Opinion
06-21-00120-CV
02-15-2022
IN RE MASON-GIBSON, INC., D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS PALESTINE, TEXAS
Submitted: February 14, 2022
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter, [*] JJ. 1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Josh R. Morriss, III Chief Justice.
This original mandamus proceeding arises out of a multi-party personal-injury lawsuit that proceeded from the explosion of a compressed-air flushing device in a room then occupied by Christopher Jaynes at the Holiday Inn Express Hotel in Palestine, Texas. Jaynes filed suit in the 4th Judicial District Court of Rusk County, asserting claims against seven defendants, among which were Mason-Gibson, Inc., d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Palestine, Texas (Mason-Gibson) and Sloan Valve Company (Sloan) for injuries he received from being struck in the head by a piece of an exploding toilet's porcelain tank lid. During the lawsuit, and while the claims among the various other parties remained unresolved, Sloan filed a motion for summary judgment based on the fifteen-year statute of repose. On April 5, 2021, the trial court granted Sloan's motion for summary judgment. The trial court's resulting order, which reads as follows, stands at the center of this mandamus action:
Sloan manufactures a pressurized system for flushing toilets called Flushmate. Jaynes claims that defects in that system can result in toilet tank explosions.
On this day came on to be heard Sloan Valve Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having considered the Motion, finds that the Motion is well taken and should be GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all claims asserted against Sloan Valve Company by all parties are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice to re-filing.
This judgment disposes of all claims and parties and is final and appealable. All costs and fees shall be borne by the party incurring same.(Emphasis added.) On May 5, 2021, Mason-Gibson timely filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that it had cross-acted against Sloan in products liability in addition to alleging separate acts of post-sale negligence. Mason-Gibson complained that Sloan's motion for summary 2 judgment did not negate or even address any of the allegations directed at Sloan's alleged post-sale negligence. It therefore contended that any global order dismissing all claims against Sloan under the statute of repose was error and prayed that the court would grant a new trial and/or vacate any order purporting to grant complete relief in favor of Sloan.
On July 13, 2021, within its plenary jurisdiction, the trial court entered an order purportedly denying Mason-Gibson's motion for new trial. An image of that order follows:
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MASON-GIBSON, INC.'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
On this day came on for consideration Defendant Mason-Gib son's Motion for New Trial. The Court, having considered the Motion and the pleadings on tile, is of the opinion that the Motion should be Denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, Chat the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Sloan Valve Company rendered on April 5, 2021, is set aside and withdrawn, and a new trial is Denied.
On August 24, 2021, Mason-Gibson filed a motion seeking clarification of the April 5, 2021, summary judgment order and a motion to sever the summary judgment ruling. In its motion, Mason-Gibson argued that Jaynes's claims against the remaining defendants and Mason-Gibson's claims against a co-defendant were not the subject of Sloan's motion for summary judgment. It claimed that the summary judgment was merely interlocutory and was not final and appealable. On September 15, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Mason-Gibson's motion for 3 clarification and motion to sever, at which the counsel for Mason-Gibson strenuously argued that the April 5, 2021, order was interlocutory and was not final and appealable. Following the hearing, Mason-Gibson wrote a letter to the trial court dated September 15, 2021, formally withdrawing its motion for clarification and motion to sever. In its letter, Mason-Gibson reversed course and took the position that the April 5, 2021, order was final and appealable.
On September 20, 2021, Jaynes filed a motion to compel and a motion for sanctions against Mason-Gibson, alleging that Mason-Gibson had informed the parties that it would not produce witnesses for pre-scheduled depositions because the entire case had been dismissed when the trial court entered its April 5, 2021, order. On September 30, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Jaynes's motion to compel and motion for sanctions. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court announced that "the prior order which granted Sloan Valve Company's motion for summary judgment finally disposed of all claims against Sloan Valve Company only." The trial court granted Jaynes's motion to compel and sanctioned Mason-Gibson.
On October 7, 2021, the trial court entered an order captioned, "Clarifying Order on Defendant, Sloan Valve Company's Motion for Summary Judgment," which provided:
On April 5, 2021, the Court considered Defendant Sloan Valve Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having considered the Motion, finds that the Motion is well taken and should be GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all claims asserted against Sloan Valve Company by all parties are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice to re-filing. The judgment disposes of all claims against Sloan Valve Company by all parties and is final and appealable. All other claims asserted against the remaining Defendants are not affected by this Order.
