Opinion
Case No. 19-10052
07-29-2019
In Re RODNEY THOMAS RIDDLE Debtor(s)
Chapter 7
DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEBTOR'S AMENDED MOTION FOR CONTEMPT [Docket Number 51]
[This opinion is not intended for publication or citation.]
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334, and the standing General Order of Reference in this District.
These matters are before this Court on Debtor Rodney Thomas Riddle ("Mr. Riddle")'s Amended Motion for Contempt ("Motion") [Docket Number 51]; the Response filed by Magistrate Janet Kleckner ("Magistrate Kleckner") [Docket Number 56]; the Response filed by the Summit County Ohio Child Support Collection Agency ("CSEA") [Docket Number 57]; and the Response filed by the Honorable John Quinn, Summit County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division ("Judge Quinn") [Docket Number 59]. The Debtor did not file a reply.
Judge Quinn's response incorporates an earlier response at Docket Number 50 filed by Judge Quinn in opposition to the Debtor's original motion for contempt.
Prior to his bankruptcy filing, Mr. Riddle was a party to divorce proceedings in front of Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner of the Summit County Domestic Relations Court. The divorce decree was entered on December 14, 2018 and included child support obligations effective as of June 14, 2018. Mr. Riddle filed his bankruptcy petition soon after on January 8, 2019.
In his Motion, Mr. Riddle asserts that Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner willfully violated the automatic stay by holding a hearing and denying a motion for a stay of execution of the divorce decree that Mr. Riddle filed to halt enforcement of the divorce decree while his bankruptcy case was pending. Mr. Riddle further asserts that CSEA willfully violated the automatic stay when, after the bankruptcy filing, it suspended his driver's license for back child support owed.
Following a hearing on a separate matter, specifically, motions to dismiss filed by the Chapter 7 Trustee and United States Trustee, this Court entered a decision and order dismissing Mr. Riddle's bankruptcy case with a three (3) year bar to re-filing [Docket Numbers 60 and 61]. The automatic stay is no longer in effect upon the dismissal of Mr. Riddle's case. Accordingly, issues raised regarding whether state court domestic relations matters and enforcement of the divorce decree may proceed are moot. All that remains with respect to Mr. Riddle's Motion is his request for actual and punitive damages for alleged willful violations of the automatic stay committed by the state court judge, magistrate, and CSEA.
For the reasons that follow, Mr. Riddle's Motion is denied.
A. CSEA's Act to Suspend Mr. Riddle's Driver's License Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay
The filing of a bankruptcy petition "operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor . . . or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide a breathing spell to a debtor by stopping collection efforts and harassment. Wohleber v. Skurko (In re Wohleber), 596 B.R. 554, 567 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2019). In addition, the stay helps to preserve what remains of a debtor's estate providing a systematic and equitable liquidation procedure for all creditors. Id. The scope of the stay is broad and encompasses almost any type of formal or informal action taken against the debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate. In re Montoya, 547 B.R. 439, 444 (Bankr. N.M. 2016) (further citation omitted); Dorsey v. Prokos Check Cashing (In re Dorsey), 373 B.R. 528, 529 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
However, "[l]ike all general rules, there are exceptions" such that the protections of the automatic stay do not apply to all actions or judicial actions against a debtor. Wohleber, 596 B.R. at 567. Both statutory and non-statutory exceptions exist. Id. (citing Dominic's Restaurant of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, 683 F.3d 757, 760 (6th Cir. 2012)).
With respect to Mr. Riddle's Motion, relevant exceptions to the automatic stay are found in Section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, Sections 362(b)(2)(A), (B) and (C) provide that a bankruptcy filing does not operate as a stay against either the establishment or modification of a domestic support obligation ("DSO") or certain types of DSO collection efforts. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A), (B) and (C). Also excepted from the automatic stay are acts to withhold, suspend, or restrict a driver's license under Section 466(a)(16) of the Social Security Act, which provides states with authority to restrict a driver's license of an individual owing overdue child support. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(D) and 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16). See also In re Penaran, 424 B.R. 868, 881 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2010) (noting that Bankruptcy Code Section 362(b)(2)(D) allows state agencies to suspend a driver's license for a debtor's unpaid DSO without violating the stay).
In this case, Mr. Riddle asserts that CSEA violated the automatic stay by suspending his driver's license as part of its collection efforts of overdue child support. Because CSEA's action in suspending his driver's license is one specifically excepted from the protections of the automatic stay, Mr. Riddle's Motion is denied with respect to CSEA.
B. Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner Have Immunity From Suit
Next, Mr. Riddle asserts that Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner violated the automatic stay by holding a hearing and denying a post-petition motion for stay of execution of the divorce decree that Mr. Riddle filed in the divorce proceedings. Mr. Riddle requests damages for what he alleges is a willful violation on their part.
Damages are available to a debtor for a willful violation of the stay pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 362(k). However, Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner argue that, regardless of whether damages could be demonstrated, damages that they assert were not specified in Mr. Riddle's Motion, they would have absolute immunity from such a claim.
Bankruptcy Code Section 362(k)(1) provides that "an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages." 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). In order to recover under this statute, an individual must establish three elements: (1) that a violation of the automatic stay occurred; (2) that the violation was committed willfully; and (3) that the violation injured the individual seeking damages. Barclay v. Reimer & Lorber Co. LPA (In re Barclay), 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 110, at *12-13, 2006 WL 238139, at *5 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2006).
"It is a well-entrenched principle in our system of jurisprudence that judges are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for money damages." Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991)). See also In re Jocelyn, 574 B.R. 771, 772 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2017) (noting that absolute immunity from suit applies to a state court judge against whom a motion for contempt for violating the automatic stay is filed). This immunity extends to magistrates. Bond v. Cook, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18786, at *2-3, 1989 WL 149396, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 1989); Hercutt v. Cross, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113401, at *5 n.5, 2013 WL 4052889, at *2 n. 5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2013). "Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, 'it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'" Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10 (further citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that such immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. Id. at 11. "First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Id. "Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 12.
In this case, Mr. Riddle does not challenge Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner's jurisdiction and authority over the divorce proceedings and actions taken therein. Furthermore, there is no question that the judge's denial of Mr. Riddle motion filed in the divorce proceeding to stay execution of the divorce decree, was a judicial action taken within the judge's judicial capacity.
Mr. Riddle fails to set forth circumstances that would overcome Judge Quinn and Magistrate Kleckner's immunity from a suit for damages. Accordingly, Mr. Riddle's Motion is denied with respect to these judicial officers.
The remainder of Mr. Riddle's Motion challenges the state court's determinations in the divorce decree entered prior to Mr. Riddle's bankruptcy filing. Any such challenges must be addressed in an appeal to the appropriate state appellate court rather than this bankruptcy court. --------
In conclusion, Mr. Riddle's Amended Motion for Contempt [Docket Number 51] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the South ern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ _________
Beth A. Buchanan
United States Bankruptcy Judge Dated: July 29, 2019 Distribution list:
Default List Plus
Lisa M. Zaring, Esq.
Raymond Hartsough, Esq.