Opinion
F01CP12002501A
12-19-2017
IN RE SANTIAGO L.-G.[1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Barbara M. Quinn, Judge Trial Referee
On October 7, 2015, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, hereafter " DCF, " filed a petition for the termination of the parental rights of Cinthya Melisa M., Jose Alberto E., and a John Doe, parents of Santiago L.-G. The earlier procedural history of this matter is long and involves highly unusual facts and circumstances. Those facts and circumstances are set forth in detail in the case of In re Santiago G., 318 Conn. 449, 121 A.3d 708 (2015), to which the court refers. At the outset and as set forth in that case, " Santiago was born in Guatemala to the respondent mother on April 18, 2009. He was cared for since his birth, however, by Maria G., an Argentinian citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States who resided in Stamford ..." After reviewing the neglect proceedings, including decisions on motions to reopen and revoke the commitment and to intervene, the Supreme Court sustained all trial court decisions including the denial of the motion to reopen the neglect adjudication of 2012. Santiago has been in the care and custody of DCF since October 2012. He has been with the same foster family since December 2012, where he has thrived.
In re Santiago G., supra, p. 453.
The termination petition alleges that Santiago’s parents have abandoned him and they do not have an ongoing parent-child relationship with him; see Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) respectively. Trial on the termination petition was originally scheduled in 2016, but was continued due to an appeal taken by Maria G. of this court’s denial of her motion to intervene. That denial was sustained earlier this year by the Supreme Court, see In re Santiago G., 325 Conn. 221, 157 A.3d 60 (2017). Consolidated with the termination petition was the permanency plan hearing by order of the court on January 26, 2017.
Trial on the petition commenced on August 21, 2017, and was continued to October 26, 2017. Notice to John Doe and Jose Alberto E. was by publication in Guatemala City, Guatemala, the last known place of residence, when all reasonable efforts to locate the exact whereabouts of either person in Guatemala failed. The court finds that the notice provided was reasonably calculated to come to their attention after vigorous efforts by DCF were unable to secure more information. The court concludes it has jurisdiction over the fathers. None of the fathers ever contact DCF and, to the extent they were not previously defaulted, they are hereby defaulted for failure to appear at trial.
The biological mother, Cinthya Melisa M., did appear in the termination proceedings and was represented by counsel. She continues to reside in Guatemala. On the first day of trial, a telephonic connection was unable to be completed and so the proceedings were transcribed and translated into Spanish and subsequently provided to the respondent mother by her counsel. On October 26, 2017, a video hookup with the mother in Guatemala City was accomplished and, for the first time in these lengthy proceedings, the mother personally appeared and testified at trial. While she did not consent to the termination of her parental rights, she did confirm in her own words the facts alleged by DCF and the statutory grounds for the termination.
The court finds from the record that there are no other custody proceedings affecting Santiago and that it has jurisdiction. After duly considering all the clear and convincing evidence and for the reasons set forth in detail below, the court grants the petition and finds that it is in the best interests of Santiago G. to terminate his parents’ rights to him. From the evidence presented, the court finds the following facts:
A. FACTS
Santiago was born to the respondent mother in Guatemala on April 18, 2009, when she was fourteen years old. Arrangements were made to give the child to the care of a non-relative, Maria G., who, together with her husband, brought the child to the United States as an infant. Some three years later, the long and complicated juvenile proceedings recited in In re Santiago G., 318 Conn. 449 (2015), began. The child’s mother testified on the last day of trial that Santiago’s father, whom she identified as Jose Alberto E., never saw the child, asked about him and never demonstrated any interest in him, either in his birth or since that time. The court reaches the same conclusions regarding the unknown father, John Doe.
The biological connection between Santiago and the respondent mother was established by DNA testing.in the earlier juvenile proceedings in May 2013.
(1) The Respondent Mother, Cinthya Melisa M.
The respondent mother is now twenty-two years old. She testified that she voluntarily relinquished her child to Maria G. in 2009, and that she has not seen him since he was a newborn. She has not had any contact with him. She has taken no steps to establish her legal relationship to Santiago since his birth. The court finds from the evidence that the respondent mother had contact with her attorneys in these juvenile proceedings, both in the neglect proceedings and in these termination hearings. She knew of the hearing dates. She admitted she did not wish to have Santiago returned to her care in Guatemala. She also affirmed that there were no relatives there who could care for him. From that testimony and other evidence before the court, the court concludes, from the clear and convincing evidence, that she has abandoned the child in the legal meaning of that term and has no ongoing parent-child relationship with him. Clearly, given her position, permitting more time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship would be futile and not in Santiago’s best interest.
(2) The Child, Santiago L.-G.
Santiago L.-G. is now eight years old. As noted, he came to the United States with Maria G. and her husband in 2009 without documentation and remained in her care in 2012, when the matter came to the attention of DCF. He has been with the same foster family since December of 2012 and knows no other family. He has flourished in their care. He is doing well in school and reports are that he is on par academically. He relates well with his peers. He possesses no relationship with his biological parents and his biological mother acknowledged that at trial. He has a warm and loving relationship with his foster parents and their child.
As the court-appointed psychologist evaluator testified and based on his evaluation of Santiago in 2013, he was a child who was even then strongly attached to his foster parents and his foster brother. At that time, the evaluator was asked to consider Santiago’s return to Maria G., and he was then of the opinion that such a removal from the foster parents, given the strength of Santiago’s attachment, would be harmful to him, given his multiple prior losses. His opinion in August 2017, when he again testified, is that delaying permanency for Santiago was not likely to be a helpful event. Providing him with permanency would " offer him the greatest degree of certainty that we can that the life he has now is the one he will have for his foreseeable future." He also noted that, because of his need for permanency, allowing more time for the establishment of a relationship with his biological mother would be detrimental to his best interests. His need is to know he has a secure and real home. His foster parents are delighted to have him in their care and have nurtured this child for many years. If permitted, they wish to adopt him.
Testimony of Dr. Mantel, August 21, 2017.
B. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The legal issue before the court is whether DCF has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the respondent parents should be terminated. In order to terminate a parent’s parental rights under Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1), or in the alternative, that the parents are unable and unwilling to benefit from such services or that such efforts are not required as a permanency plan other than reunification was approved by the court; (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2); and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3). See In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148-49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).
(1) Reasonable Efforts
Turning first to the issues of reasonable efforts at reunification or the statutory alternatives, the court has reviewed the records. DCF alleges that the parents were unwilling and unable to benefit from such services. The court so finds from the clear and convincing evidence. It was a foregone conclusion for the respondent mother that others were going to care for her child. She exhibited no further interest in Santiago once the child was relinquished to Maria G. When she appeared at the final day of trial, she was puzzled as to why she would inquire about him and how he was doing, as Maria was his mother in her view. As to the two fathers, their lack of interest also demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that they were unwilling and unable to benefit from any reunification efforts. In connection with earlier permanency plan hearings, the court also found on December 11, 2014 that further efforts were not required.
(2) The Statutory Grounds for Termination
The first ground alleged for termination of the parents’ rights is abandonment. Abandonment focuses on the conduct of the parent. In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17, 632 A.2d 1112, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993). General Statutes § 45as-717(g) defines " abandonment" as " the failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a child ..." The statute " does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern ..." In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314-15, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001). None of the parents in this matter have taken a reasonable degree of interest, as found above. Cinthya Melisa M. has clearly abandoned this child. The putative and the unknown fathers have never demonstrated any interests or concern for him. The court concludes from the clear and convincing evidence that this ground for termination of parental rights has been established.
The petition further alleges that the parents have no ongoing parent-child relationship. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). As previously noted, to grant a petition for termination of parental rights under this section, the court must make two findings: " [f]irst, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child’s best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ..." In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006).