The court thereafter entered a written order on Jaynes's motion to compel and motion for sanctions and a written order severing the summary judgment order. 4
In the meantime, on October 1, 2021, Mason-Gibson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, asking this Court to order the trial court to "vacate the void post-plenary power rulings, and instruct the trial court to close the case." On October 4, 2021, this Court issued its opinion denying mandamus relief because the record was not properly sworn. On that same date, Mason-Gibson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus-virtually identical to the one filed in this Court-asking the Texas Supreme Court to "vacate the void post-plenary power rulings [of the trial court] and instruct the trial court to close the case." On October 6, 2021, the Supreme Court denied Mason-Gibson's petition for a writ of mandamus and the emergency motion for a stay that it likewise filed in that court. On October 20, 2021, Mason-Gibson filed a motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied that motion on December 3, 2021. On December 23, 2021, Mason-Gibson filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, seeking the same relief that it sought in the Supreme Court.
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and to be entitled to such relief, a petitioner must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the petitioner has no adequate remedy by appeal." In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2019, orig. proceeding) (citing In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)). "Mandamus relief is proper when the trial court issues a void order, and, in that circumstance, the relator need not demonstrate the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal." In re Thompson, 569 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Tex. App-Houston [lstDist] 2018, orig. proceeding).
"A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law." In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. 5 proceeding) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). "It is [a relator's] burden to show entitlement to the requested relief." In re Coats, 580 S.W.3d at 435. "[The relator] must therefore show that [it] seeks to compel a ministerial act not involving a discretionary or judicial decision." Id.
Mason-Gibson contends that, because the trial court's April 5, 2021, summary judgment order contained finality language under Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), it was a final judgment that not only disposed of all claims asserted against Sloan by all parties, but also disposed of all the claims in the case, including Jaynes's claims against all remaining defendants, including Mason-Gibson. Mason-Gibson reasons that the trial court's plenary jurisdiction expired after July 19, 2021, thirty days after its motion for a new trial was overruled by operation of law. It, therefore, contends that the following trial court orders issued on October 7, 2021, were void: (1) clarifying order on Sloan Valve Company's motion for summary judgment; (2) order on plaintiffs motion to compel and motion for sanctions; and (3) order severing summary judgment ruling. Mason-Gibson asks that we order the trial court to vacate those orders and to close its file.
Jaynes brings to our attention the fact that Mason-Gibson filed the same mandamus petition requesting the same relief in the Texas Supreme Court before seeking relief on the merits of its petition in this Court. He contends that, because the merits of the petition have been presented to, and denied by, the Supreme Court, this Court should deny the petition. We do not conclude, though, that the Supreme Court denied Mason-Gibson's petition on the merits. See In 6 re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ("[T]his Court's failure to grant a petition for writ of mandamus is not an adjudication of, nor even a comment on, the merits of a case in any respect, including whether mandamus relief was available.").
"Generally, a party must seek relief in the court of appeals before seeking [relief] in [the Supreme Court]." In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. App. P. 52.3(e); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 94 (Tex. 1997)). We express no opinion on whether an appellate court must address the merits of the petition before mandamus relief can be sought in the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, we do not condone Mason-Gibson's failure to apprise this Court of the complete history of its journey seeking mandamus relief. Indeed, a similar failure by another relator resulted in the conclusion that the failure of counsel to inform the appellate court that another mandamus action had been filed in and denied by the Supreme Court required overruling a motion for rehearing and a denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus. See Lowe v. Hollern, 784 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. App-Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding). In Lowe, the relator filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the appellate court, which was denied. The relator then filed a motion for leave to file the petition with the Supreme Court, which was also denied. The relator then filed a motion for rehearing in the court of appeals. After the court of appeals set the motion for rehearing for argument, it learned of the filing in the supreme court. Our sister court determined that the Supreme Court filing was a relevant fact, and because the motion for rehearing did not set forth this fact, the order granting the motion for leave was vacated as improvidently granted. Id. We need not, however, deny Mason-Gibson's petition for a writ of mandamus on the basis of Rule 52.3(g). 7
After fully examining the petition for a writ of mandamus, the response, the reply, the complete mandamus record, and the applicable law, we conclude that Mason-Gibson has not shown itself entitled to the relief sought and therefore deny the petition. 8 [*]Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment