Opinion
March 31, 1997.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Clarkstown, dated December 23, 1994, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner's application for a sign permit, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Rudolph, J.), dated September 7, 1995, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
Before: Pizzuto, J. P., Altman, McGinity and Luciano, JJ.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
To annul an administrative determination made after a hearing, a court must conclude that the determination is not supported. by substantial evidence on the record when read as a whole ( see, Matter of Lahey v Kelly, 71 NY2d 135; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 231; Matter of Lawrence v Weinstein, 181 AD2d 888; Matter of County of Suffolk v Newman, 173 AD2d 618). A determination is supported by substantial evidence when the record contains evidence consisting of "`such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion of ultimate fact'" ( People ex rel. Vega v Smith, 66 NY2d 130, 139, quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180). Here, the determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals to deny the petitioner's application for a sign permit because the proposed sign was dissimilar in color to other signs in the immediate area of the shopping center was based upon substantial evidence ( see, Matter of Party City v Board of Appeals, 212 AD2d 618).
Moreover, the interpretation of and reliance upon Town of Clarkstown Local Law No. 7-1991 and Clarkstown Town Code § 290-31-B (1) by the Zoning Board of Appeals were neither arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law.
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.