Opinion
No. 5-815 / 05-0807
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Michael J. Moon, Judge.
Leonard Youngblut appeals a modification ruling requiring continued payment of child support for an adult child. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Christy R. Liss of Clark, Butler, Walsh Hamann, Waterloo, for appellant.
Sharon Soorholtz Greer of Cartwright, Druker Ryden, Marshalltown, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Leonard Youngblut sought a declaratory judgment extinguishing his obligation to pay child support for an adult child. The district court construed his divorce decree as requiring the continued payment of such support. The court also modified certain other aspects of the decree. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Leonard and Jolene Youngblut divorced after twenty-one years of marriage. Pursuant to a stipulated decree, Jolene assumed physical care of the parties' two children and Leonard agreed to pay monthly child support of $596.
The older child, Peter, turned eighteen in October 2003 and completed his high school graduation requirements in January 2004. In February 2004, Leonard independently calculated his child support obligation for one child, and reduced his monthly payments to Jolene from $596 to $328.
Meanwhile, the younger child, Lucas, moved in with Leonard. Leonard applied to modify the decree to reflect this move. He also sought a declaratory judgment that the reduced amount of support he had been paying since February 2004 was the appropriate amount.
The precise date of this move is disputed, with Leonard contending he moved in with him in June 2004 and Jolene contending the move took place in August 2004.
Following a hearing, the district court ruled that the dissolution decree required Leonard to pay $596 in child support until the younger child, Lucas, reached eighteen, graduated from high school, or otherwise became self-supporting. In light of Lucas's move to his father's house, the court also set a child support obligation for Jolene. After offsetting Jolene's obligation against Leonard's past due obligation, the court entered judgment against Leonard for $1,792.12.
The past-due obligation was calculated by taking the difference between what the court said Leonard owed ($596) and the amount he paid beginning in February 2004 ($328).
The court made two additional modifications: the tax dependency exemption was re-assigned to Jolene, and Leonard was held responsible for the first $250 in uninsured health-related expenses as well as seventy-one percent of the expenses after that. Leonard appealed.
In the original decree, the parties were ordered to pay equal shares of the unreimbursed health expenses.
On appeal, Leonard takes issue with the district court's (1) refusal to reduce his child support obligation, (2) reallocation of the tax dependency exemption, and (3) reallocation of the parties' responsibility for uninsured medical expenses. Our review of these issues is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
II. Child Support
The dissolution decree prescribed child support as follows:
The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner through the Office of the Clerk of Court, Tama County, Iowa, the sum of $596.00 per month for child support, commencing on the first of the month following entry of this Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, and continuing every month thereafter until the minor children reach the age of eighteen (18) years of age or graduate from high school, whichever occurs last, or becomes married, self-supporting, or deceased which condition shall first occur.
The district court construed this provision to require the payment of child support "at the rate of $596 per month until Lucas reached the age of 18 or graduated from high school or otherwise became self-supporting." The court noted that "there was no provision for reduction in support after Peter reached 18 and graduated from high school."
Preliminarily, we must decide whether a challenge to this aspect of the court's ruling triggers the modification standards of Iowa Code section 598.21(8) (2003). Those standards require a showing of a substantial change of circumstances and restrict the retroactive application of a child support modification ruling.
Decrees, like other judgments, are subject to interpretation and construction. Williams v. Bourne, 248 Iowa 189, 193, 79 N.W.2d 751, 754 (1956); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 534, at 91 (1997). They "will not be given construction such as to result in a positive wrong — evidently not within contemplation — whenever such result is possible to be avoided." McCullough v. McConnelly, 137 Iowa 682, 688, 114 N.W. 301, 303 (1907).
We believe Leonard's application for declaratory judgment seeks the interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the dissolution decree rather than a modification of that provision. As Leonard points out, the decree does not state that $596 is due until the "youngest child" meets the specified criteria. It states the amount is due until the "minor children" meet those criteria. In addition, the last sentence of the cited language uses a singular form of the verb "becomes" rather than the plural form that would be consistent with the noun "children" used in the previous sentence, strengthening our view that the provision is ambiguous. For these reasons, Leonard was correct in seeking a declaration of the provision's meaning as opposed to a modification of its terms. See In re Marriage of Bisenius, 573 N.W.2d 258, 261 (Iowa 1998) (stating "conditions of a support award for children age 18 or over are self-executing"). Cf. In re Marriage of Kupferschmidt, 705 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa Ct.App. 2005). (suggesting modification standard applied but stating "[c]learly when a child support award is based on two qualifying children and one no longer qualifies, there has been a substantial change in circumstances").
