Opinion
No. 24946-8-III.
May 10, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 05-7-01595-3, Ellen K. Clark, J., entered January 13, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Sweeney, C.J., concurred in by Kulik, J., and Kato, J. Pro Tem.
Foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in preserving their relationship with a child placed in their care. The foster parents here tried to intervene in a dependency proceeding and restrain the transfer of their foster child to a private agency for adoption. The court concluded that the placement with a family selected by the birth mother was in the child's best interest and refused to restrain the placement. That exercise of discretion is well supported by this record and legislative requirements that the state honor the choices of the birth mother. We therefore affirm the court's refusal to interfere with the transfer of the child to the private agency.
FACTS
Robert and Deslene Ackerly were the foster parents of the infant, N.M. The birth mother chose a family to adopt N.M. through Spokane Consultants in Family Living.
Spokane Consultants is a private adoption agency. The birth mother talked to a representative of that agency before she gave birth to N.M. She then asked Spokane Consultants to assist with placement of the child. The birth mother chose the family. The court ordered Spokane Consultants to proceed with relinquishment, termination, and adoption proceedings. The court ordered the child placed in the temporary custody of Spokane Consultants.
The Ackerlys moved ex-parte to restrain the transfer and for permission to intervene in the dependency action. Spokane Consultants opposed the restraining order. The court concluded that the Ackerlys had not shown "irreparable harm" and refused to restrain the transfer of N.M. It did not entertain the Ackerlys' motion to intervene. The court also concluded that the birth mother had relinquished her parental rights and fostered an open relationship with the prospective adoptive parents through Spokane Consultants. The trial judge ordered N.M transferred to Spokane Consultants.
The Department of Social and Health Services (Department) moved to dismiss the dependency proceeding. Spokane Consultants had legal custody of N.M. and the child was no longer dependent. The court dismissed the dependency action.
DISCUSSION
Restraining Order
The Ackerlys' essential argument here on appeal is that they were the only family N.M. had ever known and that the court should have allowed them to prove that they had become N.M.'s psychological and "de facto" parents. And the court ignored the best interests of the child by refusing to hear their argument.
The Department responds that the court correctly concluded that the Ackerlys failed to show the irreparable harm necessary to restrain the transfer of N.M. to Spokane Consultants.
We review this trial court decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Dependency of J.S., 111 Wn. App. 796, 804, 46 P.3d 273 (2002). Foster parents do not have a right to judicial review before the state removes a foster child. In re Dependency of J.H., 117 Wn.2d 460, 471, 815 P.2d 1380 (1991). The court need only consider the best interest of the child when it places a child. RCW 13.34.020; RCW 26.33.010; RCW 26.33.240(3); J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 804. And what is in the best interest of a child turns on the circumstances and facts of each case. J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 804. The trial judge has broad discretion when deciding these placement questions. Id. And the Department must abide by the placement preferences of the birth parent when that parent relinquishes her parental rights and agrees to place her child for adoption. RCW 13.34.125.
RCW 13.34.020 — a child's health and safety is the most paramount concern.
RCW 26.33.010 — the most important factor in an adoption is to determine what is in the best interest of the child.
RCW 26.33.240(3) — the court should determine, after reviewing all the facts, that the adoption is in the best interest of the child.
Here, the judge concluded that the birth mother had relinquished her parental rights and had developed an open relationship with the prospective adoptive parents. No one questions the suitability of the adoptive parents. The court, then, concluded from this that the placement would assure that N.M. would remain in an appropriate home without further disruption. Those are tenable grounds for the judge's discretionary decision not to restrain N.M.'s transfer to Spokane Consultants. J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 804. And it is particularly appropriate given the legislative policy spelled out in RCW 13.34.125. Failure to Hear on Permissive Intervention
The Ackerlys next contend that they had the right to at least have the court consider their motion to intervene in the dependency proceeding. But the court did not permit the Ackerlys to make their case that permissive intervention was appropriate. They maintain, then, that the court failed to exercise discretion.
First, foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest to children placed in their charge. They are not, therefore, entitled to a judicial hearing before a child is removed. J.H., 117 Wn.2d at 472, 477. The failure to hold a hearing on the motion for permissive intervention did not, then, violate the Ackerlys' due process rights. Id.
Next, the court here adhered to the best interest of the child standard when it dismissed the dependency. Clerk's Papers at 197. The Ackerlys' suggestion that they would have shown something different had they been allowed to intervene in the dependency action. But that argument is not supported by the record. Yes, they were good foster parents who loved this child. But that does not support the notion that placement with legally acceptable adoptive parents, at the request of the birth mother, is not in the best interests of N.M. Again, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider the Ackerlys' petition to intervene here. See J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 804.
We affirm the trial court's refusal to restrain the placement.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Kulik, J. and Kato, J. Pro Tem.