Opinion
2014-12-24
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Diane Pazar of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis Caputo, Tahirih M. Sadrieh, and Patricia E. Holian of counsel), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Diane Pazar of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis Caputo, Tahirih M. Sadrieh, and Patricia E. Holian of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Robert I. Caloras, J.), dated September 11, 2013. The order adjudicated Myron J. a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding order dated May 10, 2013, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and resisting arrest, and, after a dispositional hearing, placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for placement in a limited secure facility for a period of up to 18 months, with a minimum of 6 months.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant's challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence are unpreserved for appellate review, as he made only a general motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case at the close of the presentment agency's case ( see Matter of Jonathan F., 72 A.D.3d 963, 898 N.Y.S.2d 516; cf.CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Carncross, 14 N.Y.3d 319, 324, 901 N.Y.S.2d 112, 927 N.E.2d 532; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19, 629 N.Y.S.2d 173, 652 N.E.2d 919; People v. Hoffman, 2 A.D.3d 749, 768 N.Y.S.2d 651). In any event, viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d 1250, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122; Matter of Tanasia Elanie E., 49 A.D.3d 642, 853 N.Y.S.2d 380; Matter of Shariff A., 28 A.D.3d 546, 547, 816 N.Y.S.2d 92), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the determinations made in the fact-finding order.
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence, we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the factfinder to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Dashawn R., 120 A.D.3d 1250, 992 N.Y.S.2d 122; Matter of Briona T.G., 47 A.D.3d 811, 849 N.Y.S.2d 780; Matter of Carliph T., 26 A.D.3d 440, 808 N.Y.S.2d 909), and the Family Court's credibility determinations should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see Matter of Christopher H., 123 A.D.3d 713, 997 N.Y.S.2d 682 [2014]; Matter of Charles S., 41 A.D.3d 484, 838 N.Y.S.2d 136). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the determination of the Family Court was not against the weight of the evidence.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the factfinder was entitled to infer that the appellant's purpose in using physical force against the complainant was to retain control of the stolen property, and not merely to escape or defend himself ( see People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 645, 992 N.Y.S.2d 700, 16 N.E.3d 1178; People v. Lewis, 116 A.D.3d 791, 982 N.Y.S.2d 920; People v. Williams, 69 A.D.3d 662, 663, 892 N.Y.S.2d 478; People v. Bynum, 68 A.D.3d 1348, 890 N.Y.S.2d 217; People v. Tellis, 156 A.D.2d 260, 261, 548 N.Y.S.2d 648).
“A key element of resisting arrest is the existence of an authorized arrest, including a finding that the arrest was premised on probable cause” (People v. Jensen, 86 N.Y.2d 248, 253, 630 N.Y.S.2d 989, 654 N.E.2d 1237). “ ‘[C]onsidering all of the facts and circumstances together’ ” (People v. Shulman, 6 N.Y.3d 1, 26, 809 N.Y.S.2d 485, 843 N.E.2d 125 [emphasis in original], quoting People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451), probable cause to arrest the appellant was established here ( see People v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 113, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 666 N.E.2d 207; People v. Jackson, 105 A.D.3d 866, 867, 962 N.Y.S.2d 679; People v. Read, 74 A.D.3d 1245, 904 N.Y.S.2d 147; People v. Bryant, 199 A.D.2d 329, 604 N.Y.S.2d 603).