Opinion
No. 05-18-00577-CV
02-28-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF S.G.E. AND C.E., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-07604
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Nowell
Opinion by Justice Osborne
The trial court rendered a final decree of divorce between Mother and Father, the parents of minor children S.G.E. and C.E. Mother argues that the decree is inconsistent with the parties' mediated settlement agreement (the "MSA") regarding medical insurance for the children and certain home repair expenses. We conclude (1) that the decree is not consistent with the terms of the MSA regarding medical insurance for the children, and (2) Mother's complaint about home repair expenses was not raised timely. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse and render in part.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were married on July 21, 2007. Two of their children, S.G.E. and C.E., are under the age of 18. Father filed an original petition for divorce on April 12, 2017. Mother filed a counter-petition on May 1, 2017. On December 16, 2017, Mother and Father mediated their dispute and entered into the MSA. Under "Child Related Issues," the MSA provides in relevant part:
7. Health insurance for the children will be provided by [Father] at his sole expense if said policy is the same BCBS policy and coverage as currently provided by [Mother]. Otherwise, [Father] will pay [Mother] cash medical support for two children in the amount of $288.69, per month, beginning January 1, 2018. Cash medical support shall be subject to wage withholding and paid through the Texas Support Disbursement Unit. Standard health insurance provisions shall apply.
Both parties filed motions to enter a proposed decree. Mother's proposed decree provided that she would continue to maintain health insurance for the children, and that Father would pay Mother $288.69 per month in cash medical support as additional child support. Father's proposed decree, in contrast, provided that Father would "continue to maintain health insurance" for the children "that covers basic health-care services, including usual physician services, office visits, hospitalization, laboratory, X-ray, and emergency services."
The trial court signed Father's proposed decree on February 15, 2018. On March 12, 2018, Mother filed a motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment, contending that the judgment was inconsistent with the MSA's provisions on health insurance. She filed an amended motion on March 26, 2018, again complaining of the judgment's health insurance provisions, and adding a complaint that the decree was inconsistent with the MSA's provisions regarding reimbursement for home repair expenses she incurred prior to the date of the mediation.
The trial court heard Mother's motion on March 29, 2018. Mother presented evidence that the insurance coverage Father provided for the children differed significantly from Mother's policy in effect on the date of the MSA. Mother testified that at the time of the mediation, she was providing health insurance for the children. She testified to the calculations the parties made at the mediation to reach the $288.69 amount for the children's health insurance included in paragraph 7 of the MSA. Mother testified that there were "big differences" between her health insurance plan and Father's. For example, Father's annual deductible for in-network providers is $10,000; the co-pay for office visits is $35; and the maximum out-of-pocket for in-network providers is $12,000. Mother testified that in contrast, the in-network deductible for her plan is $1,500; the typical co-pay for office visits is $20; and the maximum out-of-pocket for in-network providers is $2,500, and she provided supporting documentation that was admitted into evidence. Mother testified that the differences in the policies had already caused problems in the children's medical care. She explained that because of the large deductible on Father's policy, she now pays out-of-pocket for psychiatric treatment for one of the children, in contrast to a $25 co-pay she made when the children were covered under her own policy.
The trial court denied Mother's motion, explaining that Mother was actually seeking "an enforcement," for which she would "have to first prove that [Father is] not providing a policy that's equivalent." The trial court signed an order denying Mother's motion. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In two issues, Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by rendering judgment that significantly altered the MSA's provisions on (1) health insurance and (2) reimbursement for home repair expenses. We review a trial court's judgment on a mediated settlement agreement for an abuse of discretion. R.H. v. Smith, 339 S.W.3d 756, 765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). A final judgment rendered pursuant to a mediated settlement agreement must be in strict or literal compliance with that agreement. Id. "However, a judgment will not be reversed unless it adds terms, significantly alters the original terms, or undermines the intent of the parties." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
We apply the rules of contract interpretation to the MSA. See Loya v. Loya, 526 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Tex. 2017) ("Because an MSA is a contract, we look to general contract-interpretation principles to determine its meaning."); In re C.W.W., No. 05-15-00960-CV, 2016 WL 3548036, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law we review de novo. See Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. 2015); In re C.W.W., 2016 WL 3548036, at *3.
DISCUSSION
A mediated settlement agreement meeting the family code's requirements is binding on the parties. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 6.602(b) (dissolution of marriage), 153.0071(d) (suit affecting parent-child relationship); In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). A party is "entitled to judgment" on an MSA that meets the statutory requirements "notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law." FAM. CODE §§ 6.602(c), 153.0071(e); In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447. There is no dispute that the MSA before us satisfies the requirements of family code sections 6.602(b) and 153.0071(d).
