing on visitation and other issues upon request without filing a formal petition under section 388. (See In re Michael W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 190, 194-195; In re Roger S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 29-31.) Here, father did not request a hearing on visitation or attempt to present additional evidence on that issue. Rather, he contends the visitation order was defective because there was no contemporaneous finding of detriment.
Father argues that the court was required to reconsider the issue of visitation because the December 2008 order denying visitation expired with the termination of dependency. He notes that during the review hearing at which the dependency was terminated, the court indicated that a no contact order it had issued against father on February 26, 2008 would expire with the dependency case. We are not persuaded. The court was simply recognizing that the no contact order, which was not a formal restraining order, could only remain operative during the pendency of the juvenile court proceedings. It did not purport to terminate the previous “no visitation” order, nor does father cite any authority suggesting that visitation order terminated by operation of law. Because the “no visitation” order remained in effect, it was properly included in the court’s exit orders.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment (order terminating dependency jurisdiction under section 362.4) is affirmed, as is the companion order that father have no visitation with the children.
We concur. JONES, P. J., BRUINIERS, J.