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In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin
Jun 19, 2024
No. 03-24-00230-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 19, 2024)

Opinion

03-24-00230-CV

06-19-2024

In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC


ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Relator Recess Arcade Bar, LLC has filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its plea to the jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction. See In re Texas Mut. Ins., 360 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, orig. proceeding) (explaining that mandamus review is available to remedy trial court's erroneous denial of plea to the jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in dispute that implicates exclusive jurisdiction).

Recess Arcade Bar filed its plea to the jurisdiction in response to a personal-injury suit brought by a former employee, real party in interest Alicia Peterson. In its plea, and now in this original proceeding, Recess Arcade Bar points out that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act vests the Texas Department of Insurance-Division of Workers' Compensation (at the Texas Department of Insurance) with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ultimate question of whether a claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, id. at 593-94 (citing American Motorist Ins. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex. 2001)), and argues that because Peterson never pursued her claim with the Division, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, see Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002) ("Typically, if an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency's action.").

Based on the record before us, we disagree that Peterson's personal-injury claim falls within the scope of the Division's exclusive jurisdiction. Whether a claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division "depends on whether the claim is based on claimant's entitlement to [workers' compensation] benefits." See Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314, 320 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2018, pet. denied) (quoting Bestor v. Service Lloyds Ins., 276 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.)). The merits of Peterson's personal-injury claim do not turn on whether she is eligible for workers' compensation benefits. See Medrano v Kerry Ingredients & Flavours, Inc., No. 02-20-00247-CV, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 2727, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, April 8, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that although plaintiff's personal-injury suit "touches on many of the same questions that would be posed in a Division proceeding to determine whether a claimant was entitled to compensation, [] the merits of his suit do not hinge on whether he is ultimately eligible for workers' compensation benefits"). That is, "[t]here is no aspect of the personal injury suit that requires [Peterson] to ultimately be eligible for workers' compensation benefits." See Berry Contracting, 549 S.W.3d at 321.

Moreover, Recess Arcade Bar's primary argument-that the evidence establishes that an active worker's compensation policy was in place at the time of the incident and that Peterson was acting in the course and scope of her employment-conflates the exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine with the Texas Labor Code's exclusive-remedy provision. Under the exclusive-remedy provision, recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance coverage against the employer for a work-related injury sustained by the employee. See Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a); Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 241 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. 2007). The exclusive-remedy provision, however, is an affirmative defense that is properly raised in a motion for summary judgment or resolved on the merits at trial. Olivares v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., No. 05-22-00057-CV, 2023 Tex.App. LEXIS 1649, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Medrano, 2021 Tex.App. LEXIS 2727, at *6; Robles v. Mount Franklin Food, L.L.C., 591 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2019, pet. denied); Berry Contracting, 549 S.W.3d at 321. Consequently, Recess Arcade Bar's assertion of the exclusive-remedy provision, even if supported by evidence, does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Peterson's claim. See AMS Constr. Co. v. K.H.K. Scaffolding Houston, Inc., 357 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism'd) ("The district courts decide disputes about whether the Act's exclusive remedy provision applies as a defense to an injured worker's personal injury suit.").

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Recess Arcade Bar's jurisdictional challenge, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied.


Summaries of

In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin
Jun 19, 2024
No. 03-24-00230-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 19, 2024)
Case details for

In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC

Case Details

Full title:In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

Date published: Jun 19, 2024

Citations

No. 03-24-00230-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 19, 2024)