A trial court has no authority to enter a judgment that varies from the terms of a mediated settlement agreement. Garcia-Udall v. Udall, 141 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). A final judgment does not strictly comply with a settlement agreement when the trial court's judgment adds terms, significantly alters the original terms, or undermines the intent of the parties. In re M.L.R., No. 05-15-00647-CV, 2016 WL 5791530, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
1. Health insurance
The MSA provides that Father will provide health insurance for the children "if said policy is the same BCBS policy and coverage as currently provided by [Mother]. Otherwise, [Father] will pay [Mother] cash medical support for two children in the amount of $288.69, per month, beginning January 1, 2018." The trial court's judgment does not include these terms. Instead, the trial court ordered that Father "continue to maintain health insurance" for the children without reference to Mother's policy and coverage. Consequently, the trial court's judgment varied from the terms of the MSA.
Mother offered evidence, undisputed by Father, that his insurance was not "the same BCBS policy and coverage as currently provided by [Mother]." The in-network deductible, for example, is $8,500 higher under Father's policy. Father explained to the trial court that "I have a prior court order from my first divorce . . . to have insurance for my first daughter. That's why it is more convenient for me to have all three of my kids on my insurance." But Father agreed to and is bound by the MSA's requirement that his insurance must be "the same BCBS policy and coverage as currently provided by [Mother]." Father's convenience is not among the criteria included in the MSA. See Mullins v. Mullins, 202 S.W.3d 869, 877 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (unilateral withdrawal of consent does not negate enforceability of MSA); see also Cojocar v. Cojocar, No. 03-14-00422-CV, 2016 WL 3390893, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (MSA is "more binding than a basic written contract because nothing either party does will modify or void the agreement once the parties have signed it"). We conclude the trial court's judgment "significantly alters" the MSA's original terms regarding health insurance. See Smith, 339 S.W.3d at 765. We sustain Mother's first issue.
2. Home repair expenses
In her second issue, Mother argues that the MSA "expressly provided for reimbursement for repairs 'made and paid for in the home in connection with the sale of the home' which would encompass repairs made before the mediation." She argues the trial court erred by failing to award her $2,480.89 for home repairs she undertook before the mediation. The trial court denied Mother's request for the expenses, explaining that the MSA did not provide for reimbursement of expenses incurred prior to the date of the mediation.
Mother did not raise this complaint until she filed her "Amended Motion to Modify, Correct, or Reform Judgment" on March 29, 2018, more than 30 days after the final decree of divorce was rendered. Her timely original motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment complained only of the health insurance issue we have already discussed.
Under civil procedure rule 329b(b), a party may file an amended motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment without leave of court "before any preceding motion for new trial filed by the movant is overruled," but the rule also requires that the motion must be filed "within thirty days after the judgment or other order complained of is signed." TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(b). Mother's amended motion was filed 39 days after the trial court rendered the final decree of divorce. Consequently, the amended motion was not timely and Mother's complaint about the repair expenses was not preserved for appeal. Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 719-20 (Tex. 2003) (trial court's order overruling untimely motion for new trial cannot be the basis for appellate review even if trial court acts within plenary power period). We decide Mother's second issue against her.
CONCLUSION
Mother was entitled to judgment on the MSA. FAM. CODE §§ 6.602(c), 153.0071(e); In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447. We reverse the portion of the trial court's judgment ordering Father "to continue to maintain health insurance for each child who is the subject of this suit," and render judgment that (1) Mother shall maintain health insurance for each child who is the subject of this suit, and (2) Father will pay Mother cash medical support for two children in the amount of $288.69 per month as provided in the MSA. The final decree of divorce in this cause shall be modified as necessary to conform to our opinion and judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 180577F.P05
/Leslie Osborne/
LESLIE OSBORNE
JUSTICE
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 255th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-07604.
Opinion delivered by Justice Osborne; Justices Myers and Nowell, participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court's judgment ordering appellee Juan Gabriel Enriquez "to continue to maintain health insurance for each child who is the subject of this suit," and RENDER judgment that appellant Cecilia Enriquez shall maintain health insurance for each child who is the subject of this suit, and appellee Juan Gabriel Enriquez will pay appellant Cecilia Enriquez cash medical support for two children in the amount of $288.69 per month as provided in the parties' mediated settlement agreement. The final decree of divorce in this cause shall be modified as necessary to conform to this judgment. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellant Cecilia Enriquez recover her costs of this appeal from appellee Juan Gabriel Enriquez. Judgment entered this 28th day of February, 2019.