Opinion
No. 10-17-00241-CV
12-13-2017
IN RE ROYE RAY PAYNE
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this original proceeding, we are asked to determine whether the respondent, the Honorable David L. Hodges, sitting by assignment in the 220th Judicial District Court, abused his discretion by holding relator, Roye Ray Payne, in contempt for purportedly violating a 2010 permanent injunction by placing a locked gate across a roadway. Because we conclude that the challenged conduct is outside the scope of the 2010 permanent injunction, we conclude that the respondent abused his discretion by holding Payne in contempt. We therefore conditionally grant Payne's petition for writ of mandamus.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is "no adequate remedy by appeal." In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (citations omitted). "A trial court has no 'discretion' in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts." Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). "Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. (citations omitted). In addition, a trial court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id. at 839. Regarding the resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court's discretion, relator must establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Id. at 839-40. We cannot disturb the trial court's decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable, even if we would have decided the issue differently. Id. at 840.
With respect to the "adequate remedy by appeal" prong, the Texas Supreme Court has noted that the operative word, "adequate," does not have a comprehensive definition. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. "Instead, it is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. In re Reynolds, 369 S.W.3d 638, 646 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2012, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136). "These considerations include both public and private interests, and the determination is practical and prudential rather than abstract or formulaic." Id. (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136). Therefore, an appellate remedy may be inadequate when the benefits to mandamus review outweigh the detriments. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 462, 468-69 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). "Mandamus will not issue when the law provides another, plain, adequate, and complete remedy." In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2006).
II. ANALYSIS
In 2010, plaintiffs Robert and Lisa Doty obtained declaratory and injunctive relief establishing the existence of and prohibiting the interference with a public roadway along the adjoining boundaries of three tracts—the George Bond A-102, Gertrudis Cherino A-119, and W.D. Lacy A-1221 surveys. Specifically, the trial court's judgment stated that:
Real parties in interest, Barbara Ann Kinder Holt and Darren Chadwick Holt, are the successors-in-interest in the property previously owned by the Dotys. The Holts alleged in the trial court that Payne's act of placing a locked gate across the roadway prevents them from accessing their property when access to their property from the north is impeded due to flooding.
A public roadway exists in Bosque County, Texas along the course of CR 3237 and lying along the adjoining boundaries of the George Bond A-102, Gertrudis Cherino A-119, and W.D. Lacy A-1221 surveys, to the southern property line of the Plaintiffs' property (Robert Frank Doty, Tract 2) all as shown in the highlighted portion of the survey plat which is attached to this judgment as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.Exhibit A of the 2010 judgment indicated that the portion of the roadway in question formed an "L." In any event, Payne was permanently enjoined from "blocking, obstructing, closing, damaging, or in any manner interfering with the use of that public roadway." Payne appealed, and the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that the "L"-shaped portion of the road is a public roadway. See, e.g., Payne v. Doty, No. 11-10-00181-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9929 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 15, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("(the 'L' is the portion of the road at issue in this case) . . . . After reviewing all of the evidence in this case, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the road at issue was a public road. From the evidence presented, the trial court could have determined that the road had become public either by its long-continued use and adoption as a road by the county commissioners or by an implied dedication.").
In its 2010 findings of fact, the trial court explained that the road at issue was a part of the old "Clifton to Towash Road" that "has been open to the public for over a century and was used for all manner of public and private access to the Dotys' property and beyond." The trial court also noted that the old "Clifton to Towash Road" ran from Highway 22 "along the northern boundary of the W.D. Lacy Survey" and then followed an L-shaped path "from its intersection with the north line of the W.D. Lacy Survey A1221 to the east line of the George Bond SurveyA-102 and up to the Dotys' southern/eastern property line."
