Opinion
NO. COA12-376
10-16-2012
IN THE MATTER OF LORENZO RICHARDSON
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General M. Elizabeth Guzman, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for respondent-appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Granville County
No. 11 SPC 3017
Respondent appeals from order entered 18 August 2011 by Judge S. Quon Bridges in Granville County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 September 2012.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
M. Elizabeth Guzman, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender David W. Andrews, for respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Lorenzo Richardson ("respondent") appeals from the trial court's order of involuntary commitment and argues that the order lacks sufficient findings of fact to support the trial court's conclusion that he was a danger to himself and to others. After careful review, we reverse the trial court's order.
Background
On 21 July 2011, Dr. Manijeh Boustani signed a petition for respondent's involuntary commitment alleging he was mentally ill and a danger to himself and others. On the same day, a Wake County magistrate issued an order for respondent's temporary commitment, examination, and treatment pending a district court hearing. Respondent was taken into custody at Central Regional Hospital on 23 July 2011. On 28 July 2011, following a commitment hearing before Judge J. Henry Banks in Granville County District Court, respondent was committed to an inpatient facility for a period not to exceed 21 days followed by outpatient treatment not to exceed 69 days. Defendant appealed from the 28 July 2011 commitment order in a separate appeal that was the subject of In re Richardson, ____ N.C. App. ____, 729 S.E.2d 128 (No. COA12-119) (July 17, 2012) (unpublished) (reversing commitment order for insufficient findings of fact). On 18 August 2011, a hearing was held before Judge S. Quon Bridges as to whether respondent's commitment should be continued. The trial court's order provides that the court found the following facts by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:
Respondent contests commitment. The court finds the following findings and including oral facts that are incorporated by reference:These findings of fact also appear in the transcript with immaterial variations in the wording. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that respondent was mentally ill, was a danger to himself, and was a danger to others. The trial court ordered respondent committed to an inpatient treatment facility for up to 14 days. Respondent appeals.
1. Physician diagnosed with schizophrenia with chronic paranoid type, having degressed [sic] over last weeks.
2. He was a college student but now lives in his car.
3. Respondent keeps to himself, but watches television.
4. He has indicated that he is not mentally ill or had need for medications.
5. He is currently taking Rispiridol, which has tapered up to 6mg.
6. Respondent refuses to swith [sic] medication and physician feels he would become non-compliant with meds.
7. He had incident with law enforcement resulting in being pepper sprayed and placed in a choke hold.
Discussion
Respondent argues the trial court erred by failing to make sufficient findings of fact to support its ultimate conclusion that he was a danger to himself and a danger to others. We agree.
In our review of a commitment order, we must determine "whether there was any competent evidence to support the 'facts' recorded in the commitment order and whether the trial court's ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerous[ness] to self or others were supported by the 'facts' recorded in the order." In re Booker, 193 N.C. App. 433, 436, 667 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2008) (quoting In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980)) (quotation marks omitted). "To support an inpatient commitment order, the [trial] court shall find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self . . . or dangerous to others . . . . The court shall record the facts that support its findings." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j) (2011). "The direction to the court to record the facts which support its findings is mandatory." In re Koyi, 34 N.C. App. 320, 321, 238 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1977).
A. Dangerous to Himself
Our General Statutes provide that "dangerous to himself" for an involuntary commitment proceeding means that, in the relevant past, the individual has shown that he would be unable, without assistance and supervision, "to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)-(a)(1)(I) (2011). Furthermore, there must be showing of a "reasonable probability" that the individual will suffer serious debilitation in the near future absent treatment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)(1)(II). Alternatively, the individual's dangerousness to himself may be established by showing the individual has, in the relevant past: attempted suicide or threatened suicide and that there is a "reasonable probability" of suicide absent treatment; or mutilated himself or attempted to do so and that there is a "reasonable probability" he will do so absent treatment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a)(2), (3).
Here, the findings of fact provided in the written order and in the transcript do not support the trial court's conclusion that respondent was a danger to himself. The first finding establishes that respondent has been diagnosed with a mental disorder that has digressed in the weeks prior to the hearing. Yet, the fifth and sixth findings establish that defendant was taking his prescribed medication and did not want to change it. That respondent lived in his car, watched television, kept to himself, did not think he was mentally ill, and had an "incident with law enforcement" wherein he was restrained and pepper sprayed does not demonstrate a reasonable probability of the harm required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(a): that respondent was unable or unwilling to care for himself, or that there was a reasonable probability the he would suffer debilitation, attempt suicide, or mutilate himself absent involuntary commitment. In sum, these findings do not support the trial court's conclusion that respondent was a danger to himself.
B. Dangerous to Others
Our General Statutes provide that "dangerous to others" for an involuntary commitment proceeding means that the individual has, within the relevant past,
inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-3(11)(b).
The trial court's findings fail to establish that respondent has inflicted, attempted to inflict, threatened to inflict, or created a risk of serious bodily harm to another or extreme destruction of property. Not even the trial court's finding that respondent was involved in an incident with law enforcement established that respondent destroyed property, harmed himself, or threated to or attempted to harm anyone else. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding defendant was a danger to others.
Conclusion
Because the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that respondent was a danger to himself or to others, the trial court's order must be reversed. Booker, 193 N.C. App. at 437, 667 S.E.2d at 305.
REVERSED.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).