Opinion
2 CA-JV 2024-0039
07-22-2024
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to Z.C.,
Lorenzo C., San Jose, California In Propria Persona Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. JD20210414 The Honorable Joan Wagener, Judge
Lorenzo C., San Jose, California In Propria Persona
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Dawn R. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Staring and Presiding Judge Gard concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ECKERSTOM, JUDGE
¶1 Lorenzo C. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Z.C., born July 2021, on the grounds of chronic substance abuse and time in court-ordered, out-of-home care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (B)(8)(c). We affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the order. See Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21 (App. 2005). The Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed Z.C. from her parents' care in July 2021, due to her mother's positive drug test before her birth. Z.C. was adjudicated dependent as to Lorenzo in August 2021, after he pled no contest to the allegations in DCS's dependency petition. Lorenzo did not engage in services or visit Z.C. during the next three months, at which time he and Z.C.'s mother moved to California. While in California, Lorenzo participated in a substance-abuse treatment program, but it did not include drug testing. DCS provided information about drug testing facilities. Lorenzo, however, did not participate because he was unwilling to make the required drive. Even when DCS located a nearby facility, Lorenzo nonetheless declined to provide a hair sample and did not participate in a urine test until months later. He completed two online one-hour parenting classes but resisted participating in a hands-on course because he had completed the online course. He sporadically attended video visits with Z.C. but attended no visits between January 2023 and May 2023. He stopped participating in drug testing in January 2023.
¶3 In March 2023, DCS moved to terminate Lorenzo's parental rights on neglect, substance-abuse, and time-in-care grounds. After a contested termination hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS's motion.Although the court determined termination was not warranted due to neglect, it concluded DCS had met its burden of showing termination was warranted based on Lorenzo's chronic substance abuse and Z.C. having been in court-ordered, out-of-home care for fifteen months or longer. In particular, the court highlighted Lorenzo's lack of a parental relationship with Z.C. due to his failure to meaningfully participate in virtual visits and his failure to participate in drug testing. And it found termination was in Z.C.'s best interests, noting that she was in an adoptive placement. This appeal followed.
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of Z.C.'s mother. She is not a party to this appeal.
¶4 A juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); Sandra R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, ¶ 12 (2020). We defer to the juvenile court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Accordingly, we will affirm a severance order if reasonable evidence supports the factual findings and the juvenile court's legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ¶¶ 30-31 (2023).
¶5 Lorenzo expressly identifies two issues on appeal: (1) that the preponderance standard for best interests "violate[s] due process," and (2) that the "requirement that juvenile courts consider the totality of the circumstances when determining best interests is unenforceable." He develops neither of these arguments, however, and we therefore do not address them. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, n.6 (App. 2011). For the same reason, we do not address his unsupported assertions that the best-interests standard is "unconstitutionally vague" and that "no foster parent can be genuinely as nurturing and loving" as a child's "biological father." See id.
¶6 In the remainder of his argument, Lorenzo seems to assert that DCS failed to show he was unable to effectively parent Z.C. and failed to prove it had made diligent efforts to provide reunification services, specifically drug testing and in-person visitation. See § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (termination warranted when parent "has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future"). Related to the first argument, he asserts that DCS never explained what "made the home environment unsafe for a child." He points to testimony that Z.C. did not test "positive for any substances" despite her mother's drug abuse during her pregnancy. But Lorenzo pled no contest to the dependency petition. That petition included allegations that he had an "extensive history of neglecting children, substance abuse and criminal activity" and that he had failed to protect Z.C. from her mother's substance abuse. The juvenile court's dependency finding established that Z.C. had no parent that could provide a fit home or proper parental care and control. See A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a). And the evidence shows that Lorenzo has shown no inclination to parent Z.C. during the dependency. He did not participate in hands-on parenting classes. His participation in visitation was sporadic until he stopped altogether.
Lorenzo's arguments appear focused on the time-in-care ground for termination of his rights under § 8-533(B)(8)(c) rather than termination based on chronic substance abuse under § 8-533(B)(3). However, DCS is required to provide services regardless, see Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, ¶ 12 (App. 2005), and termination on substance-abuse grounds requires proof he is unable to parent, see § 8-533(B)(3). Thus, to the extent his arguments may fairly be read to encompass both grounds, we reject them as to both grounds.
He also appears to argue that DCS did not sufficiently pursue a kinship placement for Z.C. when she was first removed from parental custody. The time to raise that issue has long passed. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 339(d)(3) (custody orders made at time of dependency disposition), 601(2)(B) (dependency disposition appealable).
¶7 Lorenzo also argues that DCS failed to diligently provide reunification services. For example, he suggests his failure to participate in drug testing was justified because of the driving distance. But his argument overlooks that he failed to participate in drug testing even after DCS located closer facilities. Similarly, he itemizes those services in which he purportedly participated. But, he does not address his failure to meaningfully participate in video visits and his lack of interest in more comprehensive parenting classes. This argument is little more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 14.
¶8 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Lorenzo's parental rights to Z.C.