Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Nos. J215505, J215506, & J215507 Marsha Slough, Judge.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI J.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
W.F. (Father) appeals from the termination of his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to his seven-year-old son Z.T., five-year-old daughter A.F., and three-year-old son N.F. Father contends (1) he was not provided with proper writ notice and notice of the six-month review hearing, at which the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing; (2) he was not provided with reasonable reunification services; and (3) the juvenile court prejudicially erred when it denied his counsel’s request for a continuance. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
The mother of the children, K.T. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal.
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The children came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) on May 31, 2007, based on several allegations of severe parental neglect and substance abuse by both parents. The children were described as being “very thin”; although N.F. was two years old at the time, he had the structure of a 10-month old. The family had been living a transient life, moving from motel to motel, for years. N.F. had been born drug positive, and Mother had had another baby removed from her care as well as prior CFS referrals. In fact, the family had a history with CFS dating back to 1999, based on Mother’s severe drug use and neglect. Father had an extensive criminal history involving drugs, receiving stolen property, burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, battery, and vandalism. In addition, Z.T. described to the social worker how the parents engaged in domestic violence. The children were eventually removed from parental custody on June 14, 2007, after the social worker received information that Father was being arrested for having a stolen trailer, and a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), was filed.
The detention hearing was held on June 19, 2007. Mother and Father were both present. Father was represented by Attorney Au Lang Le of the law firm of Alvarenga & Clark. The children were formally removed from parental custody and placed with relative caretakers. The parents were provided with supervised visitation and ordered to drug test. On June 29, 2007, Father filed a notification of mailing address form indicating an address in Barstow.
On June 21, 2007, the parents met with the social worker and appeared to be under the influence of drugs. A swab drug test of both parents showed positive results for methamphetamine.
On June 26, 2007, the social worker reviewed the case plan with the parents and referred them to substance abuse counseling, parent education, and general counseling. However, both parents continued to abuse methamphetamine and were terminated from their substance abuse programs for failure to appear or noncompliance.
Meanwhile, the children were placed with their paternal aunt and were doing well.
The jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on July 11, 2007, and was attended by both parents. Father was again represented by Attorney Le, and again at the time of the pretrial settlement conference. The matter was set contested on behalf of both parents, and the parents were ordered to mediation.
The mediation was held on July 19, 2007, and was attended by the social worker and Mother. Father was not present. Mother and the social worker reached an agreement.
It was later learned that Father was arrested on July 15, 2007, for attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and hit and run resulting in injury or death. The police report indicated that Father had hit another man with his truck and then fled the scene.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on August 30, 2007, and was attended by both parents. Father was represented by Attorney William Buster of Alvarenga & Clark. After Father waived his constitutional rights, the court found the allegations in the petition true as amended, and the children were declared dependents of the court. The parents were provided with reunification services and ordered to participate. The court adopted the case plan with minor amendments and added an additional finding that if the parents were convicted of a felony indicating parental unfitness, reunification services could be terminated at the next hearing. The matter was then continued; the court confirmed the next hearing date to be February 29, 2008.
Notice of the six-month review hearing was sent on February 5, 2008, to Father’s address in Barstow, the address he last provided to the court. Notice was also provided to Father’s attorney.
In a status review report filed February 21, 2008, the social worker recommended that services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. Father was served with the report by first class mail to the address listed on the report. The address listed was the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California. In September 2007, Father had pleaded no contest to assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and was sentenced to three years in state prison. Father was not scheduled to be released from prison until April 2009 and had not started parenting classes, substance abuse classes, or any other classes related to his service plan. The social worker had spoken with Father on February 15, 2008, and Father had asked to resume his telephone calls with the children. In addition, Father stated that he would like his relatives to have legal guardianship of the children and that he was opposed to adoption. The report also detailed Mother’s failure to visit the children or participate in services throughout the reporting period.
The six-month review hearing was held on February 29, 2008, and was not attended by either parent. Father was represented by Attorney Pablo Castro of Alvarenga & Clark. The matter was set contested and continued.
In an addendum report filed March 18, 2008, the social worker again recommended terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. The report indicated Father’s address as California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi, California. The report primarily focused on Mother’s continued problems with substance abuse and her failure to visit the children consistently.
