Opinion
No. 07-17-00455-CV
03-14-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF M.C. AND J.L., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 46th District Court Wilbarger County, Texas
Trial Court No. 27,678, Honorable Dan Mike Bird, Presiding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
"Holly," the fictitious name we will use for the biological mother of M.C. and J.L., appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights. She contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.
The rights of M.C.'s biological father were not terminated, though the Department expressed its intent to seek such termination in due course. J.L.'s father is unknown, and the Department also expressed its intent to terminate any rights of the unknown father. We will use the parties' initials or fictitious names to protect their identities. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services has used "Holly" as the alias for the mother and, for convenience, we will adopt that same alias for her.
Authority
The Texas Family Code allows a court to terminate the relationship between a parent and a child if the party seeking termination establishes (1) one or more acts or omissions enumerated under § 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination of that relationship is in the child's best interest. In re H.W., No. 07-16-00294-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12846, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 5, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2017). Both elements must be established by "clear and convincing evidence." See In re H.W., 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12846, at *4. That standard is met when the evidence of record "will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Id. at *5. In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to do that, we apply the standards described in In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112-13 (Tex. 2014), and In re K.V., No. 07-16-00188-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11091, at *6-8 (Tex. App—Amarillo Oct. 11, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). And, in applying those standards to the best-interest determination, we compare the evidentiary record to the factors itemized in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976).
Application of Authority
The trial court found that the evidence established two statutory grounds warranting termination. One involved Holly's constructive abandonment of the children when, after the Department's reasonable efforts to reunite the family, she failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the children and demonstrated an inability to provide a safe environment for the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N). The second ground concerned Holly's failure to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The findings regarding these predicate acts are not attacked on appeal. Moreover, the evidence upon which they were based may be considered in determining whether the best interests of the child warranted termination. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). That said, we turn to the record.
We begin our analysis by noting that Holly was unable to identify the father of her youngest child, J.L. When asked who he may be, she gave the Department the names of various men. Several underwent testing to determine parentage, but none have been found to be the child's father.
Furthermore, Holly had and continued to have a history of abusing methamphetamine. The Department attempted to address that in the service plan developed for her and imposed by the trial court. One aspect required that she submit to random drug testing; she refused. Another required her to attend inpatient drug treatment and comply with the ensuing recommendations; though she completed the inpatient treatment, she failed to perform the recommendations emanating from it. Another component of the service plan obligated her to submit to psychological evaluation and comply with the ensuing recommendations; she submitted but failed to comply with the recommendations.
Another aspect of the plan required her to show proof of stable employment. Though employed for a short period, she was fired after neglecting to report for work. Despite being also required to timely inform the Department of address changes, she did not. Nor did she comply with the requirement obligating her to maintain a safe and stable home for the children. Apparently, she obtained an abode for thirty days and then moved. To where she moved was and is unknown. Indeed, she ceased communicating with her children and the Department at the end of August 2017, or about three months before the termination hearing. In short, of the twelve requirements in the service plan, Holly attempted three and fully completed none.
Returning to her contact with the children, it was sporadic. Her service plan permitted her to visit the children four hours per week. She did so until the Department suspended visitation in October of 2016 because of her continued drug use. It was reinstated in June of 2017, after she passed one hair follicle test. She passed a second follicle test the following month. But, as previously mentioned, neither her children nor the Department has had contact with Holly since the end of August 2017. Nor did she appear at the final hearing to voice any concern for or interest in her children.
At the time of trial, the children resided in a non-adoptive foster home. However, plans were underway to place them with certain relatives living outside Texas. Neither set of relatives could take both children, though. Nonetheless, the relatives agreed to facilitate ongoing communication between the two children. Furthermore, the Department intended for these relatives to eventually adopt their respective ward once the parental rights of all involved (i.e., the fathers) were terminated. The oldest child indicated that he welcomed the plan intended by the Department.
The foregoing evidence leads us to conclude that the fact-finder had ample basis to form a firm conviction or belief that terminating Holly's parental rights was in the best interests of M.C. and J.L. And, frankly, little evidence appeared of record suggesting otherwise. So, irrespective of whether one peruses only those portions of the record favoring termination or the entire record, the finding has the support of both legally and factually sufficient evidence.
We overrule Holly's sole point of error and affirm the order of termination.
In parental termination cases, we are directed to render judgment "with the least possible delay." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a) (West 2014); In re L.V., No. 07-15-00315-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11607, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 9, 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (observing that such appeals "are accelerated for the purpose of providing a child with permanence and stability at the earliest possible stage of the proceeding" and citing TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a)). With that purpose in mind and "to expedite a decision" in this case, we suspend the operation of TEX. R. APP. P. 39.8, dispense with its twenty-one-day notice prior to submission, and submit the cause forthwith. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2; accord In re Z.A.S., No. 07-09-00136-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6520, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice