Opinion
04-21-00246-CV
12-08-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.R., a Child
From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020PA00605 Honorable Peter Sakai, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice.
AFFIRMED
Anna appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to R.J.R. She argues the order is void because the trial court rendered it after losing jurisdiction. We affirm.
To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to appellant by her first name and to the child by her initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
Background
The Department of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition on March 17, 2020. In the petition, the Department sought to be appointed as R.J.R.'s temporary managing conservator and to terminate Anna's parental rights.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on April 9 and 26, 2021. The evidence at trial consisted of testimony from four witnesses. After trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence the grounds set forth in Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O) &(P). The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Anna's parental rights was in R.J.R.'s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2). Based on its findings, the court terminated Anna's relationship with R.J.R. and appointed the Department permanent managing conservator of R.J.R.
Anna timely appealed the trial court's order, challenging only the trial court's jurisdiction to render the final order.
Standard of Review
We review challenges to the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
Jurisdiction to Render an Order of Termination
Anna argues the trial court lost jurisdiction to render an order of termination because it failed to commence trial before the automatic dismissal date. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a). She contends this failure renders the termination order void. We disagree.
Texas Family Code section 263.401(a) provides:
Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator, the court's jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parentchild relationship filed by the department that requests termination of the parentchild relationship or requests that the department be named conservator of the child is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order....Id. (emphasis added).
The parties agree the original automatic dismissal date was March 22, 2021. The trial court did not commence trial until April 9, 2021. Because April 9 falls after March 22, the trial court retained jurisdiction to render a final order only if it granted an extension under subsection (b). In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tex. 2021) (citing Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Tex. 1973)).
A trial court may also grant an extension under subsection (b-1) of section § 263.401. However, subsection (b-1)- addressing the court's powers after granting a new trial or mistrial-is not applicable.
In order to grant a subsection (b) extension, the trial court must: find[] that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child. If the court makes those findings, the court may retain the suit on the court's docket for a period not to exceed 180 days after the time described by Subsection (a). If the court retains the suit on the court's docket, the court shall render an order in which the court:
(1) schedules the new date on which the suit will be automatically dismissed if the trial on the merits has not commenced, which date must be not later than the 180th day after the time described by Subsection (a);
(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the child as necessary to avoid further delay in resolving the suit; and
(3) sets the trial on the merits on a date not later than the date specified under Subdivision (1).TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(b). To summarize, the court may grant an extension if it makes two findings: Extraordinary circumstances necessitate continuing the department's temporary managing conservatorship, and it is in the child's best interest. If it makes those findings, the court must render orders scheduling a new automatic dismissal date and setting a new trial date. These orders may be rendered orally in the presence of a court reporter or in writing. TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.026; G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 297-98.
The court may also issue any necessary temporary orders.
Here, the trial court issued a written order on January 5, 2021. The order contained two important dates: It scheduled the trial to commence on February 22, 2021, and it identified the automatic dismissal date as March 22, 2021. On February 22, the court reset the case for a hearing on a non-jury trial on the merits on March 16, 2021. At the March 16, 2021 hearing, the court orally rendered an order resetting trial for April 9, 2021. This order was later memorialized in writing in a new scheduling order, which was signed by all parties.
By contrast, the trial court did not issue a written order extending the automatic dismissal date. However, the Texas Family Code permits the court to render the order orally, and the court may have orally extended the automatic dismissal date during the March 16 hearing. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.026. Anna bore the burden of showing that did not occur. See G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 300 (parents bore burden to bring forth record on appeal "to demonstrate the absence of evidence" of findings). A record of the March 16, 2021 hearing has not been filed in this appeal. Anna did not move to dismiss after the March 22 dismissal date or otherwise assert the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. The record contains no evidence to support her argument that the trial court did not extend the dismissal date. Because Anna has not met her burden, it is reasonable to conclude the court extended the automatic dismissal date during the March 16 hearing. See id. at 298 (concluding only reasonable interpretation of docket entry regarding hearing was trial court extended automatic dismissal date); see also In re P.Z.F., No. 05-21-00161-CV, 2021 WL 3941667, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 2, 2021, pet. filed) ("Based on G.X.H., we imply the section 263.401(a) findings were made on the record at the oral hearing").
At the beginning of trial on April 9, Anna announced she was not ready to proceed. Because Anna was not ready, the trial court briefly commenced trial with the direct examination of one witness; it then adjourned to April 26.
Because we conclude the trial court extended the automatic dismissal date, the court retained jurisdiction to render an order of termination.
Anna also argues the trial court failed to make the section 263.401(b) findings. Because nothing in the record shows Anna raised this issue before the trial court, it is not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 301 (concluding trial court's failure to timely extend automatic dismissal date is jurisdictional and other complaints regarding compliance with 263.401(b) must be preserved for appellate review). Even if this issue were preserved, such findings may be implied in support of the March 16, 2021 order. See G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 299 (citing Shields Ltd. P'ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)).
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's order.