Later, on May 1, 2017, the Holts filed a motion for contempt, alleging that Payne violated the 2010 permanent injunction by "blocking the use of the public road, County Road 3237, by placing a gate across such public road." Payne denied the Holts' allegations.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Holts' motion for contempt, and at the conclusion of the hearing, concluded that Payne violated the 2010 permanent injunction by "blocking the use of the public road, County Road 3237, by placing a gate across such public road and affixing a lock on the gate." Accordingly, the trial court held Payne in contempt and ordered him to remove the lock on the gate and pay the Holts $4,500 in attorney's fees. The trial court also determined:
The Court further finds that the portion of County Road 3237 which extends from the gate installed by Payne to the L-shaped portion of the public road highlighted on the attachment to the original Judgment entered herein on May 3rd 2010, and designated in the survey as no longer being maintained by the county, is third a [sic] class road, and as such, Payne will not be ordered to remove the gate installed.The trial court subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Payne filed this petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court's contempt order. We requested a response, and real parties in interest have filed a response in this matter.
Based on our review of the mandamus record, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in holding Payne in contempt. This is because the gate and lock at issue in this matter is not located within the "L" portion of the roadway, which was the subject of the 2010 litigation. See Payne, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9929, at **4-6. Rather, the gate and lock at issue here is located on a portion of a roadway that runs north and south and is south of the "L." In fact, the portion of the roadway where the disputed gate and lock is located does not touch the Gertrudis Cherino Survey A-119 or the George Bond Survey A-102 at all. It is located solely within the W.D. Lacy Survey A-1221. Accordingly, we conclude that the disputed gate and lock are located on a portion of the roadway that is outside the scope of the 2010 judgment and, thus, cannot serve as the basis for the contempt order. See In re Office of the Attorney Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 628 (Tex. 2013) ("A contempt order is void if it is beyond the power of the court or violates due process. If the trial court's contempt order in this case is not void, there was no abuse of discretion." (internal citations omitted)); Tex. Animal Health Comm'n v. Nunley, 647 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. 1983) ("[T]he trial court's judgment went beyond a contempt order by granting injunctive relief not requested by the pleadings or stipulated evidence of the parties. The trial court was without authority to grant such relief." (citing Oil Field Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 381 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. 1964)); see also In re Rodman Excavation, Inc., No. 04-07-00317-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5154, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 3, 2007, orig. proceeding) ("Additionally, a contempt order is void when it purports to punish the contemnor for conduct that is beyond the scope of the trial court's prior order or decree.").
By use of the term "roadway," we do not determine or imply that it is a public roadway at the point where Payne constructed a gate. We use the term solely as a generic reference.
With regard to the second prong for mandamus relief, we note that mandamus is the proper mechanism to review a contempt order that does not impose incarceration as a punishment. See In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) ("Contempt orders that do not involve confinement cannot be reviewed by writ of habeas corpus, and the only possible relief is a writ of mandamus."); see also In re Rodman Excavation, Inc., 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5154, at *3. Given that the trial court's contempt order does not impose incarceration as a punishment, we conclude that Payne has satisfied the second prong for mandamus relief.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in holding Payne in contempt based on conduct that was outside the scope of the 2010 permanent injunction and that the contempt order at issue is only reviewable by a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Payne's petition for writ of mandamus. We are confident respondent will comply, and the writ will issue only if respondent fails to do so.
We recognize that the Holts have raised a "Cross Point" in their response to Payne's mandamus petition. However, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.4(d) provides that the arguments in a party's response to a petition for writ of mandamus "must be confined to the issues or points presented in the petition." TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4(d). Accordingly, we will not consider "cross issues" raised by the Holts in their response to Payne's petition for writ of mandamus. See id.; see also In re Fackrell, No. 12-10-00086-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6623, at **23-24 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 17, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (referencing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.4(d) while mentioning a cross issue in a response to a petition for writ of mandamus and noting that "if Gerald III believes that he is entitled to mandamus relief, he does not need leave to file a cross mandamus petition but may simply file his own mandamus petition"); In re Arbor Holding Co., No. 01-01-00857-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 4953, at **10-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 11, 2002, orig. proceeding) (refusing to consider a "cross-issue" raised in a response to a petition for writ of mandamus).
AL SCOGGINS
Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins
Conditionally granted
Opinion delivered and filed December 13, 2017
[OT06]