The contested six-month review hearing was held on March 20, 2008, and was not attended by either parent. Attorney Michael Clark of Alvarenga & Clark represented Father. When asked if the parties were ready to proceed, Father’s counsel indicated “Yes.” Father’s counsel noted that Father was in “Jamestown” at a fire camp. The social worker’s reports were admitted into evidence without objection. The court also allowed Father’s counsel to read into evidence a letter written by Father. In the letter, Father indicated that he had done “everything possible to comply with and achieve the family reunification plan within the limits of the program and resources available during [his] incarceration.” Father also noted in the letter that he had attended a substance abuse program, “NA/AA” meetings, an “AA/NA” step study, “celebrate recovery” meetings, a parenting education program, an anger management program, and daily motivational meetings. He also claimed that he had attended Bible study and church services six days a week and that he had kept in contact with his children within the limits of his incarceration. He further reported that he was enrolled in a firefighter program and planned to enroll in a continuing care residential program once on parole. Father requested additional months of services, stated there was no objection to placement, and indicated his desire that the children remain with his “sister and brother-in-law.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that notice had been given as required by law; that both parents had failed to participate and regularly make substantive progress in the case plan; and that the extent of the parents’ progress toward alleviating the causes of removal had been minimal. The court terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On March 24, 2008, four days after the hearing, the court sent notice of Father’s writ rights to his address in Tehachapi.
The section 366.26 hearing was held on July 18, 2008, and was not attended by either parent. Father was represented by Attorney Clark of Alvarenga & Clark. The court clerk indicated that the prison had advised the court that Father was out fighting fires and would not be available for transport for at least three weeks. Father’s counsel asked for an additional three weeks and indicated he anticipated a short contested hearing. The matter was continued to August 12, 2008. The contested section 366.26 hearing was again continued to the next day after Attorney Clark informed the court that a transportation order was submitted but that Father would not arrive until the following day.
Father was present at the further contested section 366.26 hearing and was represented by Attorney Le. Attorney Le indicated she wanted to set the hearing contested, to which the court replied that the matter had already been set contested and that they were present for a contested hearing. Attorney Le then asked for a short continuance “in light of the fact that the father just provided us with some information of his completion of some certificates.” She also indicated they would be filing a section 388 petition as well. County counsel, joined by minors’ counsel, objected to a continuance, stating the original section 366.26 hearing was set a month prior, and there was no good cause shown for a continuance. The court denied Father’s request for a continuance, finding “the dad giving you documents recently, maybe even this morning, in and of itself, I don’t find is good cause.”
Thereafter, the relevant social worker’s reports were submitted into evidence. Father testified and objected to the plan of adoption. He further stated that he had maintained regular contact with his children and with his sister concerning the children’s welfare. He explained that he wanted a chance to get the children back, that he had participated in services, and that he had a bond with his children.
Following argument by counsel, the court terminated parental rights and selected adoption as the children’s permanent plan, finding the children to be adoptable. The court stated that, although it believed Father loved his children and wanted the opportunity to have them, it was inclined to go forward with the recommendation based on all the evidence.
II DISCUSSION
A. Notice Issues
Father contends we must reverse the order terminating his parental rights, although not necessarily because of anything that occurred at the termination hearing. Rather, he challenges the notices, essentially seeking to appeal the order of March 20, 2008, setting the permanency planning hearing (the setting order) and terminating reunification services. Father contends he may appeal the setting order because he received inadequate notice of the setting hearing, and service of the statutorily required writ notification was defective in that it was not sent to his known address and was not sent within 24 hours of the hearing. With respect to the merits of the rulings made at the time of the setting order, Father contends he was not provided with reasonable reunification services.
1. Failure to comply with statutory notice of writ rights
The general rule is that a parent may not appeal from an order made at a hearing where a section 366.26 hearing was set unless the parent timely files a petition for extraordinary writ review (§ 366.26, subd. (l)), and the juvenile court must advise the parent of the right to file such a petition. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.585(e), 5.600(b).) Where the juvenile court fails to advise a parent of the right to file a petition for writ relief, the parent appealing from the order terminating parental rights may challenge the predicate order setting the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722.)
Section 366.26 subdivision (l) provides, in pertinent part: “(1) An order by the court that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not appealable at any time unless all of the following apply: [¶] (A) A petition for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner. [¶] (B) The petition substantively addressed the specific issues to be challenged and supported that challenge by an adequate record. [¶] (C) The petition for extraordinary writ review was summarily denied or otherwise not decided on the merits. [¶] (2) Failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ review within the period specified by rule, to substantively address the specific issues challenged, or to support that challenge by an adequate record shall preclude subsequent review by appeal of the findings and orders made pursuant to this section. [¶] (3) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules of court, effective January 1, 1995, to ensure all of the following: [¶] (A) A trial court, after issuance of an order directing a hearing pursuant to this section be held, shall advise all parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues. This notice shall be made orally to a party if the party is present at the time of the making of the order or by first-class mail by the clerk of the court to the last known address of a party not present at the time of the making of the order.”
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise indicated.
To ensure that a parent aggrieved by a setting order is made aware it may be attacked only by petition for extraordinary writ, section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3)(A) directs the juvenile court to give notice to the parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review in order to preserve any right to appeal issues raised in the setting order. “When the [dependency] court orders a hearing under section 366.26, the court must advise orally all parties present, and by first-class mail for parties not present, that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under section 366.26, the party must seek an extraordinary writ.... [¶]... Within 24 hours of the hearing, notice by first-class mail must be provided by the clerk of the court to the last known address of any party who is not present when the court orders the hearing under section 366.26.” (Rule 5.695(f)(18); see also § 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); rules 5.585(e), 5.600(d).)
Here, it appears CFS concedes the juvenile court failed to properly comply with the statutory writ right requirements. We also agree. (See, e.g., In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 719-720.) In Cathina W., the clerk did not mail notice to the mother until four days after entry of the setting order; the notice did not indicate the correct date on which the hearing had been set; and the notice was returned to the clerk with a label indicating the mother’s new address, but no effort was made to mail the notice to the new address. (Id. at p. 723.) The writ notice here was sent four days after the hearing, and it failed to include the date on which the hearing had been set.
We do, however, reject Father’s claim that the notice was defective because it was mailed to his address in Tehachapi. Even though Father had been transferred to Jamestown, Tehachapi remained his last known address until he advised CFS or the juvenile court otherwise. Thus, notice of Father’s writ rights sent to Father at that address complied with the statute. Service to the last known address is precisely what the statute and rules require. (E.g., § 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A); rule 5.695(f)(18)(A).)
In any event, as explained subsequently, Father cannot show he was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the statutory writ requirements.
2. Waiver
Preliminarily, CFS argues that Father forfeited his present contentions by failing to raise them at the 366.26 hearing. We agree. “‘As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. Any other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1158-1159 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Even a lack of notice that would otherwise violate due process can be waived by failing to raise the issue below, so long as there has been an opportunity to do so. (In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 540; In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 209-210.)
Hence, even if we assume for the sake of argument the notices to Father were defective, “[a]n appellate court ordinarily will not consider challenges based on procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.) “A defect in notice... is a most serious issue, potentially jeopardizing the integrity of the entire judicial process. However, when a parent had the opportunity to present that issue to the juvenile court and failed to do so, appellate courts routinely refuse to exercise their limited discretion to consider the matter on appeal. This is precisely because defective notice and the consequences flowing from it may easily be corrected if promptly raised in the juvenile court. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Here, though given the opportunity to present the issues of notice and reasonableness of services at the section 366.26 hearing, Father failed to do so. In fact, Father, who was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, had drafted a letter to counsel in which he explained the services he had received and completed while in prison. This letter, which was read aloud to the court by Father’s counsel and admitted into evidence at the six-month review hearing where the setting hearing was scheduled, did not contain any information concerning his alleged lack of notice or lack of reasonable services. In addition, Father’s counsel did not contend that Father was not receiving reasonable services or that the notice of the six-month review hearing was defective. Furthermore, Father again failed to raise the issues of notice or reasonableness of services at the section 366.26 hearing on August 13, 2008, at which he was present and represented by counsel. Indeed, at the section 366.26 hearing, Father testified as to the services in which he was engaged, his contact with the children, and when he was expected to be released from prison. Neither Father nor his counsel made a mention of the alleged defective notice or the alleged failure to provide reasonable services. Essentially, Father did not attack the juvenile court’s jurisdiction on the notice grounds and reasonableness of services he now seeks to raise on appeal at any of the subsequent hearings. Father thus deprived the juvenile court of the opportunity to correct the mistake. (In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.) Accordingly, he has forfeited the notice issues and reasonableness of services on appeal.
3. Notice of setting hearing
Father argues he was not provided with reasonable notice of the six-month review hearing because CFS failed to serve him written notice of the hearing or a copy of the social worker’s report to the “correct and known” address at Sierra Conservation Center, Jamestown, California.
Even if Father had not forfeited this notice issue on appeal, his claim of inadequate notice fails. In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires parents be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend. (In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116-1118 [the failure to attempt to give a parent statutorily required notice of a permanency planning hearing is a structural defect that requires automatic reversal]; In re DeJohn B. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 100, 107-110 [agency made no attempt to notify a parent of a six-month review hearing].)
Here, Father had actual notice of the six-month review hearing, his rights with regard to the hearing, and the social worker’s recommendation. At the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, at which Father was present, the court informed both parents that the failure to visit the children and participate in services would result in termination of their services at the next hearing and a subsequent order of adoption or legal guardianship. The court further informed the parents that as at least one of the children was under three years of age, reunification services would not extend beyond the six months unless the court found a probability the children would be returned to the parents within an extended period of time. The court then indicated the six-month review hearing would be held on February 29, 2008.
Following the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, notice was sent to Father on January 31, 2008, providing Father notice of the six-month review hearing and indicating that the social worker was requesting a section 366.26 hearing be set for legal guardianship. This notice was sent to Father’s address in Barstow, the address Father last provided to the court. Notice was also sent to Father’s attorney. A second six-month notice was sent on February 5, 2008, indicating the social worker was recommending a section 366.26 guardianship. This notice was sent to Father’s Barstow address, as well as to his attorney. Both notices indicated that Father had a right to be present at the hearing, to present evidence, and to be represented by an attorney. This notices further indicated that in Father’s absence the court would proceed without him.
Subsequently, the social worker prepared and served a six-month status review report recommending termination of services. The report indicated Father’s address as Tehachapi, California, and that he had been served with the report at that address by first class mail on February 4, 2008. An addendum report was also prepared and served by the social worker, again to Father’s address in Tehachapi. Moreover, Father was informed via telephone by the social worker two weeks prior to the hearing as to the recommendation for adoption and of the upcoming hearing. Indeed, in anticipation of the hearing, Father wrote a letter to his counsel addressing his current status and the services in which he had been engaged. Based on this record, it appears Father was provided sufficient notice of the six-month review hearing and its possible consequences. Thus, there is no merit to Father’s claim he received inadequate notice of the March 20, 2008, six-month review hearing.
Father asserts the notices sent to Barstow and Tehachapi were insufficient because they were sent to the wrong address. However, the error in Father’s address was solely the fault of Father, as he had failed to uphold his statutory duty of keeping the court and the social worker informed of his mailing address.
Section 316.1, subdivision (a) provides: “Upon his or her appearance before the court, each parent or guardian shall designate for the court his or her permanent mailing address. The court shall advise each parent or guardian that the designated mailing address will be used by the court and the social services agency for notice purposes unless and until the parent or guardian notifies the court or the social services agency of a new mailing address in writing.”
Section 316.1, subdivision (a) does not relieve the social worker of the obligation imposed by section 366.21, subdivision (b) to direct notice to a parent’s last known address. Here, Father had completed a form indicating his mailing address as his address in Barstow and signed the form in June 2007. The form clearly indicates that the parent is required to provide a permanent mailing address to the court. The form further advises the parent that all documents from the court and the social worker will be sent to the address provided until the parent notifies the court or social worker of the new address in writing. After Father was sent to prison in Tehachapi, he never submitted a new form indicating his change of address. Nonetheless, the social worker was aware Father was in that facility, had spoken to Father while in prison, and had sent Father documents to that address. However, the record shows that Father had never informed the social worker that he had been transferred to Jamestown, nor had he filed a new change of address form. It was not until the contested six-month review hearing that any indication was made that Father had been transferred to Jamestown. Thus, while Father attempts to dismiss his own duty to keep the court informed of his address, it would have been impossible for the social worker to keep up with Father’s changes of addresses without Father informing the court or the social worker.
4. Prejudice
Even if we assume the notices were defective, any error was nonprejudicial. “The California Constitution prohibits a court from setting aside a judgment unless the error has resulted in a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] We have interpreted that language as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error. [Citation.] We believe it appropriate to apply the same test in dependency matters.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59-60; see also In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 624.) Father had no defense to the termination of his parental rights and does not contend now that the children were not adoptable or that any exception to termination applied. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [parental rights must be terminated if the children are adoptable unless there is a compelling reason to find termination would be detrimental to the child].) The record does not establish that Father was rehabilitated or that he could be if he received additional reunification services. It only shows that Father was able to live a structured life, free of drugs and engage in services, while in prison. Though it appears Father truly loved his children and was concerned about their well-being, the record clearly shows that adoption was in the children’s best interest. There is no possibility the result would have been more favorable to Father but for the error.
Contrary to Father’s assertions, the record clearly indicates that he received meaningful access to the courts through his appointed counsel and that he had been provided an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense at the six-month review hearing as well as the section 366.26 hearing.
B. Request for a Continuance
Father contends the trial court violated his right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair hearing when it denied his “standby” counsel’s request for a continuance in light of the fact that counsel was unprepared to proceed with the contested section 366.26 hearing. We reject these contentions.
Initially, we note that Father’s argument misstates the facts in that Father’s counsel did not request a continuance based on being unprepared. Rather, the record of the further contested section 366.26 hearing shows that counsel requested a continuance in order to file a section 388 petition. Counsel was under the mistaken belief that a contested hearing had not been set; after the court informed counsel that the hearing had already been set contested, counsel specifically stated, “Then I would ask for a short continuance in light of the fact that the father just provided us with some information of his completion of some certificates. [¶] We will be asking to do a 388 as well.” The court denied the request, finding no good cause to continue the matter, and allowed counsel to make a record for appeal. Counsel stated, “We are asking for a continuance in light of the fact that the father just provided us some certificates for services that he has recently completed.... [B]ased on that, we are asking for a continuance so that we can do a 388. [¶] We’re also asking for a further contested hearing... for the same reason. Possibly to do the 388 as well.” Contrary to Father’s claim, the record clearly shows that counsel asked for a continuance to file a section 388 petition, not because counsel was unprepared.
Additionally, Father’s characterization that counsel was a “standby counsel” is belied by the record. The attorney who requested the continuance, Attorney Le, had represented Father during prior crucial hearings and was from the same law firm appointed to represent Father from the inception of the case. In fact, Attorney Le had represented Father during the early proceedings in this case, including at the detention hearing and the pretrial conference for the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Moreover, when introducing herself to the court, Attorney Le did not indicate that she was a “standby” attorney. Attorney Le was not a standby attorney, as Father seems to claim, but was one of several attorneys from the same law firm who had provided representation for Father. Further, there is no indication either at the start of the hearing or during the hearing that Attorney Le was unprepared to proceed with the hearing.
Parties to dependency proceedings have the right to representation by competent counsel. (§ 317.5; In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 535.) “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency proceedings, a parent ‘must demonstrate both that: (1) his appointed counsel failed to act in a manner expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates; and that (2) this failure made a determinative difference in the outcome, rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair in that it is reasonably probable that but for such failure, a determination more favorable for [the parent’s] interests would have resulted.’” (In re Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98.) This test is essentially the same whether Father’s claim is grounded on the statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance. (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 812.)
Based on this record, we reject Father’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when the court denied Attorney Le’s request for a continuance. Dependency cases are required to be heard on an expedited basis. There was no evidence to suggest here that Attorney Le was unprepared or that defendant was denied a fair trial. (Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1241-1242 [juvenile dependency statutory scheme requires that petitions under section 300 be heard and decided rapidly, and continuances are discouraged].) While a trial court may not exercise its discretion over continuances so as to deprive the defendant of fundamental rights, such as the right to prepare a defense, the right to counsel, and the right to effective assistance of counsel (see People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 70; Hughes v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 (Hughes)), the court’s rulings in this case had no such effect.
Defendant’s reliance on Hughes is misplaced, as that case is readily distinguishable. In Hughes, the appellate court granted a writ of prohibition following the issuance of a contempt order imposed for an attorney’s refusal to proceed to trial after his motion for continuance was denied. (Hughes, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at pp. 3, 6.) The defense attorney had two cases set for trial on the same Monday. (Id. at p. 3.) He guessed incorrectly which trial would actually go forward, used the weekend to prepare that case, and then was denied a continuance on the other unprepared case. (Ibid.) Defense counsel claimed he could not give adequate representation in the unprepared case because there was a “‘serious psychiatric issue,’” and he had been unable to interview the psychiatrist appointed to examine the defendant. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) The Court of Appeal concluded that, under those circumstances, if counsel had obeyed the court’s order to proceed, his compliance would have denied his client a fair trial. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) In so holding, the court explained, “The trial court’s error was in finding that there was insufficient reason or excuse for petitioner’s refusal to obey the court’s order to proceed with trial. The sufficient reason was the protection of his client’s constitutional right to adequate representation at trial irrespective of the reason for inadequacy.” (Id. atp. 5.) The court further emphasized that “this is significantly different from a determination that petitioner had no sufficient reason for being unprepared.... The difference between failing without just cause to be ready for trial and failing to obey a court order to proceed to trial because counsel is unprepared is not semantic.” (Ibid.)
Here, unlike in Hughes, Attorney Le did not request a continuance because counsel was unprepared. In addition, the juvenile court here was not called upon to consider whether lack of adequate preparation by counsel constituted good cause for a continuance, or whether an unprepared attorney could be held in contempt for refusing to comply with a court order to proceed to trial. It properly determined that, within its broad discretion, the defense had not demonstrated good cause for a continuance.
Accordingly, Father was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel when the court properly denied counsel’s request for a continuance.
III DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J. McKINSTER J.