Turning to the contested provision, we agree with Leonard that it cannot be read to require the payment of child support for two children after one of the children reachs eighteen and completes his high school graduation requirements. Iowa Code section 598.1(6) defines a minor child as "any person under legal age." As of October 2003, Peter was not a "minor child." Jolene was not entitled to support on his behalf unless he was engaged full-time in completing high school graduation or equivalency requirements or was dependent on his parents because of a physical or mental disability. Iowa Code § 598.1(9). Peter completed his high school graduation requirements in January 2004 and there is no evidence he suffered from a disability that rendered him dependent on his parents. To the contrary, the record reflects he earned approximately $15,000 in 2004. As the statutory definition of "minor child" was not satisfied and the statutory grounds for payment of adult support did not exist, Leonard was entitled to a reduction of his support obligation after January 2004.
Moreover, as noted, that reduction was self-executing. Bisenius, 573 N.W.2d at 261. Because the modification standards did not apply to his declaratory judgment action, Leonard was not restricted from obtaining retroactive relief. See Iowa Code § 598.21(8) (stating judgments for child support "may be retroactively modified only from three months after the date the notice of the pending petition for modification is served on the opposing party"). Although he filed his action in September 2004, he was entitled to reduce his child support payments as of February 2004, the month after Peter satisfied his high school graduation requirements.
As for the amount of the reduction, Jolene does not dispute that $328 per month, the figure calculated by Leonard for one child, was accurate.
Leonard continued to pay this sum to Jolene even after his younger son, Lucas, moved in with him. He appears to concede that the modification standards, including the limitation on retroactive reduction of child support applied to his application to discontinue this reduced support payment. Accordingly, he does not take issue with the court's termination of his obligation as of January 2005 rather than the date Lucas moved in with him.
We conclude Leonard's obligation to pay child support for his older son, Peter, expired in January 2004. Therefore, we reverse the district court's imposition of a judgment for arrears against Leonard.
III. Tax Dependency Exemption
Leonard argues the district court should not have sua sponte reallocated the tax dependency exemption for Lucas to Jolene. We disagree with Leonard that the district court lacked the authority to revisit the dependency exemption issue but agree with him that the exemption should not have been reassigned.
Tax dependency exemptions are directly related to child support, and, accordingly, were a proper subject of the proceeding. See In re Marriage of Feustel, 467 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1991). On the merits, "[t]he `general rule' is that the parent given primary physical care of the child is entitled to claim the child as a tax exemption." In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 269 (Iowa 2005). See also Iowa Ct. R. 9.6(4) ("The custodial parent shall be assigned one additional dependent exemption for each mutual child of the parents, unless a parent provides information that the noncustodial parent has been allocated the dependent exemption for such child."). However, the Iowa supreme court has recognized that a noncustodial parent may be awarded the dependency exemption to achieve equity. Id.
Here, the dissolution decree awarded Leonard the dependency exemption for Lucas, even though he was the noncustodial parent. By the time of the hearing on his modification and declaratory judgment application, he had become Lucas's custodial parent. At this hearing, Jolene presented no evidence to support her claim for an award of the exemption. Pursuant to the general rule, we conclude Leonard should have been allowed to retain the tax dependency exemption.
IV. Uninsured Health Expenses
Leonard also argues that the district court acted inequitably in sua sponte considering the issue of uninsured health expenses. We disagree. See Okland, 699 N.W.2d at 267 (noting child support comprised of medical support in addition to traditional support).
On the merits of this issue, our child support rules provide that "[t]he custodial parent shall pay the first $250 per year per child of uncovered medical expenses up to a maximum of $500 per year for all children." Iowa Ct. R. 9.12 (2005). The district court held Leonard responsible for these expenses. The court's disposition is consistent with the cited court rule.
As for uncovered medical expenses above $250, the court apportioned those expenses based on the parties' respective net incomes. This also is consistent with the rule's prescription. See Iowa Ct. R. 9.12.
V. Appellate Attorney Fees
Both parties request appellate attorney fees. Such an award rests within our discretion. In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Although Jolene's income was substantially less than Leonard's, she did not prevail on the primary issue before us. Therefore, we conclude she is not entitled to appellate attorney fees. As for Leonard's request, we conclude he is able to pay his own fees.
VI. Disposition
We affirm the district court's modification of the unreimbursed health expense provisions. We reverse the district court's reallocation of the tax dependency exemption for Lucas from Leonard to Jolene. We also reverse the court's disposition of Leonard's declaratory judgment application. We remand for a dismissal of the judgment for child support arrears against Leonard and for the recalculation of Jolene's child support arrears without an offset.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellee.