Opinion
M-4558.
03-10-2016
In the Matter of John L. SAMPSON (admitted as John Llwelyn Sampson), an attorney and counselor-at-law: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, John L. Sampson, Respondent.
Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner. Aidala, Bertuna & Kamins, P.C. (Barry Kamins, of counsel), for respondent.
Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner.
Aidala, Bertuna & Kamins, P.C. (Barry Kamins, of counsel), for respondent.
ANGELA M. MAZZARELLI, Justice Presiding, ROLANDO T. ACOSTA, DIANNE T. RENWICK, KARLA MOSKOWITZ, ROSALYN H. RICHTER, Justices.
PER CURIAM. Respondent John L. Sampson was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on April 29, 1992, under the name John Llwelyn Sampson. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.
On July 24, 2015, respondent was convicted, after a jury trial, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, of one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a) and 1503(b)(3), and two counts of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), both felonies. Respondent has not yet been sentenced.
Respondent, who was a member of the New York State Senate, attempted to prevent an associate, who had been charged by the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) with bank fraud and wire fraud in connection with a mortgage fraud scheme, from cooperating with law enforcement authorities by, among other things attempting to obtain confidential, nonpublic information regarding the mortgage fraud case through a person who, at the time, was an administrative employee with the USAO; and directing the associate to withhold documentation from the government. In addition, respondent falsely stated to FBI agents that he had not previously seen a check register page reflecting a prior payment of funds from the associate to respondent, which, in fact, the associate had shown him; and had not directed a Senate staffer to contact the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance for the purpose of having the sales tax liability of a liquor store, in which respondent had an ownership interest, reduced, which he did. The Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee) seeks an order determining that the crimes of which respondent has been convicted are “serious crimes” as defined by Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) ; suspending respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f) ; and directing respondent to show cause before a Hearing Panel or a referee, which shall thereupon hold a hearing and issue a report and recommendation to this Court, why a final order of censure, suspension or disbarment should not be made within 90 days following the imposition of sentence, or respondent's release from incarceration, if applicable, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(g).
The indictment alleged that the associate provided respondent with $188,500 so that respondent could repay funds he had embezzled from foreclosure sales for which he served as a court appointed referee. Notably, counts one and two of the indictment, which charged respondent with embezzlement, were dismissed as time-barred by the trial court.
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In response, respondent's counsel has submitted an affirmation in which he, inter alia, acknowledges that the offenses of which respondent was convicted are “serious crimes.” However, he opposes the Committee's request for an interim suspension and requests that a sanction hearing be postponed until after respondent is sentenced.
The crimes which respondent was convicted of are “serious crimes” within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) and The Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department (22 NYCRR) 603.12(b). Further, this Court has held that the federal crimes of obstruction of justice and making a false statement constitute “serious crimes” (see e.g. Matter of Williams, 217 A.D.2d 9, 634 N.Y.S.2d 693 [1st Dept.1995] ; Matter of Konigsberg, 183 A.D.2d 335, 590 N.Y.S.2d 435 [1st Dept.1992] ; Matter of Goldblatt, 132 A.D.2d 329, 522 N.Y.S.2d 566 [1st Dept.1987] [the respondent was convicted of several federal offenses after trial, including obstruction of justice, which was deemed a “serious crime”]; see also Matter of Izquierdo, 56 A.D.3d 1117, 867 N.Y.S.2d 358 [3d Dept.2008] [the respondent, who was convicted of making false statements to FBI, pled guilty to a “serious crime”] ).
This Court has consistently held that during the pendency of a “serious crime” proceeding, it is appropriate to suspend an attorney, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f), who has been convicted of a felony and is serving a term of probation or imprisonment (see e.g. Matter of Lam, 104 A.D.3d 80, 960 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept.2013] ; Matter of Schneider, 97 A.D.3d 152, 947 N.Y.S.2d 516 [1st Dept.2012] ); Matter of Shapiro, 81 A.D.3d 25, 915 N.Y.S.2d 538 [1st Dept.2011] ). Here, even though respondent has not yet been sentenced, he is still subject to immediate suspension (see e.g. Matter of Kramer, 69 A.D.3d 139, 141, 887 N.Y.S.2d 46 [1st Dept.2009] [interim suspension imposed based on “serious crime” conviction prior to sentencing]; Matter of Fasciana, 36 A.D.3d 9, 823 N.Y.S.2d 132 [1st Dept.2006] [same]; Matter of Moid, 230 A.D.2d 396, 656 N.Y.S.2d 618 [1st Dept.1997] [same]; Matter of Woodward, 218 A.D.2d 65, 638 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept.1996] [same] ).
Respondent argues that good cause exists to deny the Committee's request for an interim suspension. Respondent, however, has not presented any compelling reason why this Court should not impose an interim suspension. Furthermore, with regard to respondent's request to postpone a sanction hearing until after he is sentenced, under Judiciary Law § 90(4)(g), a sanction hearing cannot be initiated until a final judgment of conviction is entered, which will occur once respondent has been sentenced (Matter of Kramer, 69 A.D.3d at 141, 887 N.Y.S.2d 46 ). Lastly, as a matter of course, this Court refers serious crime matters to a Hearing Panel of the Committee to hear and report.
Accordingly, the Committee's petition should be granted. We deem the offenses of which respondent has been convicted a “serious crime” pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) and 22 NYCRR 603.12(b). Additionally, respondent should be suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately, and until such time as the disciplinary proceedings against respondent are concluded, and until further order of this Court. Finally, respondent is directed to, within 90 days of his sentencing or release from incarceration, whichever is applicable, show cause before a Hearing Panel designated by the Committee, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(g), why a final order of censure, suspension or disbarment should not be made.
Respondent suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York, effective the date hereof, until such time as disciplinary matters pending before the Committee have been concluded and until further order of this Court.
All concur.