Opinion
24-0143
03-27-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF R.M., Minor Child, J.M., Father, Appellant, A.S., Mother, Appellant.
Paige E. Hillyer, Davenport, for appellant father. G. Brian Weiler, Davenport, for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. Grishma Patel Arumugam, Bettendorf, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Michael Motto, Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child.
Paige E. Hillyer, Davenport, for appellant father.
G. Brian Weiler, Davenport, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Grishma Patel Arumugam, Bettendorf, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
CHICCHELLY, JUDGE.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child, R.M., born in 2022. The mother challenges the statutory grounds for termination, and the father asks us to decline to terminate based on a permissive exception. Upon our de novo review, we affirm termination of each parent's parental rights to R.M.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became involved with R.M. at birth when his umbilical cord tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The mother also tested positive for methamphetamine at the birth and for amphetamine and methamphetamine during multiple prenatal appointments. Both parents provided hair samples for drug testing soon after R.M.'s delivery; the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, and the father tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Because R.M. was born prematurely at thirty-five weeks and had several health complications, he was admitted to the NICU. The juvenile court removed him from the parents' custody, and when he was eventually discharged from the hospital, he was placed with a foster family.
Since the onset of the proceedings, the parents have struggled with substance use and domestic violence. After an argument between the mother and the father, the father "was escorted out of the hospital" and warned he would be "banned from visiting" if the behavior continued. A nurse also reported "that both of the parents seemed like they were under the influence of some drug" while visiting R.M. But neither took accountability for their use. Instead, they blamed the positive results on the mother's prescription medications and her use of Novocain at a dental appointment almost eleven months earlier. The mother later attributed the results to her thyroid issues and her previous substance use over the course of twenty years, claiming the "methamphetamine is still working out of her system" despite allegedly maintaining two years of sobriety. The father similarly explained his results by his handling of the mother's medications without gloves. The juvenile court adjudicated R.M. as a child in need of assistance, finding the parents' claims "not realistic." The court found it "inconceivable that [the father] could test positive after touching a substance while [the mother] would test negative after ingesting it." It also noted that "[the father's] positive methamphetamine test was 2.6 times higher than [the mother's] positive methamphetamine test, another anomaly if [the father] is merely touching the substance while [the mother] is actually ingesting it."
The parents continued to deny using illegal substances, coming up with more elaborate excuses such as the mother's father "spiking" food or drinks without their knowledge. HHS made numerous requests to the parents to appear for random drug testing, but they did not comply. The mother missed fifteen drug tests, and the father missed thirteen. When they did show up for testing, both continued to test positive despite their claims they were not using any substances. They also failed to appear for substance-use evaluations, and when they were recommended treatment, both parents were ultimately discharged for nonattendance.
Regarding mental-health services, the parents were similarly noncompliant. The mother missed several mental-health evaluations and did not engage in recommended treatment. She had "aggressive anger outbursts" and several diagnoses but did not attend therapy or consistently take prescribed medications. The father similarly failed to appear for two evaluations before the provider refused to schedule him and asked him to go to another location. The father never scheduled another evaluation and hasn't engaged in treatment. HHS testified that the father's "mental health concern also go[es] hand-in-hand with the domestic violence concern." But the father has similarly never completed domestic-violence classes.
From R.M.'s birth, it was clear he had "high medical needs" requiring specialized care and numerous weekly appointments. But the parents consistently struggled to meet these needs. Despite being offered the chance to go to R.M.'s medical appointments, the parents seldom attended. Sometimes they canceled as little as one hour before appointments, claiming they missed the bus or overslept. Because R.M. could not afford to miss these appointments, the foster parents had to rearrange their obligations to attend at a moment's notice. Even when the parents did attend, "[t]here have been instances when parents have fallen asleep or have behaved inappropriately during medical appointments." At one such visit, both parents "appeared to be under the influence," bickering with each other and disrespecting R.M.'s healthcare provider. After R.M. was referred to a specialist neurologist, no one was able to reach the parents to sign the required medical release despite several attempts. In order to meet R.M.'s medical needs, the foster parents were granted limited guardianship of R.M.
HHS had similar concerns about the parents' visitation with R.M. The parents generally participated in supervised visits regularly, but both required substantial direction in caring for R.M. During one supervised visit at the local library, the mother "became very upset and had been yelling and cussing." She had to be reminded "that she [was] in a public area with children and needed to be able to control herself or [she] would have to leave." Another time, the parents forgot R.M.'s diaper bag, and when they were told it was required in order to continue the visit, the mother "got upset and said how she was going to hurt someone if they don't get the diaper bag." There was yet another occasion where the mother arrived at a supervised visit with "lots of involuntary head nodding and movement of her lips" and dilated eyes. When asked about her behavior, the mother admitted to substance use the night before and again in the morning before the visit, "but just weed." The father also admitted to marijuana use "for migraines." When the parents made it through a visit without these kinds of incidents, the parents still struggled "sometimes on feeding, sometimes holding him appropriately," and understanding R.M.'s complex medical needs.
At other times, the parents were less consistent with visits. This was especially the case when the parents were having conflicts with each other. The father often failed to confirm with the provider, resulting in canceled visits, or sometimes did not show up altogether. Also, his "behavior chang[ed] in regard to him instructing and criticizing [the mother] throughout the entirety of visits." After the mother came to a visit with facial bruising, HHS offered her domestic-violence services, but she declined. But the parents continued to argue constantly. The two "have been in several altercations" and "[the mother] has been hurt with broken bones." But "[the mother] continues to deny any violence or abuse of any kind between [the father] and herself." In April 2023, the father was arrested for domestic violence against the mother. In mid-May, the mother was arrested for domestic violence against the father. By the end of May, the father was arrested again for domestic violence against the mother. The parents then split and "accused each other of using illegal substances" to HHS during their separate visits with R.M.
The State petitioned for termination in September 2023. By the time of the termination, the parents had reconciled and graduated to joint supervised visitations again but had not addressed HHS's other concerns. The two were living together out of a motel, and their only income was the mother's social security payments. After the termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights to both parents, and they separately appeal.
II. Review.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Though not binding, we give weight to the court's fact findings, especially those regarding witness credibility. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492.
III. Statutory Grounds for Termination.
Termination-of-parental-rights proceedings involves a "three-step analysis," where we determine whether statutory grounds for termination have been met, if the best interests of the child support termination, and whether we should exercise permissive exceptions to termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). Only the mother contests the statutory grounds for termination, and neither parent challenges the finding that termination is in R.M.'s best interests. The father asks us to consider exercising a permissive exception to termination. We therefore limit our analysis to the contested steps. See In re J.F., No. 19-1647, 2020 WL 110404, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) ("But when, as here, the parent's claims only relate to one step in our analysis, we only address that step.").
A. Statutory Grounds for Termination.
The juvenile court terminated the parents' parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h). We may affirm termination on any one statutory ground when the juvenile court finds multiple grounds are satisfied. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We therefore choose to focus on section 232.116(1)(h).
The court may terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) if it finds all of the following:
1. The child is three years of age or younger.
2. The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
3. The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
4. There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.
The mother only challenges the fourth element of the paragraph: whether the child could be returned to the parent's custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4); see also In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (interpreting "at the present time" to be the time of the termination hearing).
Clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that R.M. could not be returned to the mother's care at the time of termination. R.M. was removed based on the dangers posed by the parents' substance use. The mother neither complied with HHS services-missing several drug tests and substance-abuse evaluations-nor completed recommended treatment. She similarly failed to comply with mental-health services or treatment despite having several diagnoses and engaging in "aggressive anger outbursts." HHS also offered domestic-violence advocacy services, but the mother denies any abuse despite substantial evidence of arguments, injuries, and arrests. Both parents also have unresolved criminal charges that may impact the child's care. The concerns that led to the adjudication ultimately still exist. In fact, they have largely been left untouched because the mother has not admitted that there are problems that need to be addressed. The mother still claims her substance use was never proven and would not prevent her from caring for the child. We disagree.
First, we give deference to the juvenile court's finding that the parents' implausible explanations for the positive drug test results were not credible. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). Even upon our own de novo review, the record is filled with evidence of the parents' chronic substance use and their failure to maintain sobriety. Second, we have previously held that unresolved addiction impairs a parent's ability to care for their child. See State v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Iowa 2005) ("No parent should leave . . . small children in the care of a meth addict-the hazards are too great."); A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776 (recognizing "that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a parent unfit to raise children"). Furthermore, R.M. has complex medical needs that the mother cannot meet. Over the proceedings, R.M. has had countless medical appointments, but the mother rarely attended. The foster parents have gone above and beyond to rearrange their work schedules last minute for R.M. when the mother canceled. When the parents did make it to appointments, they argued, "[told] the physical therapist how to do her job," and "were not receptive" to guidance. Because R.M. is developmentally delayed, he has special feeding and holding instructions, but the parents struggled to follow these at visits and required substantial direction. Despite the opportunity to learn how to care for R.M.'s unique needs, the parents have not demonstrated a willingness to learn or provide such care. See In re A.D., No. 19-1418, 2019 WL 5792709, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019) (affirming termination when "[the parents] have yet to exhibit a full understanding of [the child's] medical needs or any ability to address those medical needs"). We are therefore not convinced that R.M. could be returned to the mother's care and have his needs appropriately met.
B. Permissive Exception.
The father next argues we should decline to terminate because of the parent-child bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (providing a discretionary exception when "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parentchild relationship"). "[O]ur consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination." In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). But we do not find that R.M. would be disadvantaged. The father has not addressed the concerns that initiated termination. He has never completed a substanceabuse or mental-health evaluation and successfully participated in the recommended treatment. He has pending criminal charges and has not completed domestic-violence programming. Nor has the father graduated to unsupervised visits, which prevents him from providing care for R.M. See In re C.N., No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020) ("Without this necessary progression, we cannot say the children could have returned to the [parent's] care."). Despite the father's love for his child, "the bond is not so strong that it clearly outweighs [R.M.'s] need for permanency." In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021). "The child has a foster care placement capable of meeting complex medical needs and willing to adopt." In re N.H., No. 12-1737, 2012 WL 6187686, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2012) (finding the placement's ability to meet the child's needs weighs in favor of termination). Further, "[R.M.] has strong bonds with foster parents and their children" and "brightens up with a smile" when they arrive. Since he was removed at birth, "[R.M.] has only observed this family as his family" and is especially bonded to his foster sister, who is closest in age. We therefore decline to exercise a permissive exception based on a parent-child bond.
IV. Disposition.
Having found the statutory grounds satisfied and because we decline to exercise a permissive exception, we affirm termination of the mother's and father's parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.