Opinion
No. COA11–968.
2012-05-15
In the Matter of R.V.G., JR.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Eryn E. Linkous, for the State. Peter Wood for juvenile-appellant.
Appeal by juvenile from order entered 24 March 2011 by Judge Louis A. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 April 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Eryn E. Linkous, for the State. Peter Wood for juvenile-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
R.V.G., Jr., a juvenile, appeals from a disposition order committing him to a youth development center in the Department of Juvenile Justice. R.V.G., Jr. contends on appeal that the trial court did not make adequate findings in its disposition order under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2501 (2011). Because we find the trial court adequately considered the mandatory factors and made sufficient findings to support its commitment order, we affirm.
Facts
On 22 October 2009, the juvenile admitted committing the offenses of breaking and entering and possession of stolen property. On 29 October 2009, the trial court imposed a Level 2 disposition and placed the juvenile on nine months of supervised probation. His conditions of probation included not violating laws or parental rules; attending school “each and every day, all classes, not hav [ing] any excused tardies, and not be[ing] suspended or excluded from school”; not using any controlled substances; cooperating with all professionals and treatment plans; complying with a curfew; not associating with victims or co-defendants; and paying restitution.
On 21 July 2010, a court counselor filed a motion for review alleging that the juvenile had violated the conditions of probation by not paying the victim the full restitution ordered by the trial court. The juvenile admitted the violation, and probation was extended by four months to enable the juvenile to complete restitution. The order also specified that probation “may be terminated” once the restitution was paid.
On 23 November 2010, the court counselor filed a second motion for review, alleging that the juvenile continued to violate the conditions of his probation. These violations included excessive absences and tardiness in five classes at school. On 4 January 2011, the juvenile admitted the allegations in the 23 November 2010 motion for review. At that hearing, the trial court specified what the juvenile was required to do in order to avoid being committed to a youth detention center, including attending a substance abuse assessment, cooperation with recommendations resulting from that assessment, attendance at school every day unless excused, obtaining a “C” average in his classes and reports from his teachers regarding his effort, complying with his curfew, and completing his community service. The court's written order specifically stated that “[t]he juvenile has been informed that if he does not complete the conditions of this order, by the next hearing, he will go to Training School.”
A third motion for review was filed on 21 March 2011 for probation violations because the juvenile had been suspended for leaving school without permission twice in March 2011. The trial court later dismissed this motion, as disposition was still pending on the previous motion for review.
On 24 March 2011, the matter came on for disposition. At that time, the trial court found: (1) the juvenile failed to complete substance abuse treatment as ordered by the court; (2) the juvenile had previously violated conditions of his probation and admitted to failing to pay restitution; (3) the juvenile admitted to violating probation by accumulating multiple absences in school; (4) the court counselor reported that the juvenile was failing all of his classes in January and was exhibiting disruptive and disrespectful behavior at home and at school; (5) the juvenile was violating his curfew; (6) the juvenile did not present letters to the court from his teachers regarding his progress; and (7) the juvenile had been suspended twice from school in March. The trial court found further that the juvenile had been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense and imposed a Level 3 dispositional order, committing the juvenile to a youth development center for a minimum term of six months with the maximum commitment extending to his 18th birthday. The juvenile timely appealed to this Court.
Discussion
R.V.G., Jr. contends that the trial court erred when it committed the juvenile to a youth development center “without making the required statutory findings.” Juvenile probation revocation proceedings are dispositional and subject to the statutory requirements for juvenile delinquency dispositions. In re D.J.M., 181 N.C.App. 126, 130–31, 638 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2007). Accordingly, a juvenile dispositional order entered after a probation revocation “shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2512 (2011). If the trial court finds that the juvenile has violated the conditions of his probation, it may enter a new disposition that includes an order of confinement for up to twice the term authorized by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2508 (2011). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2510(e) (2011).
In evaluating the dispositional options outlined in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2508, the trial court must consider:
(1) The seriousness of the offense;
(2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable;
(3) The importance of protecting the public safety;
(4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and
(5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2501(c). “ [T] aken as a whole, the district court's statements and decision [must] demonstrate that it exercised its discretion in accordance with the criteria set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B–2501(c).” In re J. S.W., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 471, 475 (2011) (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court's detailed findings of fact demonstrate that it considered the N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–2501(c) factors. The trial court specifically found that the juvenile was on probation for felony breaking and entering and felony possession of stolen goods, Class H felonies. This finding demonstrates that the trial court considered the seriousness of the offenses. The other findings made by the trial court demonstrate the trial court considered the current need to hold the juvenile accountable and to protect the public. As for the fourth statutory factor, the trial court found that the juvenile had previously admitted violating probation. Finally, the trial court's order specifically stated as to the fifth factor that it had received and considered a predisposition report, a risk assessment, and a needs assessment. The order also reflected the trial court's consideration of the juvenile's history of resisting rehabilitative and treatment efforts and the need to implement a new strategy.
In sum, we hold that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact in its dispositional order to demonstrate that it considered all of the statutory factors, and that it properly exercised its discretion when it entered a Level 3 disposition. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dispositional order.
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).