Opinion
AC 45092
07-20-2022
IN RE OMAR I. et al.
Ammar I., self-represented, the appellant (respondent father). Andrei Tarutin, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner Commissioner of Children and Families). Brian T. Walsh, New Britain, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Katarzyna Maluszewski, assigned counsel, and Robert W. Lewonka, assigned counsel, for the appellees (minor children).
Ammar I., self-represented, the appellant (respondent father).
Andrei Tarutin, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Evan O'Roark, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner Commissioner of Children and Families).
Brian T. Walsh, New Britain, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Katarzyna Maluszewski, assigned counsel, and Robert W. Lewonka, assigned counsel, for the appellees (minor children).
Alvord, Prescott and DiPentima, Js.
PER CURIAM
The self-represented respondent, Ammar I., whose parental rights had been terminated in a prior
proceeding, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open and set aside the adoptions of his three minor children, Omar I., Safiyah I. and Muneer I., on the ground that he lacked standing under In re Zen T. , 165 Conn. App. 245, 252–54, 138 A.3d 469, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 905, 138 A.3d 934 (2016), cert. denied sub nom. Heather S. v. Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families , 580 U.S. 1135, 137 S. Ct. 1111, 197 L. Ed. 2d 214 (2017). On appeal, the respondent claims that he did not receive timely and proper notice of the court's July 27, 2021 ruling regarding his amended petition for a new trial so that the court incorrectly determined that he lacked standing to challenge the adoption decrees issued on August 20, 2021. We conclude that, because the court correctly determined that notice of its July 27, 2021 decision had been sent properly to the respondent the same date as its issuance, the respondent's parental rights had been adjudicated fully and fairly prior to the issuance of the adoption decrees. Thus, the court properly determined that the respondent lacked standing to challenge the adoption decrees. See In re Zen T. , supra, at 252–54, 138 A.3d 469 ; see also Practice Book § 7-5 ("[t]he clerk shall give notice, by mail or by electronic delivery , to the attorneys of record and self-represented parties" (emphasis added)).
See In re Omar I. , 197 Conn. App. 499, 504, 231 A.3d 1196, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 924, 233 A.3d 1091, cert. denied sub nom. Ammar I. v. Connecticut , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 956, 208 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020).
The three minor children, each of whom is represented by separate counsel, filed a single brief. Counsel for the Commissioner of Children and Families and counsel for Omar participated in oral argument before this court.
In light of our conclusion that he lacked standing to pursue his motion to open and set aside the adoptions, we need not address the respondent's claim that his procedural due process rights were violated by the court's failure to hold a hearing.
We further conclude, however, that the form of the court's judgment is improper. The court should have
dismissed, rather than denied, the motion to open and set aside. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court with direction to dismiss the motion to open and set aside. See State v. Tabone , 301 Conn. 708, 715, 23 A.3d 689 (2011) ("[w]hen a trial court mistakenly denies a motion instead of dismissing it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to reverse the order denying the motion and remand the case with direction to dismiss the motion").
The form of the judgment is improper; the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the motion to open and set aside the adoption decrees.