Given the lack of contact between the parents and Santiago since his birth, the court concludes that an ongoing parent-child relationship was never established between him and any of the parents. The court-appointed psychologist evaluator has testified that to permit further time for this to occur would be detrimental to Santiago who needs a permanent home and the knowledge that he has such a home. The court concludes that this ground for termination of the parents’ rights has also been established by clear and convincing evidence.
C. DISPOSITION
(1) The Seven Statutory Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of the parental rights of Cinthya Melisa M. and Jose Alberto E. and. John Doe have been proven. It must now turn to the seven required findings.
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent- § 17a-112(k)(1)
The court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts under the circumstances of the case and the parents were unwilling and unable to benefit from the provision of any services, had they been possible. None of the parents ever sought to participate, even though the record reflects that for the respondent mother, DCF provided case management services which included notice of ACRS, and other proceedings.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) 42 U.S.C. § 620-79, as amended
The court finds, under all the circumstances, that DCF did make reasonable efforts under the peculiar and unusual facts of this case. In these proceedings, the court has concluded, from the clear and convincing evidence that parents were unwilling or unable to benefit from those services.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order- § 17a-112(k)(3).
There were no such orders as the parents never participated.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties- § 17a-112(k)(4)
Santiago was never in the care of his parents, except for a few days after his birth. There has been no contact since that time. The evidence is unequivocal that he is attached to his foster family.
5. The age of the child- § 17a-112(k)(5)
Santiago is eight years old.
6. The efforts the parents have made to adjust their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to their home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parents have maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parents, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child- § 17a-112(k)(6)
As detailed above, the parents have not sought to have this child returned to their care and have made no efforts, as a consequence of their acceptance of the relinquishment of the child to others.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent- § 17a-112(k)(7)
There has been no such conduct nor have economic circumstances prevented a relationship.
(2) Motion for Special Juvenile Immigration Status
Santiago, through his counsel, seeks for this court to make the findings required for him to permit him to petition for legal permanent residency in the United States. The court does find from the evidence that the minor child was born in and is a citizen of Guatemala. The court also finds from the records in this and other proceedings concerning Santiago that he entered the United States without documentation and has not since obtained legal status in this country. On October 16, 2012, he was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Department of Children and Family, in which care he remains. It is not in Santiago’s best interests to be returned to Guatemala, as none of his parents wish him returned to their care. There are no other relatives who could or would care for him, and he has no suitable family or support system in Guatemala. For most of his life, he has known no other family than his foster family in the United States and is strongly bonded to them. The court grants the motion and makes the findings as set forth in the order and proposed findings of fact.
Motion dated June 1, 2016, which the court grants on today’s date and in conjunction with this termination judgment.
(3) The Best Interests of the Child
The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of Santiago. See In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). In every termination case, the state has an interest in safeguarding the welfare of children which must be weighed against the constitutionally protected right of parents to maintain their connection and relationship to their children. In this case, there is no question that Santiago’s interests in a safe and stable environment outweigh his parents’ right to his society, which they voluntarily relinquished at his birth.
Santiago needs permanency and the knowledge that he has a home and a family where he belongs. Fortunately, he lives with such a family, who has waited a long time for the legal matters in this child’s life to align themselves with his actual life, as a member of their family. There can be no doubt, given the clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parents’ rights is in this child’s best interests. It is time for him to have permanency and a secure and safe placement so that he can grow and mature to become a productive child and adult.
(4) Permanency Plan
Previous permanency plans for termination and adoption of Santiago have been approved by the court. The present permanency plan was consolidated with the termination trial on January 26, 2017 and was submitted to the court. The court finds from the evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to effectuate the plan and notes for the record that there were previous findings that further efforts toward reunification were not required for the mother and that no efforts were possible for the fathers. The court approves the permanency plan for termination and adoption of this child.
Petitioner’s exhibit 2.
ORDERS
It is HEREBY ORDERED that the parental rights of Cinthya Melisa M., Jose Alberto E. and John Doe are terminated. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the child. The Commissioner will file, within 30 days hereof, a report as to the status of this child as required by statute and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law. Judgment may enter